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ABSTRACT AND KEYWORDS 
This thesis examines Canadian provincial and territorial personal data protection 
legislation as it relates to electronic health records (“EHRs”). The research categorizes 
Canadian jurisdictions’ approaches to EHR regulation and three models are identified. 
Using five criteria, the patient experience when interacting with each of the three models 
and a combination of the models is described, analyzed and reconciled. A fictional 
patient scenario is used as a tool to analyze patient interaction with the Canadian 
jurisdictions and the models. It is shown that, although Canadian jurisdictions use one of 
three separate modes of incorporating EHR-specific rules into legislation, the outcome of 
this variation is not entirely disparate, in terms of (a) the way EHRs are defined, and (b) 
the ways in which (i) consent to collection, (ii) limited use, (iii) security safeguards and 
(iv) patient participation are addressed.  
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CHAPTER 1: THE EHR AND THE CANADIAN PATIENT 
1) INTRODUCTION 
a) The Fictional Patient and Overview of Research Area 
Joe1 lives in a city located on the provincial border between Alberta and 
Saskatchewan. Joe frequently receives health care in both provinces, as nearby urban 
centres offer different health services. Joe decides which jurisdiction to visit based on his 
health needs. Each time he visits a health care provider in either Alberta or 
Saskatchewan, health care providers access and update Joe’s electronic health record 
(EHR). Generally speaking, an EHR is a digitized longitudinal collection of Joe’s 
medical information. Health care providers access Joe’s EHR to obtain the most 
comprehensive picture of Joe’s medical history to accurately and safely diagnose his 
illnesses, prescribe treatments and provide care. 
  Joe’s family physician recently informed Joe he has a rare cancer requiring 
immediate treatment. Joe’s physician described in detail the treatment courses available 
to Joe; one treatment involves a therapy only available in British Columbia.  After 
listening to his physician’s suggestions and considering his options, Joe pursues 
treatment in British Columbia.  
Joe travels to British Columbia once monthly to undergo treatment. Prior to his 
cancer treatments, Joe’s British Columbia physician accesses and reviews Joe’s EHR to 
ensure she is providing care that will not detrimentally affect Joe. She updates Joe’s EHR 
so Joe’s Alberta and Saskatchewan health care providers can access and use his most up 
to date medical history. 
  Within six months, Joe’s cancer enters remission. Consequently, Joe happily 
attends his daughter’s wedding in Prince Edward Island (PEI). Unfortunately, on his last 
day in PEI, Joe falls on a slippery section of shoreline.  Joe’s emergency room physician 
electronically retrieves Joe’s EHR to obtain Joe’s full medical history and medication list 
to properly treat Joe. Joe then flies home. 
 
Personal information is valuable, and its value is increasing. Individuals who are 
the source of personal information value control over their personal details because the 
details make an individual unique. Users of personal information also derive value from 
personal details through monetary gain or enhanced knowledge or both. Personal health 
                                                 
1 Joe is a fictional individual. This document does not constitute legal advice. 
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information is a particularly sensitive type of information; it contains individuals’ most 
intimate details, including information about health conditions that may be stigmatized 
within Canadian society. The Supreme Court of Canada has described such details as an 
individual’s “biographical core of personal information”.2  
The tremendous value of personal health information is particularly evident when 
patients interact with health care providers.3 Each day thousands of patients share 
personal health information with health care providers to obtain diagnoses, care and 
treatments. Such personal health information may then be collected, disclosed or stored 
by other health care providers to create a patient’s health history and inform future 
treatment.  
Patients may also interact and share valuable personal health information with 
health care providers in multiple Canadian jurisdictions; many individuals travel, study or 
require treatment in different jurisdictions and others may live in border or rural 
communities in which health care is provided in the adjacent province or territory. 
Patients requiring care in multiple jurisdictions can be referred to as the “trans-
jurisdictional” patient. The trans-jurisdictional patient is best explained through the above 
story about the fictional patient, Joe. 
                                                 
2 R v Plant, [1993] 3 SCR 281 at 293 as cited in R Gary Dickson, “Welcome to the Brave New World of 
Electronic Health Records” (Paper, delivered at the Saskatchewan CBA Mid-Winter Conference, 4 
February 2011) [unpublished] at 2, online: Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner 
<http://www.oipc.sk.ca/Presentations/CBA%20Mid-Winter%20Conference%202011.pdf>. 
3 For the purposes of this study, the term “health care provider” is used to refer generally to individuals 
providing care or treatment or interacting in some fashion with patients in a health care setting and collects, 
uses or discloses a patients’ personal health information. As each of the jurisdictions refer differently to this 
type of individual, for example, as a trustee or custodian, “health care provider” will be used intermittently 
for simplicity sake in place of these terms to describe the patient experience in each jurisdiction. 
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As was highlighted in Joe’s story, Canadian provinces are currently converting 
records containing personal health information into electronic form.4 One type of 
digitized health information is the EHR referred to in Joe’s situation above. One author 
defined the EHR as “an electronic record that contains personal information collected 
over a period of time (an individual’s life) that can be accessed by a health professional.”5 
However, EHR definitions differ between EHR-related Canadian statutes and also vary 
within the literature. As many academics, organizations and governments have each 
defined the EHR, the result is that it has no accepted description in Canada. Thus, the 
contents of an EHR can theoretically vary between provinces and territories. 
EHRs are to be distinguished from personal health records (“PHRs”), which are 
maintained and controlled by the patient, and electronic medical records (“EMRs”), 
which function like a physician’s chart.6 It is clear the EHR addressed in personal data 
protection legislation is distinct from the PHR because the EHR is a record of which an 
institution has custody.7 A patient does not have custody of his or her EHR. 
                                                 
4 The provinces are at different stages in converting medical records to electronic form. Pan-Canadian 
Health Information Privacy Group, Privacy and EHR Information Flows in Canada: Common 
understandings of the Pan-Canadian Health Information Privacy Group, (Toronto: Canada Health 
Infoway, 2010) at 5 [Pan-Canadian HIP]. 
5 Dara Lambie, “Canadian personal data protection legislation and electronic health records: transfers of 
personal health information in IT outsourcing agreements” (2010) 8 Can JL & Tech 85 at 86.  
6 Michelle Erin Gordon, A Framework for the Protection of Privacy in an Electronic Health Environment 
(LLM, University of Toronto, 2010) [unpublished] at 12. It should be noted that at the time of writing this 
thesis, there was one other Master of Laws thesis pertaining to EHR regulation, which is not cited to any 
extent in this thesis as it did not add to the theoretical framework of this study. Marie Nicole Pauline 
Florent, Developing a Legal Framework to Ensure the Confidentiality of the Electronic Health Record 
(LLM, Queen’s University, 2006) [unpublished]. 
7 See James Williams & Jens H Weber-Jahnke, “The Regulation of Personal Health Record Systems in 
Canada” (2010) 8:2 CJLT 241 [Williams &Weber-Jahnke, “Regulation of PHRs”] for a discussion of the 
regulatory regime that applies to PHRs. The statutory definitions of EHR are institution-centred (see pages 
99, 112 and 126 infra for statutory definitions of EHR in Ontario, Alberta and New Brunswick) and there is 
no ability for a patient to add a record to his or her EHR, in that patients cannot add another record to their 
EHRs as of right. Patients are simply afforded the ability to request corrections be made to their EHRs, as 
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Canadian provinces and territories, through the help of not-for-profit corporations 
and various provincial entities8, are attempting to create pan-provincial and territorial 
EHR networks. The provinces and territories are each at different stages in converting 
medical records to electronic form.9  
Canada Health Infoway is one of the not-for-profit corporations working with 
each of Canada’s provinces and territories to enhance EHR development across Canada.10 
It was Canada Health Infoway’s goal to introduce EHRs to half of the Canadian 
population by 2010.11 Even though there is yet no accepted definition of EHR, academics 
have indicated that Canada’s ultimate goal is to create a nationwide EHR system.12  
It is predicted that once EHRs are fully implemented, patients and healthcare 
providers will realize many benefits, including increased healthcare system efficiency, 
enhanced record portability, and reduction in physician error. While EHRs are potentially 
beneficial, the public may experience harm as a result of this new technology. Hackers 
and interested but unauthorized third parties can all wreak havoc on personal data 
protection if EHRs are nefariously accessed.  
                                                 
will be discussed later in this thesis. Patients’ ability to add another record to their medical information is a 
policy area ripe with debate but is not dealt with in and is outside the scope of this thesis.  
8 Such as eHealth Ontario. Online: eHealth Ontario <http://www.ehealthontario.on.ca/>. 
9 Pan-Canadian HIP, supra note 4 at 7. 
10 Canada Health Infoway, online: About Canada Health Infoway <https://www.infoway-inforoute.ca/lang-
en/about-infoway>. 
11 Ann Cavoukian & Peter G Rossos, “Personal Health Information: A Practical tool for Physicians 
Transitioning from Paper-Based Records to Electronic Health Records” (Information and Privacy 
Commissioner of Ontario, 2009) at 3. 
12 Nola M Ries, “Patient Privacy in a Wired (and Wireless) World: Approaches to Consent in the Context 
of Electronic Health Records” (2005-2006) 43 Alta L Rev 681 at 683; Anthony A Morris, “The electronic 
health record in Canada: the first steps” (2005) 14:2 Health L Rev 14 at 18; Patricia Kosseim & Megan 
Brady, “Policy by Procrastination: Secondary Use of Electronic Health Records for Health Research 
Purposes” (2008) 2 McGill JL & Health 5 at 6 & 7. 
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A loss of patient autonomy13 and information control also occurs when the 
decision whether or not to use their health information in a certain way is taken out of 
patients’ hands. EHRs can threaten autonomy if proper protections are not put in 
legislation to prevent personal health data from being used in secondary ways in public 
health research or by curious entities, such as insurance companies. Even in respect of 
privacy uses, any inability for the patient to control the way with which the patient’s 
personal health information is dealt from EHRs means EHRs may be paternalistic. With 
EHRs, there is a possibility health care providers will decide the way with which health 
information is dealt, which removes patient choice. 
Legal scholars have begun to analyze the issues surrounding personal health 
information digitization. A central issue in this debate focuses on the way EHRs will 
impact the protection of personal health information. However, it has been said that 
legislators are currently struggling to effectively regulate EHRs.14 At this time, Ontario, 
Alberta, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Saskatchewan, 
have enacted personal data protection legislation that specifically addresses health 
information, and to varying degrees, EHRs.15 These statutes16 apply to specific “public 
and private bodies”.17 Quebec and British Columbia, on the other hand, have enacted the 
                                                 
13 For an extensive discussion of how privacy protections of personal health information contained in EHRs 
affect personal autonomy see Gordon, supra note 6. 
14 David Young, “Security of electronic health records: does current legislation adequately protect?” (2008) 
5 Can Privacy L Rev 129 at 132. 
15 Colonel Me Michel W Drapeau & Me Marc-Aurele Racicot, eds, Protection of Privacy in the Canadian 
Private and Health Sectors 2011 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada Limited, 2010) at x.  
16 Personal Health Information Protection Act, RSO 2004, c 3 [PHIPA]; Health Information Act, RSA 
2000 c H5 [HIA]; Personal Health Information Privacy and Access Act, SNB 2009, c P-7.05 [PHIPAA]; 
Personal Health Information Act, CCSM, c P33.5 [PHIA]; Personal Health Information Act, SNL 2008, c 
P-7.01 [PHIA Newfoundland]; Health Information Protection Act, SS 1999, c H-0.02 [HIPA]. 
17 Lambie, supra note 5 at 88. 
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Conditions governing the implementation of the second phase of the experimental 
Quebec Health Record project18 (the “Conditions”) and the E-Health (Personal Health 
Information Access and Protection of Privacy) Act19 (“E-Health Act”), respectively, 
which specifically deal with EHRs.20  
The federal government’s more general Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act21 (“PIPEDA”) may also apply in private healthcare contexts 
unless a province or territory has had its relevant legislation deemed substantially similar 
to PIPEDA by the federal government and, in any event, PIPEDA will apply to cross-
border transfers of health information.22 Moreover, there are additional provincial and 
territorial personal data protection statutes, which may apply to public sector activity.23 
                                                 
18 Of the Act respecting health services and social services, OC 757-2009 and OC 566-2010 [Conditions]. 
19 SBC 2008, c 38 [E-Health Act]. 
20 See for instance ibid, s 3 regarding “health information banks”. 
21 SC 2000, c 5 [PIPEDA]. The Electronic Commerce Branch of the Government of Canada described the 
deeming mechanism as follows: 
To begin the process, a province/territory or an organization, e.g., a credit reporting agency, 
can advise the Minister of Industry of the existence of provincial/territorial legislation (either 
in force or to come into force at a future date), which they believe is substantially similar to 
the federal law. In the case of an organization providing such notification, the Minister of 
Industry will write to the Minister responsible for the relevant provincial/territorial legislation 
in order to seek that Minister's views. The Minister of Industry may also act on his/her own 
initiative to recommend to the Governor in Council, following consultation with the 
province(s) or territory(ies) involved, to designate provincial\territorial private sector privacy 
legislation as substantially similar. 
Government of Canada, online: Canada Gazette < http://gazette.gc.ca/archives/p1/2002/2002-08-
03/html/notice-avis-eng.html#i10>.  
22 The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada’s Governor in Council has declared that British 
Columbia’s Personal Information Protection Act, SBC 2003, c 63 [PIPA] and Alberta’s Personal 
Information Protection Act, SA 2003, c P-6.5 [ALTA PIPA] are substantially similar to PIPEDA; however, 
these statutes do not deal specifically with health information. So, Ontario’s PHIPA is the only province to 
have a health-specific personal data protection statute as it relates to “health information custodians” to be 
declared substantially similar to PIPEDA. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, online: 
Substantially Similar Legislation – Legal Information Related to PIPEDA 
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/legislation/ss_index_e.cfm#contenttop>. 
23 Lambie, supra note 5 at 88. For example, in British Columbia, the Freedom of Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 165 [BC FIPPA] may apply in certain circumstances. 
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Canada’s piecemeal EHR regulation appears deficient in light of Canada’s goal to 
create a “pan-Canadian”24, interoperable EHR system.25 Interoperability has been defined 
as “[t]he ability of separate systems to exchange information”.26 According to one author, 
it is a main feature of e-Health systems.27 The legal implication of interoperability is that 
a harmonized legislative scheme should be in place to ensure consistent personal health 
information protection across Canada.  
This research study examines provincial and territorial legislation relating to EHR 
regulation and categorizes Canadian jurisdictions’ approaches to EHR regulation. Three 
models are identified. The patient experience when interacting with each of the three 
models and a combination of the models is described, analyzed and reconciled through 
analysis of the patient vignette presented above. The fictional patient named Joe is used 
as a tool to analyze patient interaction with the Canadian jurisdictions. The aim of this 
study is to find out what the patient experience tells us about EHR legislation 
harmonization to determine whether provincial and territorial legislation should be 
harmonized and if the statutes need to be made consistent. This study is intended to 
establish whether unification is the preferred approach to EHR regulation.  
b) Context & Purpose 
In Canada, there is a demographic phenomenon situating the issues explored in 
this study. Canada’s population is aging and, thus, more Canadians require health care. 
                                                 
24 Williams &Weber-Jahnke, “Regulation of PHRs”, supra note 7 at 241. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Jill Scott, “The Impact of the E-Health (Personal Health Information Access and Protection of Privacy) 
Act” (2010) 23 CJALP 55 at 58. 
27 Ibid. 
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This creates more health records. Concurrently, personal health records are being 
converted to electronic form. As a consequence of these two developments, there is 
increasing discussion about the protection of electronic patient information.28  
There are also societal contexts within which this study is situated. The EHR 
discussion is underscored by the fundamental conflict between the protection of personal 
health information and its use for societal benefit.29 This thesis is not concerned with this 
fundamental conflict but will contribute to debate about the conflict by exploring 
patients’ experience with personal data protection relating to EHRs. Record digitization 
may change patients’ experiences with the law, as patients may be more frequently 
compelled to exercise rights under personal data protection legislation to have 
information withheld. However, this might make it more difficult for various entities to 
compile and use patients’ personal health information for endeavors that traditionally 
benefitted society, such as medical research and public health surveillance.  
Patients are also increasingly mobile because of the ease with which individuals 
travel via airplane. Personal travel, whether for pleasure, business or study has increased. 
Consequently, individuals’ are more likely to interact with multiple health systems across 
Canada’s jurisdictions. The trans-juridictional patient is, therefore, a realistic portrayal of 
the way that many patients may experience the EHR once it interconnects throughout 
Canada. 
                                                 
28 John Miner, “‘Obviously, I had to resign’”, The London Free Press (26 November 2010) A1. 
29 Wilhelm Peekhaus, “Personal Medical Information: Privacy or Personal Data Protection?” (2006) 5:2 
CJLT 87 at 87. 
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This study also has an economic context. In 2009, Canada’s federal government 
spent $2.1 billion on Canada Health Infoway.30 Part of this amount included $500 million 
from “Stephen Harper’s…stimulus package.”31 Through funding Canada Health Infoway, 
the federal government contributes to EHR implementation. That being said, this federal 
“funding will flow to EHR projects across the country through provincial initiatives.”32 
Gordon noted that the provinces have contributed a similar amount to EHR development, 
which has “br[ought] the total [EHR] investment close to $4-billion.”33 Ultimately, it is 
estimated EHR implementation will cost more than $10-billion.34 EHR implementation is 
jointly funded, but provincially and territorially operated. So, in a sense, joint funding 
reflects the fact that the federal government and the provinces and territories have a hand 
in EHR regulation, as federal, provincial and territorial legislation may apply in different 
situations. 
Jurisdictional, demographic, societal and economic considerations each imbue 
enactment of EHR-related legislation and the public’s perception of EHR regulation. As 
such, each of these components influences the analysis conducted in this research study. 
It is shown in the literature discussed in Chapter Two there is a lack of secondary 
sources examining whether EHR-legislation harmonization is necessary, especially from 
the patient perspective. At this point, legal scholars seem to simply state that 
                                                 
30 Gordon, supra note 6 at 19. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid at 84. It should be noted that the territories were not addressed in Gordon’s funding discussion. The 
fact that this study includes both the territories and Quebec distinguishes this thesis from most of the 
academic literature available on EHR regulation. 
33 Ibid at 19. 
34 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Electronic Health Records in Canada: An Overview of Federal 
and Provincial Audit Reports (Ottawa: OAG, 2010) at 6 [OAG Report]. 
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harmonization should occur because EHR systems will ultimately be pan-Canadian.35 But 
authors do not discuss this issue from the patient perspective and they do not do a 
detailed analysis of current statutes to determine whether harmonization is truly 
imperative. This study elaborates upon the unification problems to which many scholars 
have alluded which have not yet been reconciled.  
It is surprising the patient perspective has not been explored to any great extent in 
the literature on EHRs given comments made in a Canada Health Infoway publication 
describing many groups affected by a pan-Canadian system that provides potentially 
inconsistent personal health information protection. The Pan-Canadian Health 
Information group – a group of individuals formed through the auspices of Canada 
Health Infoway – gave examples of patients particularly affected by trans-jurisdictional 
flow of health records36 including: individuals who reside in border communities, 
individuals residing in rural areas who are required to go to other jurisdictions to receive 
care because care is not available where they live, individuals who travel to hospitals in 
other jurisdictions to receive specialized treatment, individuals who move or travel for 
study, work or otherwise, individuals who use telehealth networks, and individuals who 
receive health care from professionals who are travelling.37  
So, this study elaborates on the issues of differing provincial and territorial 
approaches to protecting health information contained in EHRs, the patient experience, 
                                                 
35 D’Agostino and Woodward have stated that “the harmonization of privacy legislation nation-wide will be 
essential to the sharing of electronic health information across borders”. Giuseppina D’Agostino & Dionne 
A Woodward, “Diagnosing Our Health Records in the Digital World: Towards a Legal Governance Model 
for The Electronic Health Record in Canada” (2010) 22:1 IPLJ 127 at 153. 
36 Pan-Canadian HIP, supra note 4 at 12. 
37 Ibid. 
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and the necessity of harmonization to increase understanding about health record 
digitization. This study is intended to illuminate the effect of health record digitization on 
personal data protection law and personal data protection laws’ converse effect on health 
record digitization, which will ultimately inform government decision-making and 
debates. 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, public confidence in health care providers 
and the federal, territorial and provincial governments hinges on the way Canadians’ 
most intimate health details are safeguarded. By addressing whether EHR regulation 
should and needs to be harmonized, this research study focuses on a central issue law and 
policymakers must consider and resolve as EHR implementation continues and 
proliferates. Therefore, this study’s results will enable legislators to make more informed 
decisions about how to improve EHR regulation, thereby increasing governments’ and 
health care providers’ ability to make decisions that maintain public confidence. 
c) Importance of Fictional Patient 
In this paper, Joe’s situation is used as a device to analyze the patient experience 
with EHR implementation and the current Canadian legislative regimes addressing 
EHRs. In requiring care in multiple Canadian jurisdictions, Joe encounters three different 
personal data protection legislation regimes relating to EHRs. Each regime protects 
personal health information contained in EHRs in a different manner and represents one 
of three models concurrently existent in this country. The differing characteristics of each 
model and their effect on patients’ experiences with Canadian legislation pertaining to 
EHRs are the subject of this thesis. In this thesis, Joe’s scenario is therefore used to 
analyze the existing Canadian legislation relating to personal health information in the 
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EHR context and to draw conclusions based on a legal analysis about harmonizing EHR 
legislation across Canada. 
d) Thesis Organization 
The remainder of this thesis is organized in the following way: 
Chapter Two discusses the relevant in literature in which academics have raised 
and analyzed issues relating to EHRs. Chapter Two describes in greater detail the issues 
and questions not yet explored and addressed in scholarly works. Chapter Three describes 
the research methodology used in this study, including the research questions, three 
hypotheses and the methodological limitations of this analysis. 
Chapter Four presents the analysis performed and the research findings in this 
study. The ways in which each of the jurisdictions and the models address EHRs is 
described and critiqued. Based on the analysis presented in Chapter Four, Chapter Five 
confirms whether the three hypotheses made in Chapter Two are correct and conclusions 
are drawn about harmonization of Canadian legislation relating to protection of personal 
health information contained in EHRs.  
CHAPTER 2: THE EHR IN LEGAL LITERATURE 
1) INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses relevant literature in which academics have raised and 
analyzed issues relating to EHRs. There is a modest amount of legal literature on EHRs, 
as digitization of personal health information is a relatively recent and evolving 
phenomenon. While conversion of medical records to electronic form has been occurring 
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for several decades, legal scholars have only recently begun to write about the specific 
issues associated with EHRs. While some government reports are incorporated within 
this chapter to supplement the discussion of EHR-related literature, journal articles 
regarding EHR regulation are the emphasis of the following discussion.  
2) RELEVANT LITERATURE 
a) Literature about the Benefits and Disadvantages of EHRs 
Legal scholars have begun to write about issues arising from EHR 
implementation, including, for example, EHR ownership38, secondary use of EHRs39 and 
international standards40. One of the main issues scholars describe is the potential benefit 
of EHR use. Scott stated that technology is being used to revolutionize Canada’s 
healthcare system to assist hospitals and facilitate communications.41 Hoffman and 
Podgurski explained that EHRs enhance patient record access, care quality and research 
prospects, as well as decrease costs and potential for errors.42 Ontario’s Information and 
Privacy Commissioner, Ann Cavoukian, and Peter Rossos, also explained that EHRs 
decrease the administrative burden of medical record keeping and consume less office 
                                                 
38 See D’Agostino & Woodward, supra note 35. This thesis is about personal data protection. Personal data 
protection is framed in terms of control not ownership. See Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “Battleground 
between New and Old Orders: Control Conflicts between Copyright and Personal Data Protection” in 
Ysolde Gendreau, ed, Emerging Intellectual Property Paradigm -- Perspectives from Canada [Queen Mary 
Studies in Intellectual Property series edited by Uma Suthersanen] (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008) 
227 at 257, n 143. 
39 Kosseim & Brady, supra note 12. 
40 Domenic A Crolla & Robert Sheahan, “Unbundling healthcare: the changing nature of the practitioner-
patient relationships as a result of electronic health records” (2009) 10 Telehealth L 15. In particular, at 
page 19, Crolla and Sheahan argue that international personal data protection standards are required. 
41 Scott, supra note 26 at 58. 
42 Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, “Finding a Cure: The Case for Regulation and Oversight of 
Electronic Health Record Systems” (2008) 22:1 Harv JL & Tech 1 at 3. 
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space than paper records.43 EHRs also enable integration of several healthcare services 
such as “patient monitoring, electronic prescribing, electronic referrals, radiology, 
laboratory ordering and results display.”44 Murphy stated that EHR investments boost the 
Canadian economy.45 Murphy also indicated, though, that the benefits of EHRs are only 
beginning to be realized and that one study shows that these benefits may only be 
realized if other aspects of a healthcare system are operating efficiently.46  
Saskatchewan’s Information and Privacy Commissioner, R Gary Dickson (“Gary 
Dickson”), predicted that EHR implementation would also generally affect various 
entities and processes.47 For instance, regulatory bodies’ “role[s] and activities”48 will 
change as a result of EHR rollout. Employment, malpractice, motor vehicle accident and 
workers compensation litigation will also be affected.49  
However, scholars have also indicated, on the other hand, that EHRs threaten 
personal data protection. Hoffman and Podgurski explained that EHR systems entail 
privacy risks and legal concerns.50 According to Rivkin-Haas, the “scale of the risk”51 
associated with EHRs “is huge”.52 Indeed, scholars have described breaches of electronic 
                                                 
43 Cavoukian & Rossos, supra note 11 at 3. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Maureen L Murphy, “Stimulating the economy by investing in health information technology: an 
opportunity for EHR [Electronic Health Record] progress” (2009) 9 Telehealth L 49 at 50.  
46 Ibid. 
47 Dickson, supra note 2 at 2. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 42 at 5. 
51 Elana Rivkin-Haas, “Electronic Medical Records and the Challenge to Privacy: How the United States 
and Canada Are Responding” (2011) 34 Hastings Intl Comp L Rev 177 at 194. 
52 Ibid. 
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personal health information that show the ease through which unauthorized individuals 
can obtain personal data from EHRs.  
Bair-Jacques reported that in 2006 a Florida medical office clerk downloaded 
1,100 patient records and subsequently provided them to a family member who collected 
$2.8 million from making fraudulent Medicare claims.53 Such a situation is more likely to 
occur in the United States than in Canada because of the market-driven American private 
healthcare system and it could be argued that this concern is not quite as relevant to the 
Canadian legal landscape. However, this example certainly demonstrates that EHR 
privacy breaches are real and that the international way in which some of our information 
is held (i.e. when EHR system databases are located in countries other than Canada) 
means that activity occurring in the United States could also negatively affect Canadians. 
As such, Bair-Jacques showed that, in the context of EHRs, privacy breaches are a threat 
and should not be dismissed as something that can be easily remedied.  
Privacy breaches have also resulted from unauthorized access to EHRs in Canada. 
Dickson explained that, in Regina, an acute care hospital records clerk’s employment was 
suspended after she viewed a colleague’s EHR without the colleague’s consent to do so.54 
While the clerk did not have the colleague’s consent to view the record, the clerk used 
her computer “access privileges”55 to look at the colleague’s treatment record. The 
colleague’s treatment record may not have been accessible if prepared in paper form. In 
                                                 
53 Lauren Bair-Jacques, “Electronic health records and respect for patient privacy: a prescription for 
compatibility” (2011) 13:2 Vand J Ent & Tech L 441 at 457. 
54 Dickson, supra note 2 at 15. 
55 Ibid. 
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paper form, the record could have been locked in a cupboard or simply put in a stack of 
paper making it more difficult for the clerk to quickly view the record. 
Authors such as Hoffman and Podgurksi, Bair-Jacques and Dickson demonstrate 
that the data protection issues EHRs raise, are, in fact, the impetus for the growth in legal 
literature on EHR implementation, as scholars are attempting to resolve the problems 
presented by this new phenomenon. As described by Dickson, “[t]he challenge is to 
recognize the fundamentally different kind of risk to privacy which is associated with the 
electronic health record”.56 Further, Dickson stressed that digitization of personal health 
information “warrant[s] different attitudes than those that traditionally have prevailed in a 
paper-driven healthcare system.”57 
Some scholars contend that EHR risks are not nearly as severe as originally 
thought. Griener explained that EHR systems are not a novel record.58 Rather, Griener 
argued that the change is instead that health care providers are required to think in a new 
way about their responsibilities and “exercise them in unusual ways”.59 Specifically, 
Griener pointed out that a professional’s decision regarding disclosure is system based 
and is not up to individual professionals.60 
Despite Griener’s assertions, legislators recognize that personal health 
information contained in EHRs requires legal protection. As a result, provinces and 
territories have begun addressing EHRs to varying degrees within legislation. 
                                                 
56 Ibid at 16. 
57 Ibid at 17. 
58 Glenn Griener, “Electronic health records as a threat to privacy” (2005) 14:1 Health L Rev 14 at 14.  
59 Ibid at 15. 
60 Ibid. 
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b) Literature about Relevant Legislation 
One author has described how some provinces have created or amended statutes 
to address EHRs. According to the author, in Ontario, the Personal Health Information 
Protection Act61 (“PHIPA”)  
leaves specific rules regarding EHRs to be developed in the Regulations. 
Section 10(3) of the Act provides that ‘[a] health information custodian 
that uses electronic means to collect, use, modify, disclose, retain or 
dispose of personal health information shall comply with the prescribed 
requirements, if any’. Section 73(1)(h) authorizes the prescription of 
regulations for the purposes set out in section 10(3) with which a health 
information custodian is required to comply when using electronic 
means.62 
While the Ontario government recently enacted Ontario Regulation 331/1163 
(“Regulation 331/11”), which includes provisions pertaining to eHealth Ontario’s role 
regarding EHRs, it still does not address other EHR data protection issues, such as 
“consent and access”64, which are addressed in British Columbia and Newfoundland’s 
legislation discussed below. Regulation 331/11’s amended section 6.1 and added section 
6.2 merely provide greater specificity about what eHealth Ontario must do relating to 
EHRs. 
In British Columbia, the government has not enacted health-specific personal data 
protection legislation; rather, British Columbia enacted the E-Health Act. The E-Health 
Act “only applies to the regulation of electronic health repositories”.65 As stated by 
Gordon, “[w]hile most health privacy legislation, including Ontario‘s PHIPA, includes 
                                                 
61 PHIPA, supra note 16. 
62 Gordon, supra note 6 at 91. 
63 O Reg 331/11. 
64 Gordon, supra note 6 at 91. 
65 Ibid at 130-131. 
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some provisions about EHRs, the E-Health Act [sic] specifically designs privacy 
protections around EHRs.”66 
Unlike other provinces, Alberta has both public health-specific personal data 
protection legislation in the Health Information Act67 (“HIA”) as well as private sector 
personal data protection legislation in the Personal Information Protection Act.68 The 
Health Information Amendment Act, 200969, which amended the HIA, 
establish[ed] a mandatory legislative framework for a pan-provincial 
EHR…[and] also provides for the regulation of health information 
repositories, which may include local systems or small scale EHRs.70 
In Saskatchewan, the Health Information Protection Act71 (“HIPA”) includes 
EHR-specific provisions that more precisely address consent and access. 72  Gordon 
explained that HIPA uses “a decentralized access model to regulate custody and control 
of…the provincial EHR.”73 
Manitoba’s Personal Health Information Act74 (“PHIA”) addresses EHRs within 
its preamble75 by stating:  
clear and certain rules for the collection, use and disclosure of personal 
health information are an essential support for electronic health 
information systems that can improve both the quality of patient care and 
the management of health care resources. 
                                                 
66 Ibid at 131. 
67 HIA, supra note 16. 
68 ALTA PIPA, supra note 22. See Gordon, supra note 6 at 110. 
69 SA 2009, c 25. 
70 Gordon, supra note 6 at 111. 
71 HIPA, supra note 16. 
72 Gordon, supra note 6 at 114. 
73 Ibid at 115. 
74 PHIA, supra note 16. 
75 Gordon, supra note 6 at 117. 
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Newfoundland recently enacted the Personal Health Information Act76 (“PHIA 
Newfoundland”), which deals with both health-specific personal data protection and EHR 
regulation, including the Newfoundland & Labrador Centre for Health Information.77 
In New Brunswick, the provincial government enacted the Personal Health 
Information Privacy and Access Act (“PHIPAA”).78 At first glance, PHIPAA does not 
deal to any great extent with the specific data protection concerns raised by EHRs. 
Section 50(4) requires custodians to use “any additional safeguards for the security and 
protection of the information required by the regulations”. It appears that New Brunswick 
may be taking a similar approach to Ontario by leaving EHR-specific requirements to 
regulations. Section 79(1)(q) of PHIPAA, in fact, indicates that regulations may be made 
regarding “establishment of an electronic health record”. 
Nova Scotia is also in the process of enacting health-specific personal data 
protection legislation that will address EHRs, but its proposed statute is not yet in force.79  
Further, as discussed previously, PIPEDA may also apply in private healthcare 
contexts unless a province or territory has legislation deemed substantially similar to 
PIPEDA.80 Moreover, there are additional provincial and territorial personal data 
protection statutes, which may apply to public sector activity, particularly in provinces 
and territories that have not enacted health-specific personal data protection legislation.81  
                                                 
76 PHIA Newfoundland, supra note 16. 
77 Gordon, supra note 6 at 130. Newfoundland & Labrador Centre for Health Information, online: Welcome 
to the Centre <http://www.nlchi.nf.ca/>. 
78 PHIPAA, supra note 16. 
79 See Personal Health Information Legislation for Nova Scotia, Health and Wellness, Government of Nova 
Scotia, online: Personal Health Information for Nova Scotia <http://www.gov.ns.ca/health/phia/>. 
80 Lambie, supra note 5 at 87. 
81 See supra note 23. 
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Scholars have explained that the existing Canadian EHR regulatory framework 
described above operates in a piecemeal manner, as multiple provincial or territorial and 
federal statutes may apply in various situations. Gibson wrote that “[i]nformation privacy 
law in Canada is a smorgasbord, with differences in degree and type of legal protection 
interjurisdictionally and within each province”.82 Gibson also described the law 
pertaining to EHRs as “a patchwork quilt with a number of holes”.83 As such, scholars 
have identified that current personal data protection legislation is deficient in the way it 
addresses EHRs. Young notes the lack of specific legislative direction with respect to 
EHRs, despite EHR systems’ aggressive uptake in Canada.84 Young finds EHRs are not 
addressed “with any specificity” 85 within current legislation. 
c) Literature about EHR-Related Legislative Models 
In this study, it is hypothesized that Canada’s unique piecemeal EHR legislative 
schemes can actually be categorized by the way in which EHRs are dealt with in 
legislation. While each province and territory chooses to deal with EHRs in its own way, 
it is hypothesized that these differences are minor compared to the overall similarities 
between the approaches. This study establishes there are currently three ways in which 
EHRs are addressed across Canada: 1) EHRs regulated through EHR-specific legislation; 
                                                 
82 Elaine Gibson, “Jewel in the Crown? The Romanow Commission Proposal to Develop a National 
Electronic Health Record System” (2003) 66 Sask L Rev 647 at 650.  
83 Ibid at 663. Here, Gibson’s metaphors and descriptions of the law are directed to articulation of the fact 
that there are inter-jurisdictional differences in the law. Gibson’s descriptions do not address inter-
jurisdictional operability (i.e. cross-border transfers of information). See infra note 217 for a brief 
discussion of cross-border transfers of information and agreements, which are not the subject of this thesis. 
84 Young, supra note 14 at 132. 
85 Ibid. 
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2) EHRs regulated through health-specific personal data protection legislation containing 
EHR-specific provisions; and 3) EHRs not specifically addressed in legislation at all.  
There has been some discussion in the literature about the trends regarding the 
way in which provinces and territories approach EHR regulation. In 2005, the University 
of Alberta Health Law Institute and University of Victoria School of Health Information 
Science jointly produced a report entitled Electronic Health Records and the “Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act” (“PIPEDA Report”).86 The 
Report describes the way in which PIPEDA interacts with provincial and territorial 
personal data protection laws in Canada. The authors discuss case studies of the way 
EHRs have been implemented and dealt with in legislation in four provinces.87 The 
authors explain that the four provinces described, including British Columbia, Alberta, 
Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia, were chosen because they represent “archetypes of 
legislative frameworks”.88 The authors described these archetypes as follows: 
British Columbia represents a jurisdiction with privacy legislation that has 
been deemed to be substantially similar to PIPEDA; Alberta represents a 
jurisdiction with both private sector privacy legislation that is considered 
substantially similar to PIPEDA, as well as specific health information 
legislation (the Health Information Act); Saskatchewan represents a 
jurisdiction that has specific health information legislation (the Health 
Information Protection Act), but has not enacted private sector legislation 
in response to PIPEDA; and Nova Scotia represents a jurisdiction that has 
neither specific health information legislation nor private sector privacy 
legislation.  All four provinces have privacy legislation that applies in the 
public sector.89 
                                                 
86 (University of Alberta, Health Law Institute & University of Victoria, School of Health Information 
Science, 2005) [PIPEDA Report]. 
87 Ibid at 69. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
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The Report’s “archetypes” differ from the models presented in this thesis for 
several reasons. First, the Report uses four archetypes rather than three, as are discussed 
herein. Second, the archetypes are based on each provinces’ and territories’ public and 
private sector treatment of personal health information. Public and private 
characterizations are dealt with implicitly in this thesis but are not the focus of the 
categories; rather the focus of the models in this thesis is EHR treatment. Third, the 
Report’s “archetypes”, by virtue of the year in which the Report was prepared, are now 
quite dated. At the time the Report was commissioned, Ontario’s PHIPA had not yet been 
declared substantially similar to PIPEDA, British Columbia had not yet enacted the E-
Health Act to specifically deal with EHRs, Newfoundland & Labrador and New 
Brunswick had not yet enacted health-specific personal data protection legislation and 
each of the provinces and territories legislation did not include the same provisions that 
are contained in current legislation. One important similarity to the models proposed in 
this thesis is that the archetypes were created following a truly national examination of 
the way all of the provinces and territories dealt with personal health information in 
Canada. 
Other authors have categorized relevant legislation but, due to the scope of their 
research, do not mention all of the provinces and territories. For instance, Gordon’s 
recent thesis grouped provincial approaches to legislating on EHRs in her discussion 
about reform of Ontario’s EHR-related laws.  
Chapter Four of Gordon’s thesis described ways in which EHRs could be 
regulated in Ontario.90 Gordon argued Ontario could reform its EHR-related laws by 1) 
                                                 
90 Gordon, supra note 6 at 83-151. 
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“maintaining the status quo”91; 2) amending PHIPA to include EHR-related provisions92; 
and, 3) enacting new legislation to deal with EHRs.93 Gordon then described provinces 
(but not territories) that have followed each approach. According to Gordon, 
Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Alberta use the second approach to EHR regulation and 
British Columbia and Newfoundland use the third approach. No provinces or territories 
are referenced with respect to the first approach, likely because, with respect to that 
approach, Gordon simply described the background for PHIPA and what would happen if 
Ontario relied on its then-current provisions to regulate EHRs. Gordon did not delve into 
provinces or territories that have not enacted any health-specific personal data protection 
legislation, such as Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and the Yukon, as is done in this 
thesis.  
Furthermore, Gordon also referenced the same provinces in respect of each 
approach. For example, British Columbia is discussed under both options two and three. 
Consequently, Gordon’s options are not a true categorization of Canadian legislation per 
se, but rather examples of ways Ontario could reform its EHR laws. In addition, Gordon 
grouped provinces in different ways than is done in this thesis. According to Gordon, 
Newfoundland is an example of a province that enacted new legislation to deal with 
EHRs. As is shown in this thesis, Newfoundland is more accurately characterized as a 
province that has health-specific personal data protection legislation that contains EHR-
specific provisions. 
                                                 
91 Ibid at 85. 
92 Ibid at 106. 
93 Ibid at 127. 
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Gordon’s thesis did not delve into territorial or Quebec laws probably because its 
aim was to reform Ontario law rather than survey the Canadian landscape. As such, 
Gordon picked provinces to discuss under each reform method based on whether similar 
provisions could be used to reform Ontario law about personal health information 
protection in EHRs. That being said, Gordon’s groupings appear to be one of two 
secondary sources that categorize EHR legislation in Canada. As neither the PIPEDA 
Report94 nor Gordon’s thesis present an up-to-date, national survey of Canadian 
legislation, this thesis fills this gap in the literature to draw conclusions about 
harmonization of Canadian EHR-related legislation. 
Ultimately, Gordon’s categorization of EHR regulation arises out of an entirely 
different phenomenon (Ontario legislative reform) than is dealt with in this thesis 
(harmonization). So, it is appropriate to revisit the way in which Canadian provincial and 
territorial legislation should be categorized to analyze harmonization from the patient 
perspective. 
d) Literature about Interoperability and Harmonization 
While several authors have explained that each province has a unique data 
protection approach, scholars have also discussed pan-Canadian EHR implementation 
and have suggested the ultimate goal of EHR implementation is nationwide 
interoperability. Kosseim and Brady explained that the Federal Ministry of Health 
Advisory Council on Health Info-Structure, which was established in 1997, had as its 
mandate…to guide the development of an integrated Canadian health 
information info-structure…[which] was envisaged as a broad, powerful, 
                                                 
94 PIPEDA Report, supra note 86. 
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and seamless information resource that would facilitate the integration of 
health services and enable continuous improvement[…].95  
Further, Ries and Moysa stated that “[i]n 2002, the Kirby Report and the Romanow 
Report made EHRs hot topics for media and policymakers by recommending their 
national implementation.”96  
Subsequent to these reports, Gibson drew attention to the problems associated 
with nationwide EHR systems.  In particular, Gibson cited issues such as difficulties with 
practical implementation, due to incompatible vendor systems, and quick leadership 
changes.97 Further, Gibson also stated that such a large undertaking might not be 
economically feasible.98 Gibson was also an early whistle-blower about the specific 
personal data protection issues associated with nationwide EHR interoperability.99 
However, academics continue to comment frequently about Canada’s goal to 
create an interoperable EHR system. For example, Ries stated “the eventual goal is to 
establish an EHR system that provides seamless access to personal health information 
wherever a patient may be in the country.”100 Further, Morris concluded his article by 
indicating that Canada is ultimately moving towards a “pan-Canadian electronic health 
                                                 
95 Kosseim & Brady, supra note 12 at 6. 
96 Nola M Ries & Geoff Moysa, “Legal Protections of Electronic Health Records: Issues of Consent and 
Security” (2005) 14:1 Health L Rev 18 at 1. Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science 
and Technology, The Health of Canadians – The Federal Role, vol 1-6 (Ottawa: Standing Senate 
Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, 2002) (Chair: Hon Michael JL Kirby). RJ 
Romanow, Building on Values: The Future of Health Care in Canada – Final Report (Saskatoon: 
Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, 2002). 
97 Gibson, supra note 82 at 659-660. 
98 Ibid at 660. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ries, supra note 12 at 683. 
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system”.101  Kosseim and Brady confirmed the provinces’ various stakeholders are, 
indeed, aggressively planning and implementing “pan-Canadian, interoperable…[EHR] 
systems.”102 Moreover, according to Kosseim and Brady, there is a “continued 
commitment to the holistic vision of a pan-Canadian health info-structure [that] catalyzed 
ongoing support for the development of interoperable EHR systems.”103  
Scholars focus on pan-Canadian EHR interoperability because several situations 
require that Canadians’ personal health information transfers between provinces and 
territories. Canadians who live in smaller centres who have diminished access to 
“specialized care”104 require that their EHRs can be accessed across the country.105 Some 
Canadians move frequently between jurisdictions for work, travel or study.106 Telehealth 
services and travelling physicians also cause trans-jurisdictional flows of personal health 
information via EHRs.107 
Canada’s Office of the Auditor General (“OAG”) has stated that provinces must 
build EHR systems upon a foundation of unified “principles and characteristics”108 to 
ensure countrywide interoperability.109 But jurisdictions that build such EHR systems are 
simultaneously required to make sure that EHR systems follow their own personal data 
                                                 
101 Morris, supra note 12 at 18. 
102 Kosseim & Brady, supra note 12 at 6. 
103 Ibid at 7. 
104 OAG Report, supra note 34 at 11. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Pan-Canadian HIP, supra note 4 at 12. 
108 OAG Report, supra note 34 at 4. 
109 Ibid. 
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protection legislation,110 which, as shown above, varies between jurisdictions; each 
jurisdiction appears to have its own unique approach to EHRs.111 It has been argued that 
trans-jurisdictional health information sharing is hindered by Canada’s existing 
piecemeal EHR legislative framework. Jurisdictions, such as Saskatchewan, fear that 
health information it shares will not be adequately protected by recipient jurisdictions. 
Saskatchewan’s Information and Privacy Commissioner stated that 
[t]he reality is that Saskatchewan would presumably not be willing to 
share the personal health information of Saskatchewan patients with 
organizations in other provinces and territories unless there is adequate 
reciprocal protection for the privacy of Saskatchewan patients and the 
confidentiality of their [personal health information].112 
Consequently, both government officials and scholars have asked what can be done to 
resolve the piecemeal framework to permit trans-jursidictional information sharing.113  
Early on, Gibson explained that Canada’s “spotty…protection”114 of health 
information contained in EHRs has to be remedied by enacting “comprehensive and 
harmonized legislation”.115 A Canada Health Infoway report explained ways in which 
EHR-related legislation should be unified to obtain congruence between jurisdictions. For 
example, Canada Health Infoway suggested interoperable EHR consent directives must 
be associated with personal health information to  
allow organisations connecting to the EHRi, or hosting components of the 
EHRi, to apply a patient/person’s consent directives in their jurisdiction as 
well as across jurisdictions. EHRi and systems connecting to the EHRi 
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will also need a consistent representation of consent and masking/lockbox 
directives in support of interoperability requirements within and ultimately 
between jurisdictions.116 
More recently, Rivkin-Haas concluded that the benefits of EHRs would not be realized 
until the health information contained in EHRs is uniformly protected across Canada.117 
Scott echoed this sentiment in her article about British Columbia’s EHR regulation.118 
Other scholars have discussed the advantages associated with a unified federal 
EHR regulatory approach. Gordon stated that  
a harmonized federal approach to regulating the privacy protections 
surrounding EHRs would enable legislators to consider Canadians’ 
definitions of health privacy and the values undermining privacy and to 
address the privacy problems that deserve legal protection in an electronic 
health environment. For example, a federal breach notification 
requirement would address concerns that arise when patient information 
travels across borders, such as in a recent situation when patient 
information got lost in transit from New Brunswick to British 
Columbia.119 
Gordon explained that federal EHR regulation furthers the goals of fairness, uniformity 
and social benefit.120 Moreover, federal regulation would 
enable patients from across the country to experience the same controls 
over their personal health information and the same ability to limit access 
to this information, regardless of where they are in the country.121  
As feared by Saskatchewan, a lack of harmonization between provinces may be a 
significant threat to patient data protection. Williams and Weber-Jahnke stated, “the 
                                                 
116 Canada Health Infoway, Electronic Health Record (EHR) Privacy and Security Requirements Reviewed 
with Jurisdictions and Providers, v 1.1 (Montreal: Canada Health Infoway, 2004-2005) at 28, online: 
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patchwork of privacy legislation has left a scattered body of law that lacks a unified 
vision for information security in the health care domain”.122 Further, Morris explained 
that from 1994 to 2002, the federal and provincial governments created various councils 
and initiatives to address the way in which EHR development should progress in 
Canada.123 A report of one of these committees124 indicated there is a “‘a real danger 
[that] exists that Canada could end up with many different approaches to privacy and the 
protection of personal health information’” [emphasis added].125 
Another reason for federal unification is to create certainty within the law 
pertaining to EHRs and ensure regulation is pro-active. Young stated it would be prudent 
for legislators to enact “instructive and preventative”126 personal data protection laws 
relating to EHRs, so individuals can avoid breaches in the first place rather than be 
penalized for them.127 Gordon also explained lawmakers must ensure law pre-empts 
technology.128 One way to ensure this occurs is to establish a federal regulatory 
framework before EHRs interconnect nationally. 
There has been some progress toward nationwide regulation. In fact, one scholar 
concluded Canada is on the path to creating a “true national standard for privacy 
                                                 
122 James Williams & Jens H Weber-Jahnke, “Regulation of Patient Management Software” (2010) 18 
Health LJ 73 at 101. Williams & Weber-Jahnke were not referring to cross-border transfers of information 
but rather inter-jurisdictional differences in the law in Canada.  
123 In addition to the Advisory Council on Health Infostructure (“ACHI”), the federal government created 
Canada Health Infoway, supra note 10 and the Office of Health and the Information Highway (which is 
also known as The Health and the Information Highway Division). Morris, supra note 12 at 16. 
124 The ACHI. 
125 Morris, supra note 12 at 16. 
126 Young, supra note 14 at 132. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Gordon, supra note 6 at 83. 
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protection”129 of EHRs as compared to the United States. Another scholar indicated that 
British Columbia is attempting to harmonize its EHR regulation with that of the other 
provinces.130 In 2005, Health Canada finalized a Pan-Canadian Health Information 
Privacy and Confidentiality Framework131 (the “Pan Canadian Framework”) that 
recommended ways in which Canadian jurisdictions could unify EHR regulation.132 The 
framework consisted of non-binding standards. Health Canada has not published any new 
documents following the Pan Canadian Framework to address unification. In addition, 
Saskatchewan133 and Quebec134 did not endorse this document.135 
Canada Health Infoway created a “pan-Canadian Privacy Forum” in 2007 to 
analyze and oversee EHR regulation across the Canada’s jurisdictions.136 The forum 
consisted of a single individual from each Canadian jurisdiction’s Privacy Ombudsman 
or Commissioner’s office and a single individual from each Canadian jurisdiction’s 
Ministry of Health.137 In 2008, another group was formed, known as the Pan-Canadian 
Health Information Privacy Group (the “HIP Group”), which continued EHR regulation 
                                                 
129 Rivkin-Haas, supra note 51 at 197. 
130 Scott, supra note 26 at 72. 
131 Canada, Health and the Information Highway Division, Pan-Canadian Health Information Privacy and 
Confidentiality Framework (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2005), online:  Pan-Canadian Health Information 
Privacy and Confidentiality Framework [Health Canada, 2005] < http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-
sss/pubs/ehealth-esante/2005-pancanad-priv/index-eng.php>. [Pan-Canadian Framework]. 
132 Dickson, supra note 2 at 7. 
133 Saskatchewan wanted the Pan-Canadian Framework, supra note 131 to contain a “stronger consent 
provision”. Dickson, supra note 2 at 8. 
134 Dickson, supra note 2 indicated at 8 that Quebec did not endorse the Pan-Canadian Framework, supra 
note 131 for “constitutional reasons”. 
135 Supra note 131. 
136 Kosseim & Brady, supra note 12 at 10-11. 
137 Pan-Canadian HIP, supra note 4 at 5. 
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discussions.138 The HIP Group consisted of the Ministry of Health representatives that 
were part of the forum.139 The HIP Group produced a report containing “33 ‘common 
understandings’ to support appropriate and privacy protective trans-jurisdictional 
disclosures of EHR information for care and treatment and for secondary uses”.140 The 
HIP Group meant for Canadian jurisdictions to endorse and use these “common 
understandings” to unify electronic personal health information protection. Arguably, the 
“common understandings” moved Canada towards unification by providing a basis from 
which Canadian jurisdictions can work when creating EHR-related laws. However, the 
HIP Group’s “common understandings” do not unify EHR regulation across Canada. The 
“common understandings” are merely non-binding principles intended to encourage 
consistent EHR regulation across jurisdictions. Furthermore, these principles also 
promote “jurisdictional responsibility for decisions in these areas”.141 
The OAG has stated that the provincial “[g]overnments are committed to 
developing an appropriate policy and legal framework for the sharing of personal health 
information between jurisdictions”.142 Indeed, the HIP Group indicated that Canada 
requires a “single integrated pan-Canadian coordinating group to discuss, address and 
coordinate common privacy related information governance issues”143 pertaining to 
EHRs and proposed five structural variations of such a body.144 However, a body has not 
                                                 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Pan-Canadian HIP, supra note 4 at 5. 
142 OAG Report, supra note 34 at 15. 
143 Pan-Canadian HIP, supra note 4 at 46. 
144 Ibid. 
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yet been created, and the “common understandings” and Pan-Canadian Framework do 
not modify the existing legal framework pertaining to EHRs. Moreover, language used by 
the HIP Group suggests that, while EHR regulation harmonization is desirable, the 
provinces and territories145 will not be pressured to modify their differing approaches. In 
particular, the HIP Group stated that 
[t]he…[common] understandings…are a mix of high level and more 
prescriptive principles that…should be adopted consistently across 
jurisdictions to support trans-jurisdictional disclosures of personal 
information in a manner that is respectful of privacy and the differing 
approaches adopted by the jurisdictions. [emphasis added]146 
Provinces will only be asked to think about trans-jurisdictional issues and consistency 
rather than enact unifying laws.147 As such, it seems that little has been done to actively 
harmonize provincial and territorial legislation at this time.148 Indeed, Gordon stated, 
“there have been no real efforts to amend [PIPEDA] to accommodate EHR systems”.149  
Therefore, either legislators are reluctant to turn their minds to unification or 
perhaps national unification is, ultimately, not possible, given disparate jurisdictional 
contexts and approaches. Indeed, Scott seems to suggest that legislators’ reluctance may 
be the culprit because at least one province is cautious about proceeding with EHR 
                                                 
145 Unlike most of the articles reviewed herein, the Pan-Canadian HIP Report, supra note 4 does refer to the 
territories at page 12 in reference to the fact that individuals residing in territories and rural locations may 
be required to visit other jurisdictions to obtain health care services. This is the sole reference to the 
territories in the Report.  
146 Pan-Canadian HIP, supra note 4 at 8. While it is not explicitly stated, the authors of the HIP Group 
Report seem to imply that both the provinces and territories are included within the term “jurisdictions”, as 
representatives from each of the territories helped developed the common understandings. Pan-Canadian 
HIP, supra note 4 at 48-49. 
147 Ibid at 9. 
148 Although some provinces have used previous provincial enactments to guide new enactments or the way 
in which existing legislation is amended. 
149 Gordon, supra note 6 at 84. 
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regulation until it can see results in other jurisdictions that are “early adopters”150 of 
EHRs.151  
It should be acknowledged, though, that solutions to legislative harmonization and 
uniform protection of electronic personal health information will not come easily.  One 
author stated “privacy solutions alone can prove to be an exercise in mental 
gymnastics”.152 The complex nature of protecting electronic personal health information 
will continue to challenge legislators as technology evolves. 
e) Literature from the Patient Perspective 
The Canadian patient perspective is not explored to any great extent in the 
existing literature about EHRs. Literature about harmonization of EHR-legislation and 
trans-jurisdictional disclosures of personal health information contained in EHRs is 
completely devoid of the perspective of the patient experience.  This study aims to 
remedy this gap.  
Only a few authors have addressed the patient experience to any degree. Most 
authors generally and simply state that digitization threatens protection of personal health 
information contained within medical records.  
In her thesis, Gordon discussed patient interests while explaining three ways in 
which Ontario’s laws could be reformed to better address the specific protection required 
as a result of EHRs. For instance, in discussing the option of maintaining the status quo, 
Gordon stated that PHIPA attempts “to balance the privacy interests of patients in the 
                                                 
150 Scott, supra note 26 at 86. 
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Ontario health care system against the need for efficient and timely sharing of their 
personal health information”.153 Gordon described the mechanisms through which PHIPA 
tries to achieve this balance, including use of the implied consent standard as a basis for 
sharing personal health information.154  
Gordon then discussed specific ways in which the patient will interact with 
PHIPA. For example, Gordon explained that patients restrict the use and disclosure of 
their personal health information through “lock box” provisions.155 In addition, Gordon 
discussed the patient experience in respect of substitute decision making, in that the 
substitute decision maker provisions in PHIPA serve an important role not 
only in protecting the patient’s privacy by respecting his dignity and 
autonomy, but also permits the substitute decision maker with some ability 
to maintain his or her dignity and autonomy when dealing with a difficult 
situation involving the health of a family member or friend who has died 
or who is or has become mentally incapable.156 
As with Ontario, Gordon also described how some of the other provinces’ (but not 
territories’) EHR-related legislation permits patients to or prevents patients from 
controlling and limiting access to their personal information.  Gordon surveys some of 
the current legislative schemes while arguing that control over and limiting access to 
personal health information contained in EHRs “must be a central part of health privacy 
legislation”.157 Furthermore, Gordon’s conclusions about the best way to improve Ontario 
EHR regulation include non-patient considerations. For instance, Gordon states that 
                                                 
153 Gordon, supra note 6 at 88. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid at 98. 
157 Ibid at 90. 
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amending PHIPA to include EHR-specific provisions would “provide guidance to 
organizations and vendors building EHR systems”.158 
Gordon’s analysis does not cover how the patient experience will differ across 
Canada as a result of trans-jurisdictional flows of personal health information in EHRs 
and how this will affect the patient experience if they are required to receive care in 
multiple jurisdictions. Gordon’s analysis focuses on the ways Ontario’s legislation can be 
improved to address EHRs.  
Aside from Gordon, Bair-Jacques has argued it is possible for patients to protect 
their health data when it is in electronic form.159 In making this argument, Bair-Jacques 
explained in one paragraph that EHRs potentially make it possible for a patient’s 
employer to learn medical information about them through a benefit program if the 
employer has a “wandering eye”.160 While Bair-Jacques suggested privacy protections 
that could be put in place161, she did not describe patients’ experience with existing EHR-
related legislation. Further, Bair Jacques did not discuss Canadian legislative 
harmonization as the subject of the article was American EHR systems and legislative 
initiatives. 
Scott also describes the effect of the E-Health Act on the patient in addition to 
discussing its effect on institutions.162 However, only British Columbia is the focus of the 
article, and it does not present a national perspective of the patient experience. Scott’s 
                                                 
158 Ibid at 149. 
159 Bair-Jacques, supra note 53 at 459. 
160 Ibid at 456. 
161 These included, opting in to EHR systems, flagging information the patient wishes to keep confidential, 
training staff and installing technological safety mechanisms. Ibid at 461-462. 
162 Scott, supra note 26 at 75. 
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description of the E-Health Act and its effect on the patient is discussed in model 1 
below. 
Lastly, the PIPEDA Report163 discussed how Canada’s jurisdictions’ data 
protection statutes apply to various entities in the context of EHRs. However, it did not 
describe the effect of the statutes’ interplay on the patient experience. 
Ultimately, there is a dearth of literature describing the effects of EHR-related 
legislation on the patient experience in trans-jurisdictional flows of personal health 
information. Consequently, this study examines the patient experience with each 
Canadian jurisdiction’s approach to EHR regulation. 
f) Situating this Research Study in the Literature 
This study examines the practical effect of the current Canadian personal data 
protection legislative regimes pertaining to EHRs. The analysis in this study was 
conducted from the patient’s perspective and illustrates how the legislation in each 
jurisdiction treats a patient’s personal health information. This research study will clarify 
previous scholars’ conclusions that personal data protection legislation pertaining to 
EHRs should be harmonized across Canada. Consequently, this research will resolve 
conflicting results identified in secondary literature because it will clarify whether the 
laudable goal of legal interoperability is in fact necessary and imminently important. 
Many authors have previously advocated for this approach but have not yet described 
whether it should be operationalized based on each jurisdiction’s current statutes.  
                                                 
163 PIPEDA Report, supra note 86. 
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Further, most authors do not look at all of the provinces and territories when 
discussing harmonization. Often, Quebec and the territories are left out. This study 
includes all Canadian jurisdictions in its analysis. 
Some of the background provided in this study, as well as some provincial 
comparisons that will be done, will replicate prior research discussed in secondary 
literature.164 However, my analysis of harmonization and provincial and territorial 
approaches as it pertains to a trans-jurisdictional patient will not replicate any literature 
found to date. As such, this analysis will not directly challenge prior research in this area 
because, at the time of researching this study, similar research has not been performed. 
It is predicted that this study will uncover surprises not revealed by previous 
research. According to the literature search performed for this proposal, there is no 
evidence of authors who have tackled the issue of whether harmonization should be 
achieved based on a patient’s interaction with Canadian legislation. While Gordon’s 
thesis focused on improving the EHR legislative framework in Ontario, it did not 
“address interrelated questions, such as those surrounding federalism, harmonization of 
health privacy legislation across provinces”.165 As such, this research study will fill a 
substantial gap in existing legal literature regarding EHRs. 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
1) RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
A harmonized legislative scheme presents several problems.  
                                                 
164 Such as in Gordon, supra note 6. 
165 Ibid at 9. 
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First, it has been said that even though provinces could harmonize statutes to 
address an interoperable EHR, PIPEDA’s application to trans-jurisdictional transfers 
would still add a layer of statutory obligations and disrupt a unified statutory scheme.166 
As a result, a harmonized legislative scheme addressing protection of information in 
EHRs currently envisioned by scholars and policy makers may not be truly possible.  
Second, as previously discussed, provinces and territories have taken “[d]iffering 
approaches to health information privacy”.167 Several reasons have been posited for this 
difference; including that separate, health-specific laws deal with a sensitive type of 
information held by numerous private and public entities whereas general, non-health 
specific laws simplify obligations and promote increased privacy protections.168  
However, it is in each territory and province’s jurisdiction to uniquely address personal 
health information in personal data protections laws. It is also in each province and 
territory’s jurisdiction to address EHRs in differing manners. But, according to Morris, 
“the present course of development of privacy regimes across the country will exacerbate 
‘legislative piling on’, with all its attendant weaknesses.”169 So, unification may also be a 
challenge because health is in the purview of each separate jurisdiction and “legislative 
piling on” is legally permissible. Even from the outset, it is clear that a harmonized 
scheme would be a difficult to achieve, if not impossible to orchestrate. 
                                                 
166 Anthony Morris, The Electronic Health Record in Alberta: An Introduction to Business and Legal 
Infrastructures and Issues (LLM Major Paper, Osgoode Hall Law School, 2003) at 57 [unpublished] 
[Morris, “EHR Alberta”]. 
167 Ibid at 71. 
168 “Connecting the Dots: A Comparative Analysis of New Privacy Laws Affecting the Health Sector in 
Canada” (1 November 2000), online: McCarthy Tétrault <www.mccarthy.ca/pubs/publication> in ibid at 
71-72. 
169 Ibid at 83. 
  
39 
Given that there are a number of flaws associated with harmonized EHR 
regulation, it seems logical that attention must be paid to whether a unified scheme 
addressing EHRs is truly necessary. This study endeavours to answer this question by 
showing whether existing legislative differences, in fact, create disparate patient 
experiences between the provinces and territories. This research examines provincial and 
territorial legislation relating to EHR regulation and categorizes Canadian jurisdictions’ 
approaches to EHR regulation. The patient experience when interacting with each of the 
three models discovered and experiencing a combination of the models is described, 
analyzed and reconciled. The following are this study’s hypotheses. 
2) HYPOTHESES 
This study had three hypotheses:170 
1. Existing personal data protection legislation can be grouped into discrete models based 
on the way it addresses EHRs. 
2. A patient’s experience with each of these models identified in existing legislation will 
differ but only to a small extent.  
3. Small differences between jurisdictional experiences are acceptable and not 
unreasonable for patients and, therefore, harmonization is not as necessary as is stated in 
current literature. 
                                                 
170 When comparing legislative treatment of EHRs in each Canadian jurisdiction, this thesis does not 
discuss inter-jurisdictional transfers of information. For a brief discussion of such transfers, see also 
footnote 217. 
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3) METHODOLOGY 
This study intended to prove or disprove the above hypotheses in the following 
ways: 
(a) Categorical Analysis of Canadian Provinces and Territories 
A categorical analysis of each province and territory’s personal data protection 
legislation pertaining to EHRs was performed to identify discrete models of the ways 
Canadian jurisdictions address EHRs in legislation. It was examined whether the 
provinces and territories could be categorized according to: 
(a) whether the provinces’ and territories’ personal data protection legislation is specific 
only to the EHR environment or, if it is not,  
(b) whether provinces’ or territories’ personal data protection legislation treat EHRs 
specifically within the context of health-specific personal data protection legislation, or, 
(c) whether EHRs are addressed specifically in general personal data protection 
legislation, or, 
(d) whether EHRs are not specifically addressed in health-specific personal data 
protection legislation, or, 
(e) whether EHRs are not addressed and only general legislation exists. 
Each of the provinces and territories were tested against these five potential and separate 
categories. Categories (c) and (d) were eliminated because no provinces and territories 
fell into these two categories. The remaining three categories were adopted and formed 
the three models described in Chapter 4 of this study. 
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(b) Evaluating Patients’ Interaction with the Models 
Second, in order to determine (a) the extent to which the patient experience 
differed between the models in hypothesis 2 and (b) “acceptable” and “not unreasonable” 
in hypothesis 3, it was necessary to establish criteria against which to test Joe’s 
experience. In this study, the factors used to evaluate the patient’s interaction with the 
legislative environment were derived primarily from the Guidelines Governing the 
Protection of Privacy and Transport of Flows of Personal Data (“OECD Guidelines”).171  
The OECD Guidelines guided and were the main impetus behind the development 
of personal data protection laws at the federal level in Canada. Indeed, it has been stated 
that the OECD Guidelines were the “genesis to PIPEDA”.172 The OECD Guidelines were 
created by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and considered 
the eight basic principles of “fair information practices”.173 
It is appropriate to use these OECD Guidelines as the means by which we judge a 
patient’s interaction with the three models and the statutes because it is quite likely that 
Part Three of the OECD Guidelines, which addresses flow of data across international 
borders, mirrors the concerns about trans-jurisdictional matters that arise with EHR use. 
While concerns may still have arisen regardless of the OECD Guidelines, Part Three of 
the Guidelines seems to suggest that harmonized data protection is required before 
jurisdictions can be required to release personal data to one another. In particular, section 
17 of the OECD Guidelines indicates that jurisdictions should refrain from restricting the 
                                                 
171 The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Guidelines on the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (Paris: OECD, 1981) [OECD Guidelines].  
172 Morris, “EHR Alberta”, supra note 166 at 51.  
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flow of information between themselves and other jurisdictions unless the receiving 
jurisdiction fails to “substantially observe these Guidelines”. According to section 17, 
jurisdictions “may also impose restrictions in respect of certain categories of personal 
data for which its…privacy legislation includes specific regulations…and for which the 
other Member country provides no equivalent protection”.174  
The OECD Guidelines apply to Member states – Canada is a member state. The 
provinces and territories of Canada are not directly members of the OECD. However, 
provinces and territories are influenced by the OECD Guidelines because of the section’s 
historical importance and because they are part of the member state of Canada. The fact 
the OECD Guidelines have been essentially made into law in Canada at the federal level, 
in both the Privacy Act and PIPEDA,175 certainly makes the case that the OECD 
Guidelines are a necessary consideration in all Canadian jurisdictions. Indeed, the federal 
government has required there be private sector adoption of PIPEDA (and, hence, 
                                                 
174 OECD Guidelines, supra note 170. 
175 There are two models through which international law may be received in Canada: 1) the 
transformationist model and 2) the adoptionist model. Under the transformationist model, international law 
does not become apart of domestic law automatically, it must be made into domestic law to have effect. 
Under the adoptionist model, international laws automatically become part of domestic law, without need 
for their incorporation into a domestic statute. For a discussion of the transformationist and adoptionist 
models see John H. Currie, ed, Essentials of Canadian Law: Public International Law, 2d ed, (Toronto: 
Irwin Law, 2008) at 224-226. Mr. Justice LeBel, writing with Andrea Gonsalves, has stated 
reception of conventional international law in Canada is transformationist. A treaty to which 
Canada is a party must be implemented by legislation or executive act in order to become 
part of the domestic law of Canada and therefore enforceable in court. 
Justice Louis LeBel & Andrea Gonsalves, “Comments on the Integration of International Law into the 
Canadian Legal System” (International Law and Litigation for US Judges, Federal Judicial Center, 
American Society of International Law, Ottawa, Canada, 30 October 2006) at 2. In this study of both 
Canadian personal data protection legislation and the OECD Guidelines, it is evident that the OECD 
Guidelines have been received in Canadian law through the “transformationist model”, in that Canadian 
jurisdictions have created new laws, the federal Privacy Act and PIPEDA and the provincial and territorial 
personal data protection statutes.  These new pieces of legislation contain elements based directly on the 
OECD Guidelines but it is these new statutes that have effect in Canadian jurisdictions, rather than the 
OECD Guidelines themselves. The OECD Guidelines were not simply adopted as Canadian law. 
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OECD) standards by insisting that PIPEDA apply in provinces and territories unless 
equivalent legislation has been passed by those provinces and territories. So if PIPEDA is 
based on the OECD Guidelines – and it is – then the provinces’ and territories’ statutes 
must also explicitly and implicitly be equivalent. 
Given that the Guidelines have been influential in Canada and used recently to 
create PIPEDA176, four of the Guidelines’ sections will form the criteria by which the 
patient experience with the legislative models is judged in this study: 
1) whether consent is necessary to collect, use and disclose data in the EHR;  
2) whether the models prescribe that the data in EHRs should have use limited only to 
that purpose for which the data was collected; 
3) whether there are security safeguards mentioned to protect patient data; and, 
4) whether patients have the right to correct their EHR.  
With respect to criterion one, consent to collection can take on many forms. 
Express, implied or deemed consent may be required to collect personal health 
information depending on the governing legislation.177 Canada Health Infoway has 
                                                 
176 The OECD Guidelines also form part of Canada’s Privacy Act. The OECD Guidelines became the 
impetus behind PIPEDA because, in 1995, the Directive on Data Protection, Directive 1995/46/EC, OJ 
L281 (1995) 0031-0050 was adopted by the European Union to require member states to follow rules 
relating to the OECD Guidelines. From that point, personal information could only be transferred to 
jurisdictions that also protected that personal information adequately. At that time, the Canadian Standards 
Association also created the CSA Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information CAN/CSA-
Q830-96 [CSA Code], which directly corresponded with the OECD Guidelines. Private sector businesses 
could voluntarily follow the CSA Code. Shortly thereafter, Canada’s federal government developed 
PIPEDA’s forerunner, including the CSA Code as part of Schedule 1 to Part I of PIPEDA, which 
eventually became law after being reintroduced to parliament as Bill C-6. Morris, “EHR Alberta” supra 
note 166 at 51. 
177 The following excerpt from Privacy Security Requirements, supra note 116 at 24 describes the 
difference between express, implied and deemed consent: 
Express consent includes any action by a patient/person or their authorized representative 
(e.g. parent, guardian or substitute decision maker) specifically to authorize the collection, 
use or disclosure of personal information (e.g. a signature, a check-off box, a verbal 
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commented that “[t]he range of legal requirements regarding consent could create 
governance issues once personal health information in the EHR Infostructure is able to 
flow across jurisdictional boundaries.”178  
Practically speaking, though, health care providers adopt a variety of means to 
obtain consent to collection, such as:  
An admission or appointment form may be used to seek consent, collect 
PHI, and inform patients/persons of the uses that will be made of their 
PHI; 
A check-off box may be used to allow patients/persons to request that their 
PHI not be shared with other organisations, the so-called “lock box” 
concept. Patients/persons who do not check off the box are assumed to 
consent to the transfer of this information to third parties; 
Consent may be given orally; or 
Consent may also be given at the time that patients/persons use a health 
service.179 
The EHR-related statutes discussed in this thesis generally do not address the mechanism 
through which consent should be obtained, if consent to collection is addressed at all. So, 
the analysis in this thesis will be limited to what is specified in statute rather than the 
particular way health care providers obtain consent to collection in dealing with EHRs. It 
                                                 
approval). Implied consent is consent that can be reasonably determined through the actions 
or inactions of the patient/person, for example, a patient/person presenting himself to a 
pharmacist, a laboratory, an emergency department, or a physician in private practice. With 
“deemed” consent it does not matter whether the patient/person has actually consented; the 
law permits organisations to act as if the patient/person has consented; there is no right to 
withdraw or withhold consent. 
178 Canada Health Infoway, Canada Health Infoway Inc. White Paper on Information Governance of the 
Interoperable Electronic Health Record (EHR) (Montreal: Canada Health Infoway, March 2007) at 10, 
online: Canada Health Infoway <https://www.infoway 
inforoute.ca/index.php/resources/reports/privacy/doc_download/75-information-governance-of-the-
interoperable-ehr>. 
179 Privacy Security Requirements, supra note 116 at 24. 
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has been said that “[t]he EHRi [interoperable EHR] must reflect legal obligations in its 
privacy requirements in all of their relative sophistication in this novel area.”180  
With respect to criterion two, limited use means that “[w]hen organisations 
identify the purposes for which they collect PHI…and seek the appropriate consent for 
these purposes, it is imperative that they then only use…information for these 
purposes”.181 The scope of use and disclosure must be distinguished. Indeed, Canada 
Health Infoway has stated “the distinction between use and disclosure is also highly 
relevant. Use refers to any processing and treatment of data within the organisation, 
whereas disclosure refers to the release of the information to third parties”.182 Canada 
Health Infoway indicated that  
[t]he ultimate goal is to have no secret, or unspecified, collections, uses or 
disclosures of personal information held in an EHRi or in POS systems 
connected to the EHRi. This is an especially delicate issue in healthcare, 
because a patient/person may not have much of a choice with respect to 
collection, use, or disclosure, if he or she wishes to receive healthcare. 
Such patients/persons have a right to know what uses and disclosures, in 
particular, are mandated by law, such as for mandatory reporting of 
infectious diseases or suspected child abuse or for law enforcement.183 
Canada Health Infoway has also explained that  
to allow patients/persons to make appropriate decisions about their PHI, it 
is important that they are made aware of and understand the purposes for 
which it is being collected, used, and disclosed. The emphasis on openness 
about the purposes for collection of PHI is meant to ensure that 
patients/persons will have ample opportunity to find out what will be done 
with their PHI, especially in addition to the delivery of healthcare (e.g. 
research or health surveillance activities).184 
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However, at the time of preparing its report, Canada Health Infoway found there were no 
technical mechanisms in place to prevent use of personal health information contained in 
EHRs for purposes beyond which it was collected.185 
With respect to criterion three, security safeguards are required to protect against 
“loss or theft, as well as unauthorized access, disclosure, copying, use, or 
modification”.186 Indeed, security safeguards have always been a main data protection 
tenant and such protections have gained increasing importance in digitized systems 
because security breaches are more “devastating”.187 As was previously discussed, 
security breaches of digitized information are more serious because damage sustained by 
patients is irreversible.188 Physical safeguards may include the following, and some 
provinces legislate that these must be present, although not specifically with respect to 
EHRs: 
Perimeter security of servers and other aspects of application hosting is a 
minimum requirement for ensuring the availability and integrity of these 
important applications and data and for ensuring the confidentiality of 
information in storage that is not already secured cryptographically. In 
turn, controlling access is a minimum requirement of perimeter security.189 
                                                 
185 Ibid at 33. Canada Health Infoway also provided at ibid at 33 that 
[t]he development of such a solution would need to take into account a number of issues, 
including the following: the identification of purposes will need to be harmonized or standardized; a 
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purpose for which the PHI will be used or disclosed are not consistent with those purposes identified 
will need to be established. 
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Controlling access entails identifying users upon registration, obtaining 
authentication of users at subsequent log-ins to the system, as well as authorizing users 
before they are granted access to both the services and data.190 Such controls can be 
tailored to fit the context within which a health care provider is working.191 According to 
Canada Health Infoway, jurisdictions must ascertain the protection amount necessary 
“based on risk, technical and operational aspects”.192 Luckily, a number of technologies, 
such as encryption and data de-identification, can be used to protect the confidentiality of 
data while it is stored.193  
In terms of trans-provincial and trans-territorial transfers, Canada’s EHR-related 
legislation does not have particular directions about how personal health information 
should be protected when transmitted.194 During storage, security safeguards may include 
encryption, physical protection or de-identification.195 According to Canada Health 
Infoway, physical protection during storage is almost always used, in addition to de-
identification.196 Encryption, on the other hand, is less common.197 Audit logs are also a 
component of ensuring the security of EHR data, especially in relation to trans-
jurisidictional transfers.198 
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With respect to criterion four, Canada Health Infoway emphasized health care 
providers’ need to obtain accurate personal health information:  
[t]he requirement for accuracy as a fair information practice has particular 
relevance for the delivery of healthcare to patients/persons, who share 
with organisations a commitment to accuracy in order to ensure efficient 
and effective delivery of healthcare.199 
Accuracy is necessary to reduce “the possibility that inappropriate PHI may be used to 
make a decision about a patient/person”.200 Involving patients in the process of obtaining 
accuracy promotes patients’ autonomy and allows them to be partners in their health care. 
It has been said that an “unlimited right of access to…personal information”201 is “a 
matter of respect for human dignity and the protection of human rights”.202 Indeed, a right 
of access has become particularly vital in the digitized environment.203 Interestingly,  
[d]ecisions made by Information and Privacy Commissioners (or their 
equivalents across Canada) have resulted in jurisprudence that emphasizes 
that only factual errors can be literally corrected, such as a birth date. 
Matters of opinion are exactly that, including a diagnosis by a healthcare 
professional that a patient/person wishes to contest.204 
Further, it is contemplated that EHRs will “automatically distribute the most up to date 
information when it is required for authorized purposes”.205 
However, it has been found that it is not always the case that patients have been 
permitted access to their personal health information held by health care providers.206 In 
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the past, health care providers were concerned that revealing patient’s personal health 
information would expose them to lawsuits, that patients would not actually understand 
the information and be harmed by it, that physicians would fail to include and omit 
certain information knowing patients would view it.207 Following the 1992 Supreme 
Court of Canada decision in McInerney v MacDonald208, patients now are legally entitled 
at common law to access their own personal health information except in certain 
situations.209 Canada Health Infoway indicated, though, that “[i]n certain situations, the 
EHRi, organisations connecting to the EHRi, or organisations hosting components of the 
EHRi may not be able to provide access to all the PHI it holds about a patient/person”.210 
Examples of when patients may not be given access include when 
information…is prohibitively costly to provide, information…contains 
references to other individuals[,]…information…cannot be disclosed for 
legal, security, or commercial proprietary reasons, information…is subject 
to solicitor-client litigation privilege.211  
The Canada Health Infoway study asserted that Canadian jurisdictions take 
different approaches to access.212 This study will examine whether the practical effect of 
a patient’s experience with the different legal requirements is really that great. 
                                                 
207 Ibid. 
208 [1992] 2 SCR 138 at 155-157. 
209 In addition to any statutory rights they may have, although this differs in the Quebec civil law context, 
which is driven by statute. 
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(c) The Fictional Patient 
Last, a fictional trans-jurisdictional patient scenario was developed to analyze the 
patient experience with the three models resulting from the categorical analysis. This 
study explains the application of the legislation of a selected jurisdiction from each model 
to Joe, the fictional patient. It posits a hypothetical situation in which EHRs can be 
electronically transferred and accessed (otherwise known as “interoperable”) throughout 
Canada: a state that is not yet technically possible, but soon will be. In fact, information 
in Joe’s EHR cannot be electronically, and therefore physically, transferred via an 
interoperable EHR network as the scenario portrays. For example, it is not yet possible 
that “[t]he British Columbian physician updates Joe’s EHR so Joe’s Alberta and 
Saskatchewan health care providers can access his most up to date cancer treatment 
information” via an interoperable EHR system. Indeed, scholars concern about personal 
data protection legislation being harmonized across Canada are premised on the fact that, 
ultimately, it appears that EHRs will be interoperable throughout Canada and health care 
providers everywhere in Canada will be able to access a patient’s record, no matter where 
the patient is in the country. That is why this scenario has been constructed that way. 
It should be further noted that the fictional patient envisioned in this study was a 
patient receiving active treatment and who was not part of a research or any other 
study.213 Further, it is envisioned that Joe learns about the law of each jurisdiction either 
through conversations with his health care providers, for example, when those health care 
providers are getting Joe’s consent, or through informational brochures or signage placed 
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in health care provider facilities. Conversation, brochures and signage are generally how 
most patients would learn about their personal data protection rights. 
4) METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS 
This thesis does not describe the legal requirements and practical result of the 
actual transfer of information between provinces and territories and what that entails 
practically speaking, because the vignette is fictional, other than to indicate the following 
[a]s a practical matter, a healthcare organisation wishing to access PHI 
from another jurisdiction must do so in a manner that respects the legal 
requirements for consent to disclose PHI in the jurisdiction of the 
organisation that holds the data as well as satisfy all the legal requirements 
for consent to access PHI in its own jurisdiction. (Otherwise the sender 
cannot honour the access request). This has profound implications for the 
interoperability of the EHRi. Information contained within a 
patient/person's EHR may carry with it the legal requirements for consent 
from multiple jurisdictions[…]. Before permitting accesses to PHI, the 
EHRi must ensure that all necessary legal requirements are upheld before 
transmitting data to a requestor.214 
On the other hand, it has also been stated more recently that, in respect of trans-
jurisdictional transfers of information, the jurisdictions sending information must 
acknowledge that information sent to that jurisdiction will be dealt with under the laws of 
the receiving jurisdictions, rather than its own.215  
To resolve conflict of laws issues in other contexts, jurisdictions use data-sharing 
agreements to address trans-jurisdictional data flows.216 In Canada, complete 
interoperability would require many bilateral or multilateral agreements.217 Canada 
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Health Infoway has stated that “[i]t remains to be seen how specific problems arising 
from trans-jurisdictional data flows in the interoperable EHR will be addressed”.218This 
thesis’ focus does not purport to answer these questions.  
This thesis does not attempt to solve or describe all of the problems associated 
with trans-jurisdictional flows of personal health information contained in EHRs, such as 
transmitting consent directives.219 Instead, this thesis attempts to uncover what it is like 
for a patient to have personal health information contained in EHRs under each current 
EHR-related model of legislative scheme and to determine, generally, how disparate or 
not disparate each model may be in fact in order to conclude whether harmonization is 
truly necessary. 
CHAPTER 4: THE LEGISLATIVE MODELS 
1) INTRODUCTION TO MODELS 
Examination of each Canadian jurisdictions’ EHR-related personal data protection 
legislation showed that there are three ways in which Canada’s provinces and territories 
                                                 
requirements, privacy requirements, inspection, audit and enforcement clauses, and liability and sanctions”. 
Each of these components would make certain parties to the agreement responsible for protecting personal 
health information contained in the EHRs. Ibid at ix. An example of an agreement protecting personal 
health information is discussed in Candice Teitlebaum & Aaron Collins, “Canadian Privacy Legislation and 
the Cross-Border Transfer of Personal Information, Part One: Personal Health Information”, online: Aird 
and Berlis LLP < http://www.airdberlis.com/Templates/Articles/articleFiles/454/Article%20-
%20Cross%20Border%20Transfer%20of%20Personal%20Health%20Information.pdf>. Teitlebaum and 
Collins discussed a “service agreement” that existed between an American- and a Canadian-based 
company, which imposed privacy protections to control access to personal health information stored by the 
Canadian company. The data at issue concerned patients and was stored for laboratories, the Ministry of 
Health and Long-Term Care, clinics and hospitals. Ibid at 2-3. Although such an agreement did not involve 
transfers between Canadian jurisdictions, it was created to address cross-border flows of information 
between Canada and the United States and is illustrative of the fact that agreements are currently and will 
be used to control trans-jurisdictional transfers of digitized personal health information. 
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address protection of personal health information contained in EHRs. The three modes of 
addressing EHRs are represented in Figure 1 below. The three grey boxes represent each 
of the models. Model 1 includes provinces that have legislation specific only to the EHR 
environment. Model 2 includes provinces that have personal data protection legislation 
that treats EHRs specifically within the context of health-specific personal data protection 
legislation. Model 3 includes territories and provinces in which EHRs are not addressed 
and only general personal data protection legislation exists. The direction of the arrows at 
the top of Figure 1 indicates decreasing specificity in addressing EHRs. Model 1 is most 
specific to EHRs and model 3 is least specific.  
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FIGURE 1: THE THREE MODELS OF EHR-SPECIFICITY IN CANADIAN 
JURISDICTIONS 
 
2) MODEL 1 - EHR LEGISLATION SEPARATE AND SPECIFIC FROM OTHER 
PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION LEGISLATION 
Model 1 includes provinces that have EHR legislation that is separate and specific 
to EHRs, including British Columbia and Quebec. In the proceeding discussion, the 
British Columbia E-Health Act and Quebec’s Conditions are discussed and analyzed. 
First, it is determined whether each piece of legislation contains an EHR or equivalent 
definition. Next, it is determined whether each piece of legislation addresses the four 
OECD principles relevant to the Canadian patient experience, namely consent to 
collection, limited use, security safeguards and patient participation. These five criteria 
are used to assess the patient interactions with the first mode of addressing EHRs in 
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legislation in Canada. Reflections about the patient interaction with model 1 are provided 
after both British Columbia and Quebec are discussed. 
a) British Columbia:  
In British Columbia, personal health information was first protected under the 
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act220 (“FIPPA”), which continues to 
apply to the public sector, and the Personal Information Protection Act221 (“PIPA”), 
which applies to the private sector.222 Like other Canadian jurisdictions, though, each 
British Columbia hospital now has an EHR system.223 To address the EHR phenomenon, 
the British Columbia E-Health Act came into force in November 2011.  
The E-Health Act contains rules by which personal health information databases, 
known as “health information banks” (“HIBs”), are governed.224 The E-Health Act rules 
prevail over FIPPA and PIPA when the E-Health Act provides “specific and limiting” 
rules about use and disclosure of personal health information.225 Scott stated “[the] E-
Health Act enables a set of rules to emerge that are specific to each database, and that are 
                                                 
220 BC FIPPA, supra note 23. 
221 PIPA, supra note 22.  
222 “Benefits for the Public – eHealth – Ministry of Health – Province of British Columbia”, online: British 
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subject to the privacy framework in the legislation.”226 So, collection, use and disclosure 
of personal health information contained in databases are specifically addressed.227 
The E-Health Act has received mixed reviews: by some, it has been hailed as a 
distinctive, new way to address patients’ personal information in the e-health context.228 
The British Columbia Ministry of Health stated that the E-Health Act ensures EHRs are 
“protected by privacy measures that are among the strongest in Canada”.229 Scott also 
stated “the E-Health Act sets fundamental standards for patient privacy and public 
accountability for provincial e-health and represents a very necessary safeguard.”230 It is 
also thought that the E-Health Act is just the start of improvements that can be made to 
personal data protection in British Columbia. Scott commented “the new legislation is an 
opportunity to create a consistent approach that will enhance current health care delivery 
models”.231  
Despite these accolades, it is acknowledged that the E-Health Act may simply 
create more complexity for those attempting to comply with PIPA and FIPPA.232 For 
some, the E-Health Act merely “legalizes”233 work done on e-health and it does not 
actually protect patients’ interests. It has been posited that a main reason for enacting the 
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E-Health Act was “to allow the Ministry to require personal health information to be 
disclosed to [the] data banks, except where disclosure is prohibited by law.”234 
Regardless of policy makers’ and authors’ views, the E-Health Act is one of only 
two statutes separately and specifically enacted in Canada to address issues created by 
digitized personal health information.235 The patient experience with the E-Health Act is 
assessed next. It will be shown that, even though British Columbia enacted legislation to 
separately and specifically address EHRs, the E-Health Act fails to address some of the 
five criteria used in this study to assess the specificity with which statutes deal with 
protecting personal health data in EHRs.  
i) EHR Definition: 
The E-Health Act does not define EHRs, even though it was specifically enacted 
to address e-health. Instead, the E-Health Act deals with “health information banks” 
(“HIBs”).236 HIBs are databases of personal health information collected for the purposes 
set out in section 4 of the E-Health Act and that are in the custody or control of a health 
care body.237 Databases become HIBs when established by an order or designation of the 
Minister of Health.238 Some of the purposes for which personal health information is 
collected include providing health services or care, preventing or managing chronic 
health conditions, and assessing and dealing with public health requirements.239 
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According to section 1, a health care body means the Ministry of Health, a health care 
body as under British Columbia’s FIPPA240, the Provincial Health Services Authority and 
any society reporting to the Provincial Health Services Authority. 
While the E-Health Act defines HIBs rather than EHRs, personal health 
information is defined in the Act as “recorded information about an identifiable 
individual that is related to the individual’s health or the provision of health services to 
the individual”.241 This definition seems quite broad. However, the definition implies that 
health information ceases to be personal health information when it is not about an 
“identifiable individual”. Consequently, it seems that health information that forms part 
of an aggregate and is not identifiable, such as is created for research purposes, is not 
personal health information under the E-Health Act. 
What this Means for Joe: 
The fact that EHRs are not defined in the E-Health Act has several implications 
for Joe. When Joe travels to British Columbia and receives health care, Joe’s EHR would 
not be automatically governed by the E-Health Act simply because it is a digitized record 
of personal health information. If Joe’s EHR is contained within a database that has been 
designated a HIB, collection use and disclosure of his personal health information will be 
governed primarily by the E-Health Act and in some instances by FIPPA or PIPA 
                                                 
240 Schedule 1 of BC FIPPA, supra note 23 states that a health care body means:  
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established under the Hospital (Auxiliary) Act, (c) a regional hospital district and a regional 
hospital district board under the Hospital District Act,…(f) a Provincial mental health facility 
as defined in the Mental Health Act, or (g) a regional health board designated under section 4 
(1) of the Health Authorities Act. 
241 E-Health Act, supra note 19, s 1. 
  
59 
(depending on whether his health care providers activities are public or private in nature). 
If Joe’s EHR is not contained within a HIB, it will not be governed by the E-Health Act.  
What this means for Joe is that if Joe’s EHR is part of a HIB, Joe’s personal 
health information will benefit from any specific protections provided to or requirements 
for digitized health information contained in the E-Health Act, which will be discussed in 
following sections. If Joe’s EHR is not part of a HIB, his personal health information will 
not be governed by an act that has any specificity to digitized health information, rather it 
will be governed by more general personal data protection legislation such as FIPPA or 
PIPA.  As will be shown in this study, though, there will only be a few ways in which 
such a difference in the governing act will actually affect the patient experience. 
ii) Consent to Collection: 
The E-Health Act does not use the word “consent” with reference to collection of 
personal health information. There are only six mentions of consent within the text of the 
E-Health Act.242 Four out of six consent references relate to obtaining an individual’s 
express consent to disclosure in certain circumstances, such as for planning or research. 
In the other two references, the word consent is part of a reference to the Health Care 
(Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act. Accordingly, the E-Health Act does not 
actually require patients to consent to the collection of their personal health 
information.243 British Columbia legislators decided to forego patients’ consent to 
collection of their personal health information into HIBs.  
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Instead, British Columbia made it a priority for patients to be able to restrict 
access to their personal health information contained in HIBs.244 In place of consent to 
collection, the E-Health Act uses a disclosure directive, which “is a ‘written instruction’ 
that may be used to restrict the disclosure of all or some of the personal health 
information within a HIB”.245 Scott commented that disclosure directives give patients “a 
multiplicity of choices with respect to protecting their health information from 
disclosure”.246 Section 5 of the E-Health Act describes the purposes for which personal 
health information may be disclosed. If disclosure occurs in Canada, then purposes must 
involve collecting and using personal health information as per section 4, planning or 
researching or, if outside of Canada, it must be for dealing with a public health threat. 
The E-Health Act’s Disclosure Directive Regulation247 also describes age related and 
other requirements for making and revoking disclosure directives. 
At first glance, disclosure directives appear to restore patients’ abilities to make 
decisions about what is done with their personal health information, which was taken 
away by the absence of a “consent to collection” requirement. However, the E-Health Act 
still limits patients making disclosure directives. Under the E-Health Act, it is possible for 
the Minister of Health to cap the number and breadth of disclosure directives available to 
patients.248 The scope of disclosure directives can also be limited by a designation order, 
in that patients may only be permitted to restrict disclosure based on the type of personal 
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health information, the purpose for which it will be provided or the persons who will 
receive the information.249 In emergency situations, when express consent is provided, a 
disclosure directive may be ignored by health care providers in favour of obtaining 
information that may assist with a patient’s care.250 The reasons for this include that 
when patients/persons request that their healthcare provider mask or lock 
components of their PHI, it may not be possible for their healthcare team 
to provide appropriate care. The potential negative outcomes associated 
with locking or masking PHI relevant to a patient/person’s care include 
misdiagnosis, adverse drug events or even healthcare providers refusing to 
provide care.251 
Further, subsection 8(3) indicates that, in respect of some HIBs, disclosure 
directives may not be available to patients if a data stewardship committee has suggested 
to the Minister of Health that that HIB should not have disclosure directives. It is 
interesting that data stewardship committees are afforded this ability, because section 
11(1) explains that such committees are in charge of disclosure for planning and research 
purposes. Data stewardship committees in charge of planning and research may be more 
inclined to limit disclosure directives than data stewardship committees that are 
independent of planning and research activities. 
Another section of note is 9(4), which states that disclosure directives will only 
become effective once activated in their HIB. However, the E-Health Act does not 
describe when activation must take place or what activation entails.  
Disclosure directives are a unique approach to promoting a patient’s ability to 
control the way in which her or his digitized personal health information is used and 
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disclosed. Examining the way disclosure directives affect the patient experience with the 
E-Health Act will show whether model 1 differs in this respect from the other legislative 
models. In fact, the analysis below demonstrates disclosure directives are one of the only 
major ways the E-Health Act, as a statute that separately and specifically addresses 
EHRs, changes the patient experience with Canadian EHR-related legislation.  
What this Means for Joe: 
In British Columbia, Joe will not be able to consent to the collection of his 
personal health information into an EHR in a HIB. Collection of personal health 
information in his EHR will be automatic if his EHR is to be part of a HIB, depending on 
the way EHRs in nationwide, interoperable databases are dealt with in the E-Health Act 
in future. Instead, under the current scheme, Joe would be given the opportunity to create 
a disclosure directive to indicate how he would like to restrict use and disclosure of his 
health information.  
Joe will first need to be informed by his health care providers that he has the 
ability to make these restrictions. Based on the limitations described in the preceding 
section, it is also possible his restrictions will not be observed. It could be the case that 
Joe has not previously encountered a jurisdiction wherein his personal health information 
is automatically collected (although it will be shown that there are few Canadian 
jurisdictions where consent is required). If that is true, Joe may be shocked to learn 
British Columbia does not allow him to choose whether or not his information will be 
collected. Perhaps there is some information contained in his EHR that is not relevant to 
his cancer treatments and that he would prefer to remove from his HIB. For this reason, it 
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can be argued “that choosing a disclosure directive model over consent to disclosure does 
not sufficiently respect a patient's autonomy”.252 
However, patients like Joe, who have particular information they prefer to 
withhold, may be satisfied to know it is possible to restrict disclosure of certain types of 
personal health information to certain health care providers. Joe’s fears about his 
information getting into the wrong hands may be quelled by this E-Health Act option.  
Joe may also be concerned about the implications of restricting disclosure of 
certain types of his health information. Scott commented that  
a disclosure directive that restricts certain persons or groups of persons 
from access may mean that the information collected by an authorized 
user may not be collected, used or disclosed by unauthorized persons or 
groups in downstream systems. Such an interpretation could have a 
significant impact on downstream [EHR] systems. However, it is not clear 
how such activities could be tracked.253 
It may make Joe uncomfortable to know his decision to restrict disclosure of some 
information could negatively affect care he receives at a later time. But, Joe may be 
satisfied he is the one to make this decision about his personal health information, rather 
than an administrator or health care provider.  
In fact, disclosure directives that do not allow certain individuals to see a patient’s 
health information may be more of an issue for institutions, in terms of restricting what 
“downstream” health care providers can see, and less of an immediate concern and cause 
of stress for patients like Joe. If Joe intentionally restricted person(s) from accessing 
information and that restriction is carried into other systems, it may affect the way 
administrators deal with his information. In this situation, though, Joe’s autonomy is 
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respected because his wishes are upheld and he has controlled the dissemination of his 
own information. 
iii) Limited Use: 
Under the E-Health Act, the purposes for which personal health information 
contained in HIBs can be collected and used are set out in the designation order.254 
Section 21 of the E-Health Act prohibits the collection and use of personal health 
information for any purpose that is not part of the designation order. Section 4 of the Act 
states the allowed purposes, which include providing health services or care, preventing 
and managing chronic conditions, health insurance and billing, dealing with public health 
needs, researching health matters and addressing public health threats. Section 3 also 
states a designation order must authorize one or more persons to use personal health 
information in a HIB. Consequently, the designation order can limit the number of 
persons authorized to use a patient’s information. 
To better illustrate what is meant by a designation order, one author, Scott, 
described the designation order contents for the Patient Laboratory Information Solution 
(“PLIS”), which is an example of an e-health project in British Columbia.255 PLIS was 
designated a HIB and enables clinicians to access digitized information about lab tests 
and results generated by both private and public entities.256 The designation order for 
PLIS states that personal health information contained within it may be used 
to prevent or manage chronic conditions and to address public health 
needs, collection and use for insurance and billing purposes, collection and 
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use for health services planning or improvement and for research into 
health issues and, subject to the approval of the data stewardship 
committee, disclosure for health services planning or improvement and for 
research into health issues.257 
Interestingly, these uses, while purporting to limit the way lab tests results may be 
used, are actually quite broad. Many different uses could fall within the purview of this 
designation order. For instance, “planning or improvement” could encompass an infinite 
number of hospital projects. “Research into health issues” could mean any conceivable 
type of research about any conceivable health matter. Furthermore, “insurance purposes” 
is undefined and could be interpreted to mean uses not in patients’ interests.  
So, theoretically, a list of purposes for which personal health information 
contained in HIBs can be used purport to limit what may be done with patients’ 
information. In the case of the above designation order, however, it could be argued that 
the designation order purposes are so broad that practically all possible uses fall within 
the contemplated purposes. That being said, though, one author argued “[t]he provisions 
of the [E-Health] Act [sic] with respect to use and disclosure are more limiting than those 
in FIPPA.”258 This study will show there are not great differences between the limits 
prescribed by various jurisdictions’ general personal data protection statutes and those 
prescribed by separate, specific acts, such as the E-Health Act.  
What this Means for Joe: 
To understand how the designation order limited use provision affects Joe, the 
PLIS designation order purposes for which personal health information may be used is 
                                                 
257 Ibid. 
258 Ibid at 61. 
  
66 
provided as an example in this section. It is appropriate to use the PLIS HIB as an 
example because it is likely Joe would undergo laboratory tests in a private or public 
sector laboratory to determine his cancer treatment progress after travelling to British 
Columbia. 
According to the designation order purposes described for the PLIS HIB above, 
Joe’s personal health information, if collected into this HIB, could be used for a wide 
variety of purposes. It is quite possible Joe’s personal health information would be used 
for a number of secondary purposes, such as public health statistics. As previously 
discussed, Joe would not be able to control whether his lab tests results were collected 
into the PLIS HIB if he was concerned that his information would be used in a way with 
which he did not agree. Under the E-Health Act, Joe is not required to consent to 
collection of his personal heath information. However, it appears Joe would only be able 
to control disclosure for undesirable secondary purposes by creating disclosure directives, 
which do not necessarily guarantee prescribed uses. 
The concept of limited use under the E-Health Act should also be examined in 
light of Scott’s observation that the E-Health Act limits the purposes for which personal 
health information contained in HIBs may be collected and used more than FIPPA. Based 
on the analysis of the PLIS designation order uses, Joe’s experience with the model 3 
provinces and territories will probably not differ to as great an extent as authors currently 
purport. Under model 3, it would seem only logical that broader use could be made of 
Joe’s EHR data because these jurisdictions’ have general personal data protection rather 
than EHR-specific and separate protection, or even health-specific personal data 
protection. But, based on the broad purposes for which Joe’s personal health information 
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could be used under a PLIS HIB, there may be little difference between Joe’s experience 
with models 1, 2 and 3 in this regard.  
The impact of designation order purposes on Joe also depends on whether he is 
concerned about limiting his data’s use in the first place. Joe may be perturbed to know 
that, when he travels to PEI, for example, his personal health information could 
theoretically be used for more purposes. Joe may be fairly unconcerned that the so-called 
broader FIPPA provisions are  
those respecting disclosure in accordance with a treaty, arrangement or 
written agreement made under an enactment of B.C. or Canada or to a 
Member of the Legislative Assembly who has been requested by the 
individual to resolve a problem or to a representative of the bargaining 
agent of an employee who has authorized an inquiry.259  
Furthermore, Joe may realize that, practically speaking the designation order 
purposes required under the E-Health Act, may not truly mean his personal health 
information will be disclosed in fewer situations than are allowed under FIPPA. This will 
be described in greater detail in the discussion of model 3. 
iv) Security Safeguards: 
There are no provisions in the E-Health Act that directly address the type or 
nature of protective safeguards that should be used in respect of HIBs. There is also no 
reference to any other act, such as FIPPA or PIPA, which specifies safeguards that should 
be employed. In terms of protecting privacy, section 21 of the E-Health Act simply 
indicates personal health information contained in HIBs must not be collected or used for 
purposes other than as described in the designation order and must not be disclosed 
contrary to the designation order or as stated in the E-Health Act. 
                                                 
259 Ibid. 
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What this Means for Joe: 
Even though the E-Health Act specifically deals with digitized health information, 
Joe cannot be confident EHR-specific safeguards are being used to keep his personal 
health information secure. Joe can assume hospital policies are in place to safeguard his 
data, but this is not legally prescribed. Joe can only be assured the physicians’ duty to 
keep his personal health information confidential is enough to ensure proper safeguards 
are set up. Joe is likely confident this is the case, given that even before his health 
information was digitized, his health care providers kept his health information secret. 
But, as yet, there is no indication that technological safeguards will be legally required 
under the E-Health Act. 
v) Patient Participation: 
The E-Health Act enables patient participation by affording patients the right to 
put disclosure directives in place. Section 17, which is not yet in force, will also allow 
patients to access their personal health information and the associated audit logs 
describing disclosures of their health information.260 Some of these mechanisms are 
                                                 
260 Bill 24, E-Health (Personal Health Information Access and Protection of Privacy) Act, 4th Sess, 38th 
Leg, British Columbia, 2008, s 17 (third reading) [Bill 24]. Section 17 provided that 
[s]ubject to th[e] Act and the regulations made under it, an administrator must make 
available, without request, to a person 
 (a) that person's personal health information contained in the health information bank for 
which the administrator is responsible, 
(b) a record of any disclosure directives made by the person that apply to the health 
information bank, and 
(c) information respecting who has collected, used or disclosed that person's personal health 
information. 
(2) An administrator may delete from the information that would otherwise be available, or 
from a record made available, under this section any information he or she would be entitled 
to refuse to disclose under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. 
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unique to the E-Health Act and not contained in other British Columbia personal data 
protection statutes.261 Disclosure directives and the patient implications were discussed 
above in regards to consent to collection but brief additional comments are made below. 
Patients’ access to health information and audit logs are then discussed.  
As described above, patients can participate with protecting their personal health 
information contained in HIBs by making a disclosure directive. While this type of 
participation is not specifically contemplated by the OECD individual participation 
principle, it does involve a patient’s active interaction with protecting their personal 
health information. Not only do disclosure directives allow patients to participate in 
protecting their data, disclosure directives have been touted as an “ingenious and 
workable privacy solution”.262 It has been argued “[t]he disclosure directive model 
created by the [E-Health] Act has sufficient flexibility to take account of all of the key 
variables and the privacy context for any given HIB”.263 The different contexts include 
community clinics, hospitals and general practitioners’ offices.264 Scott explained that 
each of these environments might engender different “patient privacy expectations”.265 
As a result, patients are permitted to participate in protecting their personal health 
information in different ways in each of these contexts and environments, thereby 
                                                 
(3) Section 19 [information-sharing agreements] does not apply to disclosure of personal 
health information under this section. 
261 Scott, supra note 26 at 75. 
262 Ibid at 79. 
263 Ibid. 
264 Ibid. 
265 Scott also cited “[t]he type, scope and sensitivity of the record, the nature of the database and proposed 
uses, the need for access to essential information, system security and other factors” as important variables 
informing the HIB privacy context. Scott, supra note 26 at 79. 
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actively tailoring the way their data may be used. However, as was previously discussed, 
there may be some instances where disclosure directives will be contravened in favour of 
efficiency or obtaining complete medical histories in emergency situations. 
Once proclaimed into force, section 17 of the E-Health Act will enable another 
type of patient participation directly contemplated in the OECD individual participation 
principle. Section 17 will permit patients to access their personal health information that 
is within a HIB.266 However, FIPPA may restrict patient participation in that it may limit 
the information the patient is entitled to see.267 It appears from this section, though, that 
patients would be able to view their record but not necessarily affect corrections to it. 
Indeed, Scott argued that “[t]hese standards, along with disclosure directives, establish 
new expectations for patient privacy in B.C. …enabling patients to review and have a say 
(albeit a limited say) as to how their records are being managed” [emphasis added]. 
Currently, though, reference to requests for information in the E-Health Act268, only 
pertain to persons authorized by designation orders to obtain the personal health 
information for the designation order purposes. The requests for information sections do 
not pertain to patients who are the source of personal health information. 
Lastly, in future, patients may participate in protecting their health information by 
viewing an audit log describing disclosures, if any, of their personal health information. 
Audit logs are used to monitor breaches of personal health information and disclosure 
directives in HIBs.269 Scott indicated the variety of HIBs created mandates audit logs 
                                                 
266 See Bill 24, supra note 260. 
267 Scott, supra note 26 at 68. 
268 In ss 6 & 7. 
269 Scott, supra note 26 at 80. 
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specific to each database.270 Like the above access provisions, the provisions permitting 
patients to access audit logs are also not yet in force.  
What this Means for Joe: 
If Joe’s personal health information is contained within an HIB in British 
Columbia after being transferred from Alberta and Saskatchewan, as was discussed with 
respect to consent to collection, Joe participates with data protection by creating a 
disclosure directive for his EHR.  
The effect of Joe creating a disclosure directive was discussed above. However, 
one author suggested there are additional considerations involved in that process. Scott 
suggested “it [is] important that the patient is well informed about his or her choice and 
the associated risks and is mature enough to appreciate the consequences”271 of creating a 
disclosure directive. It is true Joe must be informed about the risks and consequences of 
making a particular disclosure directive. But, if it is the intention of health care providers 
to judge whether Joe has the maturity to make a decision about a disclosure directive, the 
disclosure directive process will simply become paternalistic, rather than promote Joe’s 
autonomy. A patient like Joe probably wants to know decisions they make about 
disclosing health information will not be doubted or overridden. For this reason, the E-
Health Act may do little to assuage patients’ data protection concerns if it is 
commonplace for health care providers to circumvent disclosure directives in a system 
where the patients are not even able to consent to collection of their health information 
into an HIB. 
                                                 
270 Ibid. 
271 Ibid. 
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Until section 17 is proclaimed into force, Joe has no right under the E-Health Act 
to access his personal health information contained in an HIB to affect corrections or 
simply view its contents. Joe is also not yet able to view audit logs to see who has 
accessed his information, for what purposes its been used and to whom and when it was 
disclosed. Consequently, at this time, the E-Health Act does not afford Joe much ability 
to know what truly goes on with his personal health information, and will not do so until 
section 17 is proclaimed in force.  
So, while British Columbia purports to address the legal concerns raised by EHRs 
in a separate and specific way in the E-Health Act, the five criteria used in the study are 
not all dealt with in the EHR-specific context. It is shown in the next section that Quebec 
is similar in this respect as well. 
b) Quebec: 
This section introduces what has been done to implement an EHR system in 
Quebec, as well as the EHR separate and specific legislation enacted to address EHR 
implementation.272 Some insight regarding the way Quebec’s civil law regime is 
contrasted with the other provinces and territories’ EHR-related legislation must first be 
provided to address the way Quebec fits into the three models developed in this thesis.  
Civil law in Quebec involves prescribing specific rules under which all scenarios 
are to be interpreted. Consequently, Quebec’s treatment of EHRs will naturally address 
specific legal problems raised by EHRs more readily than the other provinces and 
                                                 
272 The analysis in this section is limited by the fact that the author of this thesis does not have civil law 
training. While Quebec is included for the sake of completeness and providing a national picture of EHR 
legislation, it must be noted that the Quebec experience is analyzed from the perspective of a common law 
trained scholar. 
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territories’ statutes, as a general rule. Quebec, therefore, and somewhat inevitably, will 
fall within and define model 1 because Quebec will always lead the way in enacting 
legislation that contemplates legal issues associated with new technology. However, this 
means that, in some ways, Quebec’s legislation can provide a benchmark for the way 
with which EHRs could be specifically dealt in statute. This will not necessarily change 
the patient experience with the EHR in Quebec, though. The patient experience will be 
analyzed further in this section.  
It has been more than ten years since Quebec determined e-Health would be part 
of its healthcare vision.273 The Quebec Ministry of Health and Social Services introduced 
Quebec’s EHR, the Dossier de santé du Québec,274 or Quebec Health Record (“QHR”), 
as an experimental project in the territory of the Capitale-Nationale, Saguenay—Lac-
Saint-Jean or Lanaudière health and social services agency. Currently, the regions of 
Capitale-Nationale, Estrie, Lanaudière and Montréal are participating and more regions 
will join in future.275 The Minister of Health and Social Services determines which 
regions take part in the project.276 Individuals in the participating regions may refuse to 
have an EHR, but only those individuals living in the regions can have an EHR.277 Within 
                                                 
273 Patrick Powers, “Québec’s e-Health Journey – Assessing the Path Forward” (2012) 10:3 
ElectronicHealthcare, e30 at e30, online: Longwoods < http://www.longwoods.com/content/22745>. 
274 Ibid. 
275 “Regions Participating in the QHR Project”, online: Dossier de santé – Ministère de la Santé et des 
Services sociaux <http://www.dossierdesante.gouv.qc.ca/en_citoyens_experimentation.phtml>. 
276 Information Document Regarding the Implementation of the Second Phase of the Experimental Project 
for the Québec Electronic Health Record (June 2010) at 4, online: Dossier de santé – Ministère de la Santé 
et des Services sociaux 
<http://dossierdesante.gouv.qc.ca/download.php?f=1fafb50fa07b29d5550de82380956014> [Information 
Document]. 
277 Ibid at 9. 
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the last two years, portions of the project have become operational and Quebec’s EHR is 
expected to achieve complete functionality by 2016.278  
In some senses, Quebec is not unlike the provinces in model 2 that enacted 
regulations pursuant to existing legislation to address EHRs. First and foremost, 
Quebec’s An Act respecting Health Services and Social Services279 governs records 
containing personal health information “held by public and private health and social 
service institutions.”280 Quebec’s Conditions281 is an Order in Council that governs EHR 
development in Quebec. Much like a regulation, an Order in Council is made pursuant to 
a statutory provision of a legislative enactment. The Conditions were created pursuant to 
the first paragraph of section 434 of An Act respecting health services and social 
services, which provides that 
the Minister of Health and Social Services…may, notwithstanding any 
inconsistent provision, to the extent and on the conditions fixed by the 
Government, implement any experimental project concerning the 
organization of the human or material resources of institutions for the 
purpose of fostering integrated organization and the provision of health 
services and social services.282 
The Conditions address the implementation of an experimental project initiated by the 
Quebec government in 2006 known as the Health and Social Services Network 
Computerization Plan, the point of which was to create an interoperable EHR. The 
Ministry of Health and Social Services stated “[a person’s] right to privacy and the 
                                                 
278 Powers, supra note 273 at e30. 
279 RSQ, c S-4.2. 
280 Information Governance, supra note 178 at 27. 
281 Conditions, supra note 18. As is clear from the title, two phases of EHR implementation have occurred. 
The first phase began in a medical clinic in the Capitale-Nationale region of Quebec in May 2008. The 
second phase brought EHR implementation to additional medical clinics in the Capitale-Nationale region 
and Estrie, Lanaudière and Montréal. Information Document, supra note 276 at 4-5. 
282 Conditions, supra note 18, preamble. 
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protection of the health information in [their] QHR are part of the guiding principles of 
the QHR project.”283  
The Quebec government made additional Orders in Council to address the 
evolution of EHR implementation. On November 30, 2011, the Minister of Health and 
Social Services made an additional Order in Council, Minister’s Order 2011-015, to 
indicate the Conditions would apply to the introduction of the EHR in Montreal.284 
Ultimately, in this study, Quebec is placed in model 1 because of the separate and 
specific way it addresses EHRs in its Order in Council. No other province has enacted a 
regulation that so comprehensively deals with the specific legal issues raised by EHRs. 
Even British Columbia’s E-Health Act is not as detailed as the Conditions. Further, the 
Conditions provide that  
[i]f the Québec Health Record is deployed throughout Québec, subject to 
any legislative amendments passed by the National Assembly for that 
purpose, the information stored under these Conditions by the entities 
referred to in section 1 shall continue to be stored by them, on the 
conditions prescribed by law at the time of the deployment.285  
In other words, the Conditions will be accepted as the governing statute at such time as 
the EHR is deployed throughout the province. 
                                                 
283 “Right to privacy and the protection of personal information”, online: Dossier de santé – Ministère de la 
Santé et des Services sociaux <http://www.dossierdesante.gouv.qc.ca/en_citoyens_confidentialite-
1.phtml>. 
284 This additional order in council indicated that 
the Minister of Health and Social Services [Yves Bolduc] has determined that March 30, 2012 will 
be the date on which Health Records may be constituted for anyone residing within the territory of 
the Montréal health and social services agency on February 29, 2012, who is entered in the register 
of insured persons kept by Régie de l’assurance maladie du Québec and does not register a refusal to 
have a Health Record during the preliminary refusal registration period, which is determined as 
follows: March 5, 2012 to March 26, 2012.  
Gazette Officielle du Quebec (2011) Vol 143, No 51, II, 3726. 
285 Conditions, supra note 18, s 8(2). 
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Moreover, Bill 59, An Act respecting the sharing of certain health information286, 
was introduced to the second session of the thirty-ninth legislature of the Quebec 
National Assembly in 2012. The Bill introduces legislation quite similar on its face to the 
E-Health Act. Like the E-Health Act, the Bill deals with health information banks. The 
Bill’s explanatory notes indicate the Act establishes six clinical domains and states that 
“[a] clinical domain is made up of one or more health information banks holding 
information that may be released in a secure manner through the Quebec Health 
Record”.287 The Bill also establishes “an electronic prescription management system for 
medication”288 to “shar[e]…electronic prescriptions for medication in a secure 
environment”.289  
However, unlike the E-Health Act, the Act creates rules to “protect health 
information held in a health information bank and to govern the release, use and 
conservation of information”.290 In addition, the Bill describes “[t]he rights of the persons 
to whom the information relates”291 such as “the right to refuse to allow the release of 
information held in a health information bank in a clinical domain and the right to have 
the information corrected.”292 Perhaps most importantly, the Act discusses “[s]pecific 
rules on the release, use and conservation of health information”293 which apply in place 
                                                 
286 2nd Sess, 39th Leg, Quebec, 2012 [Bill 59]. 
287 Ibid at 2 (Explanatory Notes). 
288 Ibid. 
289 Ibid. 
290 Ibid. 
291 Ibid. 
292 Ibid. 
293 Ibid. 
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of any legislative provisions, that provide rules to the contrary. In particular, 
“[a]djustments are made to the rights, provided for under the Act respecting Access to 
documents held by public bodies and the Protection of personal information, of a person 
to whom the information relates”.294 
The below analysis of the patient experience will be based on the Conditions, 
which are currently in force in Quebec, rather than Bill 59, although it seems Bill 59 may 
pass in the near future. Analysis of the Conditions is most appropriate, though, because 
they reflect the current legislative landscape in Quebec. In order to describe the patient 
experience in Quebec, the following sections discuss whether the Conditions have an 
EHR definition, and whether the Conditions address consent to collection, limited use, 
security safeguards and patient participation in their provisions. 
i) EHR Definition: 
As was previously discussed, the way a patient interacts with EHR-legislation in 
each Canadian province and territory depends upon whether and how EHR is defined in 
legislation. There is no definition of Quebec’s EHR in the Conditions. Instead, a 
definition is found in the Information Document Regarding the Implementation of the 
Second Phase of the Experimental Project for the Quebec Electronic Health Record.295 
According to the Information Document, the Quebec Electronic Health Record “is a new 
electronic tool aimed at giving all Quebeckers a file in which basic information on their 
state of health is kept”.296 The Information Document indicates the EHR “will enable 
                                                 
294 Ibid. 
295 Information Document, supra note 276 at 4. 
296 Ibid. 
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mainly physicians, nurses and pharmacists to consult and share…information”.297 In 
addition, although it does not explicitly define EHR, section 7 of the Conditions 
stipulates that an EHR “is made up of” the following types of information: 
the unique identifying number of the person concerned and the following 
information: 
(1) the results of the person’s laboratory analyses…; 
(2) the results of the person’s medical imaging examinations…; 
(3) the person’s medication…including any therapeutic indications given 
on the prescription. 
Based on the gradual implementation strategy for the experimental project, 
the Health Record may also include the following information: 
(1) contact information for the person’s professional contacts…; 
(2) the person’s immunization data…; 
(3) any allergies or intolerance that may have an impact on the person’s 
health or on a health and social service provider’s ability to take the 
person in charge; 
(4) emergency data and complementary information… 
The Information Document indicates “complementary information” includes “any 
additional information [an individual] and an authorized clinician decide to enter (such 
as: treatment, orthosis wearing, pacemaker, organ donation).”298 The Information 
Document further clarifies that subsection 7(3) entails all of an individual’s prescription 
medications obtained at pharmacies, which includes “intended therapeutic effects, if 
indicated on the prescription”.299  
Lastly, section 22 provides that  
                                                 
297 Ibid. 
298 Ibid at 5. 
299 Ibid. 
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[t]he agency may also store emergency data and complementary 
information on the person concerned, which may include any essential 
information needed before treating a person who is unable to communicate 
or presents clinical conditions that place the person’s health or life at risk 
if specific measures are not taken, including diagnoses, treatments, 
surgeries or immunization coverage, blood transfusion record, the use of 
orthotic or prosthetic devices or high technology devices, the fact that the 
person is a carrier of multiple resistant bacteria, the existence of consent to 
organ or tissue donation or a living will, the presence of a metal implant, 
pacemaker or contact lenses, the date of the event concerned and the 
number of reoccurrences, and any refusal to have a blood transfusion. 
So, while the Conditions do not define EHR, a number of sections in the Conditions 
describe in great enough detail what is contained in an EHR. It is suggested that it is, 
therefore, probably clear to patients what an EHR includes in Quebec. 
What this Means for Joe: 
If health care providers in Quebec use a combination of the definition contained 
in the Information Document, as well as the contents specified in section 7 of the 
Conditions, to explain to Joe that which his EHR contains, Joe would probably 
understand what constitutes his EHR. While the definition contained in the Information 
Document is not a statutory definition, the contents specified in section 7 clarify to a fair 
level of detail what comprises Joe’s EHR. Joe may wonder what may comprise 
“complementary information” and “emergency data”. These answers are not enumerated 
in the statute but instead described in the Information Document. The statute, therefore, 
provides a broad basis from which to draw the particular types of information, and 
enables an EHR to include information previously not contemplated by Order in Council 
drafters.  
As will be discussed, the Conditions are far more specific about EHR contents 
than the E-Health Act, which purports to deal directly with digitized information. A 
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patient, like Joe, can be much more certain about what types of information his physician 
will view and use to provide treatment if Joe travelled to Quebec rather than British 
Columbia. However, this discrepancy between EHR descriptions may not alter Joe’s 
EHR experience with the EHR statutory regime. Health care providers in British 
Columbia and Quebec likely established through practice what to include in EHRs.   
As with the E-Health Act, though, the fact that EHR is not defined in the 
Conditions may still leave it open to interpretation as to what the EHR in fact entails in 
Quebec. Further, it is not clear from the Conditions if the EHR is the individual computer 
file, or the electronic system itself. 
ii) Consent to Collection: 
As was previously discussed, the OECD collection limitation principle states that 
individuals should have knowledge of or consent to collection of their personal 
information.300 However, the Conditions do not allow patients to consent to collection. 
Section 6 of the Conditions provides it is the EHR project’s aim to provide every 
insured person on the Board’s register with a Quebec Health Record, unless they 
explicitly refused to have one.  Therefore, section 6 makes clear that the Quebec EHR 
system is premised on voluntary participation; however, in the participating regions, an 
individual’s personal health information is always collected into an EHR, even if an 
individual refuses an EHR. 
                                                 
300 OECD Guidelines, supra note 170, s 7. 
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Section 79 of the Conditions indicates that “[a]ny person who is entered in the 
register of insured persons kept by the Board may refuse to have a Health Record”.  
Persons 14-years-of-age or older may refuse an EHR; refusal can also be expressed by a  
holder of parental authority or tutor of a person under the age of 14, [a] 
tutor or curator of an incapable person, [a] mandatary of a person whose 
mandate given in anticipation of incapacity has been homologated, 
or…any person authorized for that purpose by the person concerned.301  
Individuals who refuse an EHR must be instructed about the EHR project 
“objectives and aims”,302 as well as the “terms and conditions”303 relating to access and 
use, communication, retention and destruction of information contained in EHR 
systems.304 
The Conditions permit qualified individuals to refuse a Health Record through 
many different means.305 Individuals are permitted 21 days from a date determined by the 
Minister of Health and Social Services in which to refuse an EHR.306   And, as Quebec’s 
                                                 
301 Conditions, supra note 18, s 79. 
302 Ibid, s 80. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Ibid. 
305 Section 85 states that it may be done  
(1) in person, to a person employed or directed by an institution participating in the experimental 
project; 
(2) by telephone, to any person designated by the Associate Deputy Minister for information 
technologies; 
(3) by mail; 
(4) by Internet; 
(5) by any other means indicated by the Associate Deputy Minister for information technologies 
using the procedure, if applicable, set out in the information document posted in particular on the 
website of the Ministère de la Santé et des Services sociaux. 
A confirmation of the registration of the refusal shall be given to the applicant, except if the 
applicant sent the refusal by mail. 
306 Information Document, supra note 276 at 4. 
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EHR project was still experimental at the time the Order in Council was made, section 83 
provides that “if the Health Record is deployed throughout Québec the agreement is 
deemed to be valid until the person refuses to have a Health Record.”307 So, first-phase 
EHRs stayed active in the second phase of implementation, but individuals were also 
permitted to indicate they did not want an EHR anymore.308 As per section 84, “[a] 
person may refuse at any time to have a Health Record [emphasis added].” 
However, as described above, no matter when an individual refuses to have an 
EHR, entities will still collect information, including the individual’s pharmacy 
prescription medication, medical imaging exam results, and laboratory examinations and 
test results.309 Consequently, the Conditions do not afford individuals the right to consent 
to collection, but rather to prevent the collected information from being accessed and 
used. 
Moreover, unlike in British Columbia, individuals cannot choose which 
information to include in their EHR.310 Quebec cites “professional responsibility and 
quality of care”311 as reasons for including all of the stipulated information. Individuals 
are advised to simply refuse an EHR if they do not wish certain information to be 
available to health care providers.312 Similarly, individuals are not permitted to state 
which health care providers can access their EHRs. Again, this prohibition differs from 
                                                 
307 It has been indicated that the project will be deemed non-experimental and in effect as at the end of 
March 2012, however, the National Assembly has yet to pass the new legislation as of the time of writing 
this thesis. 
308 Information Document, supra note 276 at 4. 
309 Ibid at 10. 
310 Ibid at 11. 
311 Ibid. 
312 Ibid. 
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British Columbia’s E-Health Act, which permits individuals to specify particular health 
care providers to whom individuals do not wish to grant access. However, section 17 of 
the Conditions provides that  
Information stored prior to a person’s refusal to have a Health Record 
remains inaccessible to an authorized health service provider while the 
refusal is in effect, unless the health service provider justifies the need to 
access the information for one of the following reasons: 
(1) the health service provider has already accessed the person’s Health 
Record, before the person refuses to have a Health Record; 
(2) the health service provider is part of a care team that includes another 
health service provider to whom subsection 1 applies. 
So, even in Quebec, a patient’s direction about accessing information contained in her or 
his EHR is subject to multiple exceptions, as is also the case in British Columbia. 
What this means for Joe 
The patient experience with Quebec’s Conditions is not unlike that in British 
Columbia in respect of the consent to collection criterion. As in British Columbia, 
Quebec’s legislation allows patients like Joe to limit access to their information. In both 
British Columbia and Quebec, Joe is not given an opportunity to consent to the collection 
of his personal health information into his EHR. Instead, Joe is permitted to refuse access 
to his information once its collected. So, in some respects, Quebec’s legislation ensures 
Joe’s autonomy by introducing some patient controls over personal health information. 
But, under Quebec’s Conditions, an individual never has a choice as to whether the 
information is collected in the first place. 
Quebec and British Columbia’s legislation differ in terms of whether individuals 
can specify to whom and what type of information may be made accessible. Quebec does 
not allow individuals to specify these criteria, but British Columbia’s E-Health Act does. 
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However, it is arguable that Quebec and British Columbia do not differ to any great 
extent in this respect because British Columbia’s E-Health Act permits health care 
providers to access normally inaccessible information in the event of emergency. 
Emergency situations are the reason for allowing Quebec health care providers access to 
all of individuals’ personal health information all the time. British Columbia allows 
access in emergency situations as well, so this effectively makes the patient experience in 
both provinces the same in model 1 in respect of this criterion. 
iii) Limited Use: 
In Quebec, another principle upon which the second phase of implementation is 
premised is “limiting the use and disclosure of the information contained in [an 
individual’s] file”.313 This principle aligns with the OECD limited use guideline, which 
again states that “[p]ersonal data should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise 
used for purposes other than” those specified at the time of collection or those compatible 
with the original purposes and specified at the time the purpose is changed.314 
Accordingly, section 11(5) of the Conditions sets limits on using information contained 
in EHRs; information may only be used for purposes stipulated in section 10 of the 
Conditions.  The purposes discussed in section 10 include giving 
authorized health service providers access to relevant, organized, 
integrated and updated information to enable them to quickly assimilate 
information on a person’s health when they take charge of that person or 
dispense any kind of health service to the person that continues and is 
complementary to the services dispensed by other health service 
providers; and… 
                                                 
313 Ibid at 2. 
314 OECD Guidelines, supra note 170, ss 9-10. 
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[ensuring] the effective communication of the Health Record, for the sole 
purpose of dispensing health services to the person concerned [emphasis 
added]. 
Only “authorized health service providers” may receive the information if it is required to 
execute their duties.315 In other words, personal health information contained in EHRs 
can only be used by health services providers when providers take care of or provide 
health services to an individual who is the subject of the EHR.  
Moreover, according to section 75, 
[t]he manager of the Québec Health Record directory may not use the 
stored information for any other purposes than its communication to 
authorized health service providers according to the access profile 
assigned to them. 
Sections 11(5), 10 and 75 are broad provisions governing the way in which patients’ 
personal health information contained in EHRs may be used. Unlike the specific 
provisions indicating the type of information contained in EHRs, the purview of the use 
provisions is quite wide – “dispensing health services” can conceivably encompass many 
actions taken by health service providers and this phrase is not defined in the Conditions.  
Practically speaking, the use provisions wide purview is important for enabling 
health service providers’ access to patients’ health information in many health contexts 
and for numerous situations that may arise. Consequently, it appears that, under the 
Conditions, use of personal health information contained in EHRs is only narrowed by 
the fact that health service providers must be “authorized” rather than by any purposes 
specified in section 10. 
 
                                                 
315 Conditions, supra note 18, s 11(5). 
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What this means for Joe: 
If Joe travels to Quebec and receives health care, he will be sure his health service 
providers will only use the personal health information contained in his EHR if they are 
authorized to do so and will only use it for the purposes of dispensing health services to 
him. Similarly, the EHR directory manager is also bound to use his personal health 
information in this manner. It is likely Joe will be unsure about what constitutes health 
services. Joe may be concerned about the fact the limited use provision is actually quite 
broad. However, he will probably take some comfort that health service providers must 
obtain a certificate of authorization, which is discussed next, before they can use his 
information. 
iv) Security Safeguards: 
Quebec’s second phase of EHR implementation is also premised upon the 
importance of keeping information secure.316 In section 2 of Chapter 1, Division 1, the 
Conditions address entities317 requiring safety measures to ensure information is 
protected. Section 2 states that “entities must establish a set of safety measures and 
mechanisms to ensure the availability, integrity and confidentiality of the information 
they hold. They must also ensure that the mechanisms function adequately.” In addition, 
section 11 requires compliance with the principles of  
                                                 
316 Information Document, supra note 276 at 2. 
317 Entities or entity are described in section 1 as any or all of the following:  
the Minister, the manager of the Québec Health Record directory, any health and social 
services agency, hereinafter referred to as an “Agency”, authorized by the Minister to 
establish the service to store certain health information for any person referred to in section 6, 
the manager of the information system in the laboratory domain, the manager of an 
information system in the medical imaging domain, the manager of the register of the results 
of medical imaging examinations, the Régie de l’assurance maladie du Québec, hereinafter 
referred to as the “Board”, and the manager of access services. 
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(8) responsibility and accountability, in that the entities referred to in 
section 1, as well as institutions and health service providers referred to in 
section 4, must ensure the proper operation of the measures and 
mechanisms established under their responsibility to ensure the security of 
the informational assets concerned and the confidentiality of information; 
[and] 
(9) the security of informational assets, in that the entities referred to in 
section 1 must establish a set of safety measures and mechanisms to 
ensure the availability, integrity and confidentiality of the information they 
hold 
Moreover, the manager of access services, who is appointed by the Minister of 
Health and Social Services, is duty bound to create components maintaining security of 
the personal health information contained in EHRs.318 As described in the previous 
section, a specific security safeguard addressed by the Conditions entails authentication 
certificates issued by the Regie de l’assurance maladie du Quebec.319 Only health care 
providers who hold these certificates can access an individual’s EHR. The authentication 
certificate is specific to the health care providers’ particular role.320 The Ministry of 
Health and Social Services indicates the authentication certificates create a “highly secure 
access mechanism”.321 
What this means for Joe 
Patients travelling to Quebec can expect that security measures are in place 
protecting personal health information contained in their EHRs based on the above 
provisions. In fact, patients like Joe would be more confident that their information is 
safeguarded in Quebec because a particular individual is appointed to address the very 
                                                 
318 Conditions, supra note 18, s 71(1). 
319 Information Document, supra note 276 at 6. 
320 Ibid. 
321 Ibid. 
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issue of security. Other than authentication certificates, however, Joe would be unclear 
about what specific mechanisms were being used to protect his health information. In 
fact, the general security safeguards prescribed in sections 2 and 11 are not unlike those 
required in health-specific and general personal data protection legislation described in 
models 1 and 2. 
v) Patient Participation: 
Quebec’s Information Document states patient rights “are respected and 
protected”322 during the second phase of EHR implementation. The rights to which the 
Information Document refers include individuals’ “right to privacy; right to information 
and the right to access one’s own health record; right to correct inaccurate or incomplete 
information; and right to lodge a complaint.”323 Each of these rights reflect the OECD 
individual participation principle that patients should have the right to learn whether an 
entity has data about them, what that information is and to be able to change the data if 
required. Several sections of the Conditions address these rights. 
Section 11(6) provides that a person has “the right of access and rectification”.324 
A description of these rights is found in later sections of the Conditions. To consult 
                                                 
322 Ibid at 7 
323 Ibid at 2. 
324 A person’s right in section 11(6) entails the following:  
(a) has a right of access to the information held by the entities referred to in section 1, to the 
name of the health service provider or to the identifier of the information system covered by 
an object certificate that sent the information, and to the date on which the information was 
sent; 
(b) has a right of access to the person’s Health Record, to the name of any health service 
provider who has consulted the person’s Health Record, and to the date on which it was 
consulted; 
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information contained in an EHR, an individual is required to file a request with the head 
of the hospital or community centre’s Medical Records Department. Section 90 states 
that an access or rectification application must be in writing and made out by the person 
who is the subject of the information or another person entitled to receive that personal 
information. Section 92 provides that  
[th]e person is entitled to receive any personal information concerning the 
person contained in the person’s Health Record or in one of the 
information systems referred to in sections 23, 28 and 45. 
The person may also receive the identifier of the computer system or the 
name of the health service provider who entered information in an 
information system or the storage system referred to in section 17, and the 
date on which the information was entered. 
Interestingly, section 92 of the Conditions also indicates that a “person may receive the 
reason why the person’s refusal to have a Health Record has been overridden.” Patients 
will receive a receipt of acknowledgement of their request and an answer to the request 
20 days after acknowledgement.325 If the answer does not follow in 20 days, the patient 
will receive a notice and an answer will follow 10 days after that.326 
                                                 
(c) may demand the rectification of any information concerning the person held by an entity 
referred to in section 1, or contained in the person’s Health Record, that is inaccurate, 
incomplete or equivocal, or that was gathered, stored or communicated without authorization; 
(7) a right of redress, in that any person is entitled to file a complaint with 
(a) the person responsible for access to documents and the protection of personal information 
at an entity referred to in section 1; 
(b) the person responsible for the central coordination of requests for access and rectification 
and complaints referred to in section 100; 
(c) the Commission d’accès à l’information; 
(d) the Minister[.] 
325 Information Document, supra note 276 at 7. 
326 Ibid. 
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As provided for in section 11(6), the Conditions also permit patients to rectify 
“inaccurate, incomplete, ambiguous [and] unauthorized information”327 contained in their 
EHR. Section 100 addresses rectification: 
[e]very person who receives confirmation that the person’s Health Record 
or one of the information systems referred to in sections 23, 28 and 45 
contains personal information concerning the person that is inaccurate, 
incomplete or equivocal, or whose collection, communication or 
conservation were not authorized by these Conditions, may demand that it 
be rectified. 
Sections 101-111 then describe further requirements for rectification procedures, 
including timelines for response from appropriate officials. A patient may file a 
rectification request at the same location as for the access requests. A response will 
follow in 30 days, and if not within that time, then 30 days following that.328 The same 
process is followed when a patient wants to obtain a list of those entities or individuals 
that have accessed their EHR.329 Sections 101-111 also provide alternatives to 
rectification and enable health providers to correct information if inaccurate. 
What this means for Joe 
Based on the provisions laid out in the Conditions, a patient like Joe, would 
clearly understand how to obtain any information contained in his personal health record, 
details about its use and also how the information could be corrected if he finds an error 
or omission.  
Consequently, Joe would feel confident he could ensure his health care providers 
have the correct and complete information about his medical history at their disposal 
                                                 
327 Ibid at 8. 
328 Ibid. 
329 Ibid. 
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when dispensing health services to him. This may be particularly important for 
individuals travelling from other provinces, who wish to confirm that their new health 
services providers know what has occurred in Joe’s medical history. As a result, such 
provisions would enhance Joe’s autonomy by ensuring he participates in his own care 
and the responsibility of taking charge of his health. 
The specificity with which Quebec’s Conditions addresses access and requests for 
corrections is not unique, however. A discussion of the similarity between Quebec’s 
Conditions and even general personal data protection legislation in this respect will 
follow in discussions of models 2 and 3.  
c) Summary of Patients’ Interaction with Model 1 
Model 1, separately and specifically addressing EHRs in legislation, is found in 
British Columbia and Quebec. Even though both provinces purport to specifically deal 
with EHRs in statute, it could still be expected that Quebec and British Columbia’s laws 
would differ to a great extent because Quebec is a civil law and British Columbia is a 
common law jurisdiction. At least with respect to EHRs, though, the differences are in 
fact much less pronounced than expected.  
As shown in Table 1, neither jurisdiction defines the technological phenomena 
with which their statutes purport to deal. Quebec describes EHRs through various 
provisions but does not define the term in statute. British Columbia does not describe 
EHRs at all but rather refers to HIBs. Neither province requires consent to collection; 
however, both provinces require limited use of digitized health records.330 But, the 
                                                 
330 This term is used because British Columbia does not actually refer to EHRs. 
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provisions requiring limited use essentially afford health care providers broad discretion 
to override such requirements for various reasons. The E-Health Act does not refer to 
security safeguards, but such protection is available through FIPPA, although it is not 
EHR-specific. Quebec’s Conditions refers specifically to security safeguards but does not 
delve deeply into what such safeguards entail; in effect, Quebec’s security requirements 
are, therefore, not unlike FIPPA’s. Last, these two model 1 provinces permit patient 
participation through different means, although, ultimately, both allow access and 
requests to make corrections.  
One significant difference between Quebec and British Columbia, and, as will be 
shown in the proceeding analyses, between each of the other Canadian jurisdictions and 
British Columbia, is the E-Health Act’s use of disclosure directives. Disclosure directives 
are the single most unique aspect of British Columbia’s EHR-specific legislation and do 
buck the trend toward similarity that exists between the other jurisdictions. 
The similarity between the model 2 and 3 jurisdictions is addressed in the next 
discussions. 
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TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE TREATMENT OF PERSONAL 
HEALTH INFORMATION IN EHRS IN MODEL 1  
Study 
Criteria: 
 
Models & 
their 
Jurisdictions: 
 
EHR 
Definition 
Consent to 
Collection 
Limited Use Security 
Safeguards331 
Patient 
Participation 
Model 1:      
BC No No Yes Yes Yes332 
QC No No Yes Yes Yes 
 
3) MODEL 2 – HEALTH-SPECIFIC PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION 
LEGISLATION CONTAINING EHR-RELATED PROVISIONS 
As shown in Figure 1, model 2 includes provinces that have health-specific 
personal data protection legislation containing EHR-specific provisions in statute or 
regulations. The greatest number of Canadian jurisdictions have chosen this legislative 
route and amended existing legislation to accommodate the specific legal issues raised by 
EHRs: Ontario, Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and Labrador and New 
Brunswick. Using this legislative model enables jurisdictions to build upon existing data 
protection rules relating to health information to encompass the digitized environment 
within a pre-existing framework.  
                                                 
331 Only general security safeguards are described in BC FIPPA, supra note 23. There are no security 
safeguards described in the E-Health Act. Quebec’s Conditions describe security safeguards specifically 
related to EHRs. 
332 Patient participation is addressed in BC FIPPA, supra note 23 rather than in the E-Health Act (at least 
until section 17 of the E-Health Act is declared in force, which was not yet done at the time of writing this 
thesis). 
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Arguably, amending pre-existing legislation is the most efficient way of 
addressing an existing phenomenon, such as health records, that has recently evolved 
through technological change. Rules and safeguards that may still apply to health records 
are already contained within the legislation. The advantage of such a strategy is that, 
theoretically, all the change that is required is any provisions dealing with the technology 
and the problems it presents. The disadvantage is that conflict may inevitably result 
between provisions addressing the new and old technology. Provisions may be left in 
that, are, in fact, detrimental to protecting personal health information in the new 
technological context. Some of the pre-existing provisions will not necessarily harm 
patient privacy but may, instead, make it more difficult to interpret amendments and 
simply cause unnecessary complications in administering the legislation.333 
While there are both advantages and disadvantages to integrating new with old 
provisions, six Canadian provinces have already made a legislative choice to address 
EHR through amendment, rather than by creating new separate EHR-specific legislation, 
as was done in British Columbia and Quebec, or by ignoring the EHR context all 
together, as in the territories, Nova Scotia and PEI. Even though each of these provinces 
have dealt with EHR governance through enacting EHR related regulations to amend 
statutes, each jurisdiction also differs (to a certain extent) between the way it deals with 
the specific legal concerns raised by personal health information contained in EHRs. For 
instance, several provinces have different ways of dealing with consent to collection of 
personal health information contained in EHRs. Canada Health Infoway wrote that  
                                                 
333 See Gordon, supra note 6 for another discussion of the benefits and disadvantages of amending existing 
legislation to address new phenomena. 
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[t]he differing consent regimes can best be illustrated by noting specific 
examples from various Canadian jurisdictions, such as Manitoba, Ontario, 
and Saskatchewan, which employ a non-consensual, implied and deemed 
consent model, respectively, for obtaining patient consent.334 
Albeit, there are certainly ways in which even provinces that have chosen the same 
legislative model differ. However, it will be shown in the below legislative descriptions, 
comparisons and analyses, that the current EHR-related provisions in both model 1 and 
model 2 provinces do not create extremely disparate patient experiences between 
Canadian jurisdictions. In fact, many of the ways in which the model 2 provinces have 
amended their statutes are quite similar to the ways the model 1 provinces have enacted 
EHR-specific statutes, even despite that Quebec is a civil law regime. 
The following sections will describe the legislative provisions in each of Ontario, 
Alberta, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador and Saskatchewan. 
Following that analysis, the resulting patient experience under model 2 is described and 
then compared with the patient experience in model 1 provinces. It is found that the 
patient experience with model 2 provinces does not differ to a great extent from the 
patient experience discovered in the analysis of model 1 provinces. 
a) Ontario: 
In Ontario, an organization called eHealth Ontario is “harnessing information 
technology and innovation to improve patient care, safety and access in support of the 
government’s health strategy”.335 eHealth Ontario was created in the fall of 2008 and 
resulted from the merger of two existing organizations, including Smart Systems for 
                                                 
334 Information Governance, supra note 178 at 34. 
335 eHealth Ontario, “Frequently Asked Questions”, online: eHealth Ontario 
<http://www.ehealthontario.on.ca/about/faqs.asp>. 
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Health Agency and the eHealth Program of the Ministry of Health and Long-Term 
Care.336 eHealth Ontario has the primary responsibility for executing Ontario’s “eHealth 
strategy” and its purpose includes encompassing “all health care system information 
system initiatives that [a]re provincially funded [;] [s]upport clinicians and the delivery of 
patient care [;] [a]re actually or potentially province-wide in scope”.337 eHealth Ontario 
indicates that, through its initiatives, Ontario will have a comprehensive EHR by 2015.338 
While eHealth Ontario’s personal data protection requirements are addressed in 
PHIPA, interestingly, eHealth Ontario implemented its own privacy and data protection 
policy, personal information privacy policy, and personal health information privacy 
policy.339 eHealth Ontario’s personal health information privacy policy states that it 
contains mandatory requirements that “go beyond [those] laid out in legislation and 
regulation”.340 Moreover, some of eHealth Ontario’s programs and services have their 
own privacy policies. The Enterprise Master Patient Index (EMPI) is such a tool; its own 
privacy policy is fashioned to reflect the Canadian Standards Association’s Model Code 
for Protection of Personal Information, which, as previously discussed, was modeled after 
the OECD Guidelines.341 eHealth Ontario indicates that personal health information 
collected, used and disclosed through the EMPI is governed by PHIPA. It is, in fact, the 
                                                 
336 Ibid. 
337 Ibid. 
338 Ibid. 
339 eHealth Ontario, “Privacy”, online: eHealth Ontario < 
http://www.ehealthontario.on.ca/privacy/index.asp>. 
340 eHealth Ontario, “PHI Privacy Policy”, online: eHealth Ontario 
<http://www.ehealthontario.on.ca/pdfs/Privacy/PHI_PrivacyPolicy.pdf>. 
341 eHealth Ontario, “Enterprise Master Patient Index (EMPI)”, online: eHealth Ontario < 
http://www.ehealthontario.on.ca/programs/clientRegistry.asp>. The EMPI is used by Ontario’s Wait Times 
Information System, which hospitals employ to identify patients between health care institutions. It 
currently does not contain clinical information. 
  
97 
EMPI Privacy Policy, though, which deals quite specifically with the OECD criteria 
analyzed in this thesis, including consent to collection, limited use, security safeguards 
and patient participation. However, the EMPI Privacy Policy and all others produced by 
eHealth Ontario are not legally binding and we must look to PHIPA’s regulation to 
determine the way Ontario deals with EHRs. Despite the specificity with which eHealth 
Ontario’s policies deal with the OECD principles, the interplay between eHealth 
Ontario’s policies and PHIPA is a topic that requires further analysis and which is outside 
the scope of this thesis. 
Ontario amended its health-specific personal data protection statute, PHIPA, to 
include EHR-specific provisions. However, electronic records are only briefly mentioned 
within the text of the PHIPA itself. Namely, section 10(3) of PHIPA states that “[a] 
health information custodian that uses electronic means to collect, use, modify, disclose, 
retain or dispose of personal health information shall comply with the prescribed 
requirements, if any.” Section 10(4) further indicates that 
[a] person who provides goods or services for the purpose of enabling a 
health information custodian to use electronic means to collect, use, 
modify, disclose, retain or dispose of personal health information shall 
comply with the prescribed requirements, if any. 
It is section 73(1)(h) that authorizes the Minister to make the prescribed requirements in 
regulations. PHIPA’s General Regulation 329/04342 (“General Regulation”) was 
amended to address EHRs. 
To flesh out its “prescribed requirements” and address EHRs, PHIPA’s General 
Regulation was amended in June 2011. Regulation 331/11 amended section 6.1 and 
                                                 
342 O Reg 329/04. 
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added section 6.2 to General Regulation to provide greater specificity about what eHealth 
Ontario must do relating to EHRs. As will be described in greater detail below, the 
amendments clarified obligations of EHR service providers, and described eHealth 
Ontario’s obligations, which include safeguarding information and ensuring compliance. 
The amendments “clarif[ied] that eHealth Ontario can create or maintain Electronic 
Health Records as a service for Health Information Custodians, when it is acting as a 
Health Information Network Provider for those Custodians”.343 
As in British Columbia, it could be argued that PHIPA’s General Regulation 
simply legalizes the work done by eHealth Ontario in creating or maintaining EHRs 
because section 6.2 provides eHealth Ontario with the authority to do so. The specific 
ways with which personal health information contained in EHRs must be dealt seem to be 
left to health care administrators. Legislators have allowed administrators to determine 
the ways legal problems associated with EHRs will be addressed through policies, even 
though such policies are not legally binding. As will be discussed below, it could be 
argued Ontario’s EHR-related regulation deals with EHRs less specifically and 
comprehensively than British Columbia and Quebec. However, analysis of specific 
aspects of PHIPA’s General Regulation shows that the actual statutory differences 
between Ontario and the two model 1 provinces do not truly affect patients’ practical 
experience with the legislation.  
                                                 
343 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, “Notice of Proposed Amendment to Regulation 329/04 under 
the Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004 Clarifying eHealth Ontario’s Authority as a Health 
Information Network Provider to Create Electronic Health Records” at 1, online: Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care < 
http://health.gov.on.ca/en/common/legislation/priv_legislation/docs/pub_notice_ehealth.pdf>. 
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In the following discussion, Ontario’s PHIPA will be discussed in light of the five 
criteria analyzed in this study, and then compared with those provinces previously 
described in this thesis. 
i) EHR Definition: 
EHR is defined in Ontario’s personal data protection legislation. Section 6.2(4) of 
PHIPA’s General Regulation states that an  
“electronic health record” means a record of personal health information 
created or maintained in electronic form by eHealth Ontario to enable 
health information custodians to use electronic means to disclose personal 
health information to one another for the purpose of providing or assisting 
in the provision of health care to the individual whose personal health 
information is contained in the record. 
eHealth Ontario is involved in, and therefore creates or maintains, EHRs for custodians in 
the following contexts: Diabetes Management, ePrescribing, Drug Profile Viewer, 
eReferral & Resource Matching, Ontario Laboratories Information System, Diagnostic 
Imaging and several other services, including the EMPI.344 Each of these services fulfill 
functions to which each of their names allude. The EMPI’s function is perhaps not as 
self-evident. The EMPI “stores and links demographic and selected personal 
information”345 such as a person’s date of birth, name, health card and medical record 
numbers. It is clear from the General Regulation’s EHR definition that the EHR-specific 
provisions govern EHRs in each of these contexts because these are contexts in which 
EHRs are created or maintained by eHealth Ontario.  
                                                 
344 Supra note 341. 
345 Ibid. 
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In Ontario, PHIPA’s EHR definition is tied to eHealth Ontario; other digitized 
health records not created or maintained by eHealth Ontario are not directly contemplated 
by the EHR-specific regulation; instead, such digitized records are governed by PHIPA’s 
non-EHR specific provisions. So, even though, Ontario, defined EHR directly within the 
amended regulation, unlike British Columbia and Quebec, it is possible that not all 
digitized health records are contemplated by the regulation. British Columbia and Quebec 
purported to specifically address EHRs through statute but did not define EHRs in 
legislation. Ultimately, though, it seems likely that the model 1 provinces’ and Ontario’s 
legislation will still be interpreted to include digitized information, regardless of whether 
it is captured by the EHR definition. 
What this Means for Joe 
At first glance, it may seem that an actual EHR definition would mean a patient in 
Ontario would know exactly what is implicated by their digitized personal health 
information. A patient, like Joe, would know from reading the definition that the record is 
required to be created or maintained by eHealth Ontario to fall within the provisions of 
the act. If Joe is travelling to Ontario, his EHR may not have been created or be 
maintained by eHealth Ontario. Rather, it is likely that his record was created and is 
maintained in another jurisdiction. Consequently, it is unclear whether the EHR-specific 
provision in the regulation would apply to his record. It appears that the non-EHR 
specific provisions in PHIPA would apply, though. 
On the other hand, depending on the care Joe receives when he travels to Ontario, 
it is conceivable an EHR may be created and then be maintained by eHealth Ontario if 
Joe requires treatment or tests that necessitate a new eHealth Ontario record. Presumably, 
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this could include any one of the records in the above listed eHealth Ontario services, 
such as a record in the EMPI. The EHR definition does not enumerate records, but 
instead indicates it could be any of the records developed by eHealth Ontario, as long as 
eHealth Ontario creates or maintains it. 
Joe may find his experience with EHR legislation in Ontario is similar to his 
experience in British Columbia. In both provinces, to be caught by each act’s respective 
provisions, Joe’s record must be encompassed by a designated service, which is either a 
database designated by the Minister, as in British Columbia, or a database created or 
maintained by eHealth Ontario. It is likely the two provinces’ services will not differ 
drastically in terms of the records designated health information banks by the Minister 
and the records created or maintained by eHealth Ontario. Both will include records 
generated as a result of laboratory testing, for instance.   
Even though each province’s EHR definitions may not change Joe’s experience to 
any great degree, Ontario’s approach to consent, limited use, safeguards and patient 
participation could differ. After all, Ontario’s PHIPA has been declared substantially 
similar to PIPEDA whereas British Columbia’s E-Health Act has not. At face value, a 
patient might expect that, for this reason, Ontario’s EHR personal data protection 
legislation more comprehensively addresses the OECD principles, even though British 
Columbia enacted specific legislation to deal with EHRs. It will be shown, however, that 
the existing statutory differences do not create a great disparity in the patient experience 
between models. 
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ii) Consent to Collection: 
As was previously discussed, the OECD collection limitation principle states 
individuals should have knowledge of or consent to collection of their personal 
information.346 In Ontario, PHIPA does not specifically address consent in the EHR 
context, rather PHIPA requires that implied consent is necessary for collecting, using and 
disclosing personal health information generally.347 Section 18(1) provides that, when 
consent is mandated, it “must be: knowledgeable; relate to the information and must not 
be obtained through deception or coercion.”348 According to Canada Health Infoway, 
“[k]nowledgeable consent means that a patient must know the purpose for the collection, 
use or disclosure and know that he or she may provide or withhold consent.”349 However, 
health information custodians can collect personal health information from patients 
without consent for the purpose of treatment and care.350 In particular, collection is 
permitted when it is “reasonably necessary for the provision of health care and it is not 
reasonably possible to obtain consent in a timely manner”.351 
In Ontario, consent is also important in terms of restricting use and disclosure, 
and as with consent to collection, provisions addressing restriction of use and disclosure 
are not particular to EHRs. Restrictions upon use and disclosure of personal health 
information are termed a “lock box”.352 Sections 37(1)(a), 38(1)(a) and 50(1) of PHIPA 
                                                 
346 OECD Guidelines, supra note 170, s 7. 
347 Information Governance, supra note 178 at 34. 
348 Ibid. 
349 Ibid. 
350 See section 36(2) of PHIPA, supra note 16. Privacy Security Requirements, supra note 116 at 109.  
351 Ibid. 
352 Privacy Security Requirements, supra note 116 at 26. 
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permit patients to provide instructions about the ways in which their personal health 
information can be used and disclosed.353  As in British Columbia and Quebec, though, 
section 40(1) of PHIPA indicates lock boxes can be overridden in situations where there 
is “a significant risk of serious bodily harm to a person or group of persons”.354 
What this Means for Joe: 
In Ontario, Joe will find health information will be collected into his EHR when 
he receives care and treatment, without health information custodians directly asking him 
whether he wishes to have the information included in his EHR. Joe will be able to 
restrict the purposes for which his health information is used and disclosed through 
placing a lock box on certain types of health information contained in his EHR. However, 
lock boxes and collection without consent are not specific to EHRs. Joe was previously 
able to use a lock box to protect certain personal health information outside the digital 
context. 
As was discussed above, though, Joe is also not required to consent to collection 
in either British Columbia or Quebec. Consequently, his experience between the model 1 
and model 2 provinces do not differ with respect to the consent to collection criterion. 
iii) Limited Use: 
The provisions in PHIPA that address limited use are not EHR-specific. Ontario’s 
PHIPA mandates that personal health information custodians use only as much 
                                                 
353 Ibid at 25, n 29. 
354 Ibid at 26, n 36. 
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information “as is reasonably necessary to carry out the identified purposes”.355 Sections 
31-33 and 37-50 of PHIPA address a number of different uses and disclosures that can be 
made of personal health information. This principle aligns with the OECD limited use 
principle, which again states that “[p]ersonal data should not be disclosed, made available 
or otherwise used for purposes other than” those specified at the time of collection or 
those compatible with the original purposes and specified at the time the purpose is 
changed.356 
What this Means for Joe 
As in British Columbia and Quebec, the way in which Joe’s digitized personal 
health information is used in Ontario is also restricted to those purposes specified in the 
legislation and at the time of collection. Joe will find the Ontario does not differ greatly 
from the model 1 provinces even though they represent different legislative models. 
iv) Security Safeguards: 
According to Canada Health Infoway: 
[h]ealth information legislation does not contain specific directions 
regarding protection of information during transmission, but there are 
some general requirements. For example, Ontario’s health information 
legislation requires custodians to ‘transfer’ PHI in a secure manner.357 
Ontario has amended its General Regulation to indicate that appropriate security 
safeguards must be implemented to protect personal health information in EHRs. In 
particular, section 6.1 states that eHealth Ontario must introduce technical, physical and 
                                                 
355 Ibid at 33. 
356 OECD Guidelines, supra note 170, ss 9-10. 
357 Privacy Security Requirements, supra note 116 at 59. 
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administrative safeguards, as well as procedures and practices approved by Ontario’s 
Information and Privacy Commissioner. Specific security and privacy requirements must 
also be met when eHealth Ontario deals with EHRs. Section 6.1 states that such 
safeguards, practices and procedures must  
permit compliance with the Act by health information custodians who rely 
on services supplied by eHealth Ontario to use electronic means to collect, 
use, modify, disclose, retain or dispose of personal health information; 
While stating that eHealth Ontario and custodians must ensure safeguards are in place, 
there are no provisions that actually address what the technical safeguards entail. It can 
be assumed this is established through organization and hospital policy. Consequently, it 
is conceivable there may be a fair degree of variation between each entities’ safeguards. 
If “appropriate” is not defined and a standard not mandated by law, there is no legally 
binding standard to which organizations must adhere. Section 6.2(2)(4)(i) describes that 
the safeguards must be aimed at  
A. protect[ing] against theft, loss and unauthorized use or disclosure of 
personal health information contained in the electronic health record, 
B. protect[ing] the electronic health record against unauthorized copying, 
modification or disposal, and 
C. protect[ing] the integrity, security and confidentiality of the personal 
health information contained in the electronic health record 
No methods of achieving these protections are discussed in the General Regulation or 
PHIPA itself, though. 
However, section 6.1 implies that only eHealth Ontario is responsible for 
implementing safeguards, rather than custodians themselves. Custodians must comply 
with such safeguards. For this reason, a certain degree of stability will exist between the 
safeguards instituted for those records created and maintained by eHealth Ontario. It is 
not clear what safeguards will apply to other EHRs. Further, the wording in section 6.1 – 
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“custodians who rely on services supplied by eHealth Ontario” - implies that some 
custodians do not rely on eHealth’s services. To what provision do these custodians refer 
to determine what security safeguards should be implemented? 
The questions raised by Ontario’s EHR-specific amendments are not unique to 
Ontario, though. British Columbia’s E-Health Act also does not stipulate the specific 
nature of security safeguards. Quebec legislation does not provide greater specificity in 
this respect. Consequently, at face value, little variation exists between the ways a 
patient’s personal health information is protected between each of these provinces.  
What this Means for Joe: 
Joe will feel confident personal health information contained in his EHR, if 
created or maintained by eHealth Ontario, will be safeguarded, in some way, against data 
protection breaches and abuse. Joe may question whether personal health information 
contained in EHRs that are neither created nor maintained by eHealth Ontario will be 
specifically protected. That being said, PHIPA’s General Regulation does not specify the 
ways in which personal health information contained in EHRs will be protected, but 
simply states safeguards will be put in place. Consequently, Joe will simply be 
superficially reassured his information is protected and that the necessary precautions are 
being implemented and carried out. 
Joe will find his experience with knowing the ways in which his personal health 
information is safeguarded does not differ greatly between Ontario and the model 1 
provinces. In fact, Quebec and British Columbia, similar to Ontario’s PHIPA, simply 
assert that personal health information contained in EHRs will be safeguarded through 
security measures. Neither the EHR-specific statutes nor the statutes amended to address 
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EHRs state exactly what measures are taken to protect personal health information 
contained in EHRs. So, as with the EHR definition, consent to collection, and limited use, 
Joe will likely not experience great disparities in the way in which his personal health 
information contained in his EHR is dealt between the jurisdictions based on the current 
legislation. 
v) Patient Participation: 
The OECD patient participation principle provides that patients should have the 
right to learn whether an entity has data about them, what that information is and to be 
able to change the data if required. This principle is made part of PHIPA in section 58. 
However, as with the other provisions addressed above it is not tailored specifically to 
EHRs. According to section 58(8), there is a duty to correct 
if the individual demonstrates, to the satisfaction of the custodian, that the 
record is incomplete or inaccurate for the purposes for which the custodian 
uses the information and gives the custodian the information necessary to 
enable the custodian to correct the record. 
Patients will not always succeed if the correction consists of their physician’s opinion, as 
“there is no obligation to correct a record that ‘consists of a professional opinion or 
observation that a custodian has made in good faith about the individual’.”358  
Section 55(1) provides further direction about patient’s participation rights. 
According to section 55(1), patients can request the corrections in writing and must show 
that the information “is incomplete or incorrect”. Custodians are required to provide the 
patients with reasons if the custodian refuses to make the corrections.359 Even though 
                                                 
358 Ibid at 33. 
359 Ibid at 113. 
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section 55(1) and 58 are not EHR-specific, these provisions mean that, in Ontario, 
patients are entitled to know what information is held in their EHR and correct it if the 
custodian is satisfied that a correction should be made. 
It could be argued that in satisfying a custodian that changes must be made, the 
patient does not truly participate with his or her digitized information, because a 
custodian may veto a change. It is foreseeable that some patients may find it difficult to 
satisfy a custodian because the General Regulation does not stipulate what must be 
proved to request the change and in what form the request must be submitted, if any. 
What this Means for Joe: 
As in Quebec and British Columbia, Joe is permitted to request changes be made 
to his personal health information contained in his EHR, albeit with slightly different 
conditions attached to whether the custodians will in fact implement the change. Quebec 
and Ontario, despite being under different legislative regimes, are similar in this regard. 
While Joe would perhaps expect British Columbia’s E-Health Act to be more similar to 
Quebec with respect to the patient participation criterion, he will not experience the same 
level of patient participation in British Columbia under the E-Health Act, as he would in 
Quebec and Ontario, unless the E-Health Act is amended to include such provisions. As 
of now, patients rely on FIPPA for access and requests to corrections in British 
Columbia. 
So, despite being a province that has less-specific EHR-related legislation, Joe 
may find that Ontario fosters greater participation with his EHR than in British Columbia, 
if only the E-Health Act is meant to govern patient participation with EHRs. As is 
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discussed next, similar findings are made upon analyzing Alberta’s health-specific 
personal data protection legislation which has been amended to address EHRs. 
b) Alberta: 
As with the other provinces discussed previously, a brief overview of EHR 
development in Alberta is provided and the health-specific data protection legislation 
amended to accommodate EHR is then analyzed. The extensive EHR initiatives in 
Alberta are not explored in any great depth herein, however. 
In Alberta, EHR development began 13 years ago. The winter of 1999 brought the 
introduction of Alberta WellNet – the means through which Alberta invested in “health 
care information technology”.360 During February 1999, Alberta’s government appointed 
Alberta Wellnet’s CEO. Alberta WellNet’s goal was and still is to allow health care 
providers to “share health information within a secure network environment that will help 
them to make better decisions about health care.”361 More formally, Alberta Wellnet’s 
objective is “[t]o enable better decisions, using integrated system wide health 
information, to improve the health of Albertans and the management of the health 
system.”362 A few years after Alberta Wellnet’s formation, several western regional 
health authorities (RHA), including an Alberta health authority, joined forces in 2001 to 
coordinate and fund EHR initiatives. 363 Accordingly, Calgary Health Region, Capital 
Health Authority, Regina Health Region, Saskatoon Health Region and Winnipeg 
                                                 
360 Morris, “EHR Alberta”, supra note 166 at 29. 
361 Ibid. 
362 Ibid. 
363 Ibid at 32. 
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Regional Health Authority364 commenced a partnership to “deliver comprehensive health 
care services to over 4.7 million Canadians and provide tertiary care services to the 9 
million Canadians of western Canada and three territories.”365 This conglomerate of 
health authorities employs each of the RHA’s resources and member knowledge to 
enhance health care delivery by developing an EHR.366 Given that these provinces have 
joined together to pool resources to develop EHR systems in each province, it seems 
likely, at least at face value, that the patient experience with each of these jurisdictions 
will not actually be that disparate with one another. Of course, further examination of 
whether this hypothesis is correct is conducted in the proceeding discussion of the model 
2 provinces. 
It has been said that “Alberta is the only province with both a general private 
sector law and a health specific law.”367 As previously described, Alberta’s health 
information is governed by the HIA.368 Alberta’s HIA contains Part 5.1 entitled “Alberta 
Electronic Health Record” and also contains an EHR-specific regulation, enacted in 
2010, entitled Alberta Electronic Health Record Regulation.369 The regulation amended 
the HIA to include EHR-related provisions dealing with EHR-specific issues such as 
logging capacity and audit information logs. Similar to Ontario and unlike British 
Columbia and Quebec, Alberta addressed EHR technology by amending an existing 
                                                 
364 The Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and Vancouver Island Health Authority were involved in 
“observer roles”. Ibid. 
365 Ibid at 32. 
366 Ibid. 
367 Information Governance, supra note 178 at 27. 
368 HIA, supra note 16. 
369 Alta Reg 118/2010. 
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personal data protection statute to accommodate the technological advances. 
Furthermore, the provisions contained in the HIA and its regulation are arguably just as 
comprehensive, if not more, than those in British Columbia’s E-Health Act and Quebec’s 
Order in Council. Yet, Alberta, according to the characterization method used in this 
study, falls under model 2 because the Alberta government chose to accommodate EHRs 
through an existing statute.  
Interestingly, the Health Law Institute at the University of Alberta made a written 
submission to the Standing Committee regarding EHRs, prior to the most recent statutory 
amendments. The submission described the concern that “Bill 52, The Health 
Information Amendment Act, 2009 would significantly undermine the achievement of an 
appropriate balance between”370 protecting individual privacy and using health 
information for societal benefit. The purported goal of the amendments was to support 
EHR development in Alberta.371 The Health Law Institute indicated that it was 
“imperative to maintain some role for individuals in the use of their information.”372 
According to the group of scholars at the institute, “Bill 52 eliminate[d] any such role and 
render[ed] a balance between these two important aims non-existent.”373 Whether this 
balance has shifted or eliminated since Bill 52 received royal assent can be evaluated by 
looking at the patient perspective. The way in which patients interact with the HIA is 
explored and discussed further next. The patient interactions with the statute and 
regulation are then compared to those of the previously examined provinces. 
                                                 
370 Tracey M Bailey, “New Frontiers For Electronic Health Records and Research Databases - Alberta's Bill 
52: Submission of the Health Law Institute on Bill 52” (2009) 18:1 Health L Rev 37 at 37. 
371 Ibid at 39. 
372 Ibid. 
373 Ibid. 
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i) EHR Definition: 
EHRs are directly defined within the HIA. Section 56.1 of Part 5.1 of the HIA 
entitled “Alberta Electronic Health Record” states that an Alberta EHR is  
the integrated electronic health information system established to provide 
shared access by authorized custodians to prescribed health information in 
a secure environment as may be further defined or described in the 
regulations. 
Section 60(3) further defines EHRs in stating that “‘electronic health records’ means 
records of health information in electronic form”. However, section 60(3) defines EHR 
with specific reference to section 60(2)(a) which indicates that  
[t]he safeguards to be maintained under subsection (1) must include 
appropriate measures (a) for the security and confidentiality of records, 
which measures must address the risks associated with electronic health 
records.374  
Alberta’s HIA also contains an EHR specific regulation, enacted in 2010, Alberta 
Electronic Health Record Regulation.375 Section 1(b) of the regulation also defines 
“electronic health record information system” as “the system used by an authorized 
custodian to collect, use and disclose health information about an individual.” 
What this means for Joe: 
Patient’s like Joe will have a clearer idea of how an EHR is defined in Alberta 
than in British Columbia, Quebec and, perhaps even Ontario376. Even though British 
Columbia and Quebec have enacted separate legislation to address EHRs, it is Alberta 
and Ontario that define the EHR in EHR-related amendments to pre-existing statutes. In 
                                                 
374 Security safeguards are discussed in greater detail below. 
375 Supra note 369. 
376 Ontario legislation does not contain three separate definitions of EHR as are contained in Alberta’s HIA, 
supra note 16. 
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Quebec, Joe will know about what is contained in his EHR based on Quebec’s 
Information Document, but that document does not have the force of law. British 
Columbia’s E-Health Act, on the other hand, does not in fact define the EHR at all, but 
rather defines an entirely different term altogether. 
Arguably, though, at first glance, Alberta HIA’s EHR definition does not actually 
clarify EHR’s meaning for patients like Joe, with the result that the meaning of EHR 
likely does not truly differ greatly between provinces. It can be argued that the definitions 
in section 56.1 and 60(3) of the HIA do not provide any greater insight into what 
constitutes an EHR than the phrase “electronic health record”. Use of generic, non-
descriptive definitions in Alberta and Ontario could mean EHRs are similarly constituted 
in both provinces.377 It could also mean each province’s EHRs vary in design but that, 
ultimately, EHRs in both provinces are used and function for the same purpose. 
Consequently, a patient like Joe may not experience a situation where he moves between 
provinces and different records are considered EHRs. 
Several additional observations can be made from the HIA EHR definitions. 
When taking section 56.1’s definition at face value, it seems the emphasis of Alberta’s 
EHR is promoting the ease with which health information can be shared amongst 
                                                 
377 Indeed, Canada Health Infoway’s 2011-2012 Annual Report suggested that jurisdictions’ EHRs are 
similarly constituted because certain components should be present: 
Infoway and its jurisdictional partners determined that six core electronic systems should be 
built to collect: client demographics, provider demographics, diagnostic images, dispensed 
drugs, laboratory test results, and clinical reports or immunizations. When all six core 
elements are present, the information for an EHR is considered to be available, meaning it 
has been digitized and stored in a database that is accessible to authorized health care 
providers.  
Canada Health Infoway, Annual Report 2011-2012 (Canada: Canada Health Infoway, 31 March 2012) at 4, 
online: Canada Health Infoway < https://www.infoway-inforoute.ca/index.php/resources/infoway-
corporate/annual-reports?view=docman>. 
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custodians, rather than protection of patient information. Indeed, section 56.2 states that 
the purpose of Part 5.1 of the HIA is “to enable the sharing and use, via the Alberta EHR, 
of prescribed health information among authorized custodians.” Section 56.1 states that 
the information is shared in a “secure” environment, but there is no reference to patients 
in the Alberta EHR definition. Perhaps this is indicative of less emphasis on patient 
protection and more importance placed on efficiency and effective health care delivery by 
custodians and those health care providers interacting with custodians.  
However, patient’s like Joe perhaps will be reassured the definition in section 
60(3) is associated and specifically contemplated with reference to security safeguards 
for EHRs. The Regulation does not clarify EHR’s meaning to any great extent and may 
leave patient’s like Joe with further questions about the relationship between the EHR 
itself and the system referred to in its definition.  
So, at first glance, it is not entirely clear which health records are encompassed by 
these definitions, nor is it clear what information is contained within them. However, 
section 56.1(c) defines “prescribed health information” to mean  
health information about an individual that is of a class or type prescribed 
by the regulations that a regulated health profesional [sic] or an authorized 
custodian may or must make accessible to authorized custodians via the 
Alberta EHR.  
This definition refers to the EHR, so reference can be made to the regulations for further 
information about what constitutes an EHR in Alberta. Indeed, section 4 of the Alberta 
Electronic Health Record Regulation lists in quite specific detail the personal health 
information contained in EHRs for the purposes of section 56.1(c): 
(a) personal demographic information that uniquely identifies the 
individual, 
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(b) information that uniquely identifies health service providers who 
provide health services to the individual, 
(c) information about where health services are performed on and 
delivered to the individual, 
(d) information about key clinical events at the point of care in respect of 
the individual,  
(e) known allergies and intolerances of the individual,  
(f) immunizations of the individual, 
(g) prescription information in respect of the individual, 
(h) dispensing information relating to prescriptions in respect of the 
individual, 
(i) drug‑to‑drug interaction alerts in respect of the individual, 
(j) laboratory test results of the individual, 
(k) diagnostic imaging reports and tests of the individual, 
(l) diagnostic imaging digital images of the individual, and 
(m) other medical reports of the individual. 
This list, in combination with the EHR definitions in the HIA and its regulation, provide 
one of the most comprehensive descriptions of an EHR among the provinces examined 
thus far. Quebec similarly lists information included by “personal health information” but 
does not have a comparable EHR definition. However, comparison of the Alberta and 
Quebec lists shows that very similar information is likely contained within the EHR 
between provinces. 
Consequently, the general vagueness with which the records are defined in the 
other provinces’ statutes may actually mean that what is included and contemplated by 
EHR does not vary greatly between model 1 and model 2 provinces. For this reason, 
perhaps Joe’s experience between provinces may not truly change because of the way in 
which EHRs are defined. 
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ii) Consent to Collection: 
According to Canada Health Infoway, “[s]ome jurisdictions, such as Alberta, do 
not use the notion of implied consent in their health information legislation. Consent is 
either express and informed, or it is not required in specified circumstances.”378 In 
Alberta, custodians are permitted to directly collect personal health information for EHRs 
without patients’ consent if that “information relates directly to and is necessary to enable 
the custodian to carry out the provision of health services.”379 A patient’s consent, when 
required, must be informed and given in writing or electronically.380 
As earlier discussed, consent to collection is often intimately related to disclosure 
in that patient control over their information is either controlled through consent to 
collection or consent to disclosure. So, while provincial legislation may not emphasize 
consent to collection, patients can prescribe what is done with personal health 
information after collection through the filter of health care providers. Similar to 
Ontario’s lock box provisions, and British Columbia’s disclosure provisions, Alberta’s 
HIA section 56.4 explains that, when decisions are made about what information will be 
made accessible from the EHR,  
a regulated health professional or an authorized custodian must consider as 
an important factor any expressed wishes of the individual who is the 
subject of the prescribed health information relating to access to that 
information, together with any other factors the regulated health 
professional or authorized custodian considers important. 
Further, section 58(2) of Part 6 of Alberta’s HIA mandates that, prior to disclosing a 
patient’s personal health information, healthcare providers must consider that patient’s 
                                                 
378 Privacy Security Requirements, supra note 116 at 92, n 94. 
379 Ibid at 109. HIA, supra note 16, s 20. 
380 Privacy Security Requirements, supra note 116 at 108. HIA, supra note 16, s 34. 
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“expressed wishes”381 about disclosure of the patient’s personal health information, as 
well as any other important considerations.382 Sections 56.4 and 58(2) do not necessarily 
create a formal process through which the health professional or custodian considers 
patients wishes, as is created through lock box provisions. However, the effect of these 
sections is likely the same for patients. 
Following the implementation of Bill 52, it is not as clear that personal health data 
in Alberta’s EHRs is effectively protected by a lock box-like mechanism, though. Bill 52 
“amendments deem actual disclosure of prescribed health information pursuant to a 
Ministerial request a ‘provision of information’.”383 According to Tracey Bailey of 
Alberta’s Health Law Institute,  
providing information in compliance with a request by the Minister is not 
considered to be ‘disclosure’ of health information, [which] [i]n 
effect…remove[s] protections for patient privacy that are currently 
provided by the HIA.384  
Tracey Bailey argued that “[b]y deeming the transfer of information a non-disclosure, the 
amendments eliminate the current duty to consider the wishes of individuals.”385 Indeed, 
section 56.3(7) of Part 5.1 of the HIA now states that  
the making of prescribed health information accessible pursuant to this 
section does not  
(a) constitute a disclosure of that information, or  
(b) require the consent of the individual who is the subject of the 
information. 
                                                 
381 Privacy Security Requirements, supra note 116 at 25. 
382 Ibid. 
383 Bailey, supra note 340 at 40. 
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What this means for Joe: 
As has been shown through examining other provinces, Joe will not be able to 
control that personal health information which is included within his EHR but he may 
have some control over the way that information is disseminated. Such a system, as in 
other provinces, maintains a certain degree of patient autonomy, but as Tracey Bailey 
argues, some of that autonomy over personal health information is removed when health 
care custodians can easily override patient wishes when custodians do not consider the 
patient opinion important.  
To some degree, Ontario’s lock box provisions may be more effective for patients 
like Joe in this respect. However, Ontario, too, allows health care providers to override 
patient wishes in certain circumstances. 
iii) Limited Use: 
Alberta has been referred to as an example of a jurisdiction that limits use of 
personal health information contained in EHRs. According to Canada Health Infoway, 
“[t]he limitation principle in relation to uses and disclosures of personal health 
information can be illustrated by the privacy framework contained in Alberta’s HIA.”386 
As in Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia, Alberta health information custodians are 
only permitted to use personal health information contained in EHRs for prescribed and 
limited uses.387 In Alberta, EHR personal health information can only be used as is 
necessary for specific purposes.388 For example, section 56.5 provides the following: 
                                                 
386 Information Governance, supra note 178 at 35. 
387 Privacy Security Requirements, supra note 116 at 33. 
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119 
(1) Subject to the regulations, 
(a) an authorized custodian referred to in section 56.1(b)(i) may use 
prescribed health information that is accessible via the Alberta EHR for 
any purpose that is authorized by section 27; 
Section 27(1) lists such broad uses as “providing health services;…determining or 
verifying the eligibility of an individual to receive a health service; [and] providing for 
health services provider education” among many others. Quite similar purposes are listed 
by Ontario and Quebec, for example. Section 56.5 then also states that 
 (b) an authorized custodian referred to in section 56.1(b)(ii) may use 
prescribed health information that is accessible via the Alberta EHR, and 
that is not otherwise in the custody or under the control of that authorized 
custodian, only for a purpose that is authorized by 
(i) section 27(1)(a), (b) or (f), or 
(ii) section 27(1)(g), but only to the extent necessary for obtaining or 
processing payment for health services. 
Sections 27(1)(a), (b) or (f) refer to providing health services, determining or verifying 
health service eligibility and carrying out a purpose authorized by an Alberta or federal 
statute. Section 27(1)(g) involves “internal management purposes” such as resource 
allocation and policy development for human resource management and health services. 
Section 56.5 concludes by providing that: 
 (2) For greater certainty, the use pursuant to subsection (1) of prescribed 
health information that is accessible via the Alberta EHR does not 
constitute collection of that information under this Act. 
(3) For greater certainty, the use pursuant to subsection (1) of prescribed 
health information that is accessible via the Alberta EHR does not 
constitute a disclosure of that information by 
(a) the regulated health professional or authorized custodian who 
originally made that information accessible via the Alberta EHR pursuant 
to section 56.3, 
(b) any other authorized custodian, 
(c) the information manager of the Alberta EHR, or 
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(d) any other person. 
What this means for Joe: 
Even though Alberta is grouped amongst the model 2 provinces because it has 
accommodated EHRs through amending existing statutes, its limited use provisions 
resemble those used in British Columbia, Quebec and Ontario. In fact, the uses discussed 
are similar to those described in section 4 of the E-Health Act, such as identifying an 
individual receiving health services (s. 4(a)), providing health services (s.4(b)), and 
engaging in health services improvement (s.4(g)). As such, it is predicted Joe will not 
experience great disparities in the way in which his personal health information contained 
in his EHR can be and is used between provinces. 
iv) Security Safeguards: 
As could be observed by looking at Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec’s laws 
thus far, “there does not appear to be any broad agreement in Canadian healthcare 
jurisdictions (or in most other jurisdictions) as to what constitutes adequate technical 
safeguards (or security safeguards or security arrangements).”389 Section 60(1) of the 
HIA provides that safeguards are required to have appropriate mechanisms for securing 
records, including mechanisms that deal with the privacy risks of EHRs. 390 Safeguards 
entail “ensuring health data is protected against threats or hazards to the security or 
integrity of the information or the loss, unauthorized use, disclosure or modification of 
the information”.391 The duty requiring safeguards applies also to Alberta custodians 
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storing and using health information not in Alberta or disclosing to anyone not in 
Alberta.392 Section 60(2) specifically requires safeguards for EHRs: 
(2) The safeguards to be maintained under subsection (1) must include 
appropriate measures 
(a) for the security and confidentiality of records, which measures must 
address the risks associated with electronic health records[.] 
Furthermore, in Alberta, contracts are used to protect personal health information 
during third party processing.393 As is also true in Ontario, Privacy Impact Assessments 
are also required by law and ensure that an analysis of the appropriate privacy protective 
mechanisms is performed on personal health information contained in EHRs.394 Bill 52 
contemplated that this safeguard be removed. In her submission to the Standing 
Committee on Bill 52, Tracey Bailey of Alberta’s Health Law Institute argued that it was 
“extremely concerning”395 that Bill 52 did “away with this oversight and public 
accountability without justification”.396 As such, the Alberta government decided to 
retain Privacy Impact Assessments which still form part of the required safeguards listed 
in Part 5.1 of the HIA. Section 56.3(3)(b) states the Minister is required to 
prepare a privacy impact assessment describing how disclosure of the 
health information may affect the privacy of the individual who is the 
subject of the information and submit the privacy impact assessment to the 
Commissioner for review and comment 
 prior to making a patient’s health information accessible to authorized custodians. 
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Further, Alberta health information custodians must make logs about data 
accessed from EHRs. Section 6 of the Regulation states that “[a] custodian must ensure 
its electronic health record information system creates and maintains logs”. Custodians 
must note who obtained access to personal health information contained in an EHR, when 
and why the information was disclosed and what information was disclosed, among other 
things.397 In addition, this information is required to be kept for 10 years after 
disclosure.398 The Alberta EHR information manager is also required by section 7 of the 
Regulation to conduct a monthly review of the logs. 
What this means for Joe: 
All provinces examined thus far, including Alberta, Ontario, Quebec and British 
Columbia, state that security safeguards are required to protect the personal health 
information contained in EHRs. However, very little else is said in these provinces’ 
legislation about what the security safeguards entail. Only Quebec ventures into the 
security requirements with any degree of detail. Consequently, it could be possible that 
each province has widely disparate methods of ensuring data protection for EHRs. It is 
more likely, though, that the safeguard methods are, in fact, quite similar because each 
provinces health professionals are bound by professional ethical codes and common law 
obligations of confidentiality399 to ensure protection of patient information, and these 
                                                 
397 Privacy Security Requirements, supra note 116 at 65. 
398 HIA, supra note 16, s 56.6(2). See also Privacy Security Requirements, supra note 116 at 65. 
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methods began to evolve as soon as computers were used in medical practices and health 
care settings. 
Alberta and Ontario do differ from British Columbia and Quebec in requiring 
privacy impact assessments, however. Patients like Joe may, therefore, experience some 
trickle-down effect of the lack of privacy assessment use in provinces like British 
Columbia and Quebec. It is unlikely, though, that individual patients will experience the 
immediate effect of this difference, unless there is a particular privacy concern associated 
with the particular disclosure of their health information. It is likely that a cumulative 
effect of a lack of such mechanisms will be felt by many patients interacting with a health 
care provider over time as privacy concerns arise. 
v) Patient Participation: 
One of the express purposes of the HIA is to “provide individuals with a right to 
request correction or amendment of health information about themselves”.400 Pursuant to 
section 13 of the HIA, patients may make a written request that personal health 
information contained in their EHR be corrected and then custodians must provide 
reasons if they refuse such corrections.401 Patients can then request that the custodian’s 
decision be reviewed by the Commissioner.402  
What this means for Joe: 
As in the Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia, Joe can also participate with his 
EHR to request changes or corrections be made. Like the other provinces, it is possible 
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for custodians to override the patient’s requests, which detracts from some of the 
autonomy afforded patients by the right to correct contained in the statutes. 
c) New Brunswick: 
Another more recently formed example of a model 2 province is New Brunswick. 
In spring 2008, the New Brunswick government announced its plan to digitize health 
records.403 In New Brunswick, responsibility for EHR implementation lies with the 
Department of Health along with its e-health branch.404 EHR implementation in New 
Brunswick is part of the “One Patient, One Record” or “OPOR” initiative.405 Laboratory 
and diagnostic imaging, as well as patient admission and discharge information, were the 
initial focus of the project.406 Authorized health care providers at hospitals and health 
care facilities in New Brunswick’s two Regional Health Authorities view patients’ EHRs 
through a web portal.407 Additional systems are used to view other patient information.408 
Phase implementation has been used to roll out the EHR in New Brunswick and began 
first with emergency room nurses and physicians, as well as neuro and orthopaedic 
surgeons, oncologists and nephrologists in various hospitals and centres.409 
                                                 
403 Patrick Powers, “New Brunswick’s E-health Strategy and the Evolution of Regionalization” (2010) 9:1 
ElectronicHealthcare e27 at e27, online: Longwoods < http://www.longwoods.com/content/21769> 
[Powers NB]. 
404 Ibid at e31. 
405 New Brunswick Canada, “New Brunswick's Electronic Health Record”, online: New Brunswick Canada 
Electronic Health Record Content <http://hps.gnb.ca/ehr-e.asp>. 
406 Powers NB, supra note 403 at e31. 
407 Ibid. 
408 Ibid. 
409 Supra note 405. 
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 PHIPAA came into force in September 2010. At first glance and while New 
Brunswick was placed amongst model 2 provinces, this statute does not deal to any great 
extent with the specific data protection concerns raised by EHRs. It appears, at first, that 
New Brunswick may be taking a similar approach to Ontario by leaving EHR specific 
requirements to regulations. Section 79(1)(q), in fact, indicates that regulations may be 
made regarding “establishment of an electronic health record”.410  
As PHIPAA was so recently enacted, the New Brunswick government had a great 
number of statutory examples from which to draw to create its health-specific personal 
data protection legislation relating to EHRs. Consequently, there are more details 
contained in PHIPAA and its regulations relating to EHRs than in other model 2 
provinces’ statutes, generally. That being said, New Brunswick does not necessarily 
afford patients greater protection for the personal health information than other provinces. 
It simply deals more specifically with EHRs within its health-specific personal data 
protection provisions.  
Therefore, even though New Brunswick is a model 2 province, one aspect of 
PHIPAA’s General Regulation411 operates in a similar fashion to British Columbia’s E-
Health Act. In New Brunswick, the Minister of Health is given the authority to designate 
an information network412, as is true in British Columbia where the Minister designates a 
health information bank. So, while on the whole New Brunswick is most appropriately 
categorized as a model 2 province because of the way it addresses EHRs, its provisions 
share similar features with a model 1 province. This finding bolsters the conclusion that 
                                                 
410 PHIPAA, supra note 16. 
411 NB Reg 2010-112 [NB General Regulation]. 
412 Ibid, s, 14. 
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the patient experience with each model is actually fairly similar generally, with only 
small differences, which are discussed in this study. 
i) EHR Definition: 
Like Ontario, New Brunswick defines EHR not within statute but within the 
corresponding regulation to PHIPAA. Within PHIPAA itself, the existence of EHRs is 
merely acknowledged in the fact that electronic records are included within the definition 
of record in section 1. 
“record” means a record containing information in any form, including 
information that is oral, written, photographed, recorded or stored in any 
manner, on any storage medium or by graphic, electronic, mechanical or 
any other means, but does not include electronic software or any 
mechanism that produces records. 
Section 2 of PHIPAA’s General Regulation413 provides that, in New Brunswick, EHR 
means “an electronic record of an individual’s personal health information that is 
accessible from interoperable systems within an information network”. For even further 
clarification, patients may look to what the New Brunswick government has said 
regarding the EHR; namely, that an EHR  
provides authorized health professionals access to clinically-relevant 
information. Information available will include: demographic information 
(name, date of birth, address, etc); lab test results (Chemistry, 
Hematology, Coagulation and Challenge); and diagnostic imaging reports 
(Imaging intervention, MRI, Nuclear Medicine, Ultrasound, CT and X-
Ray). Echocardiograms are excluded at this time.414 
According to section 15 of the General Regulation, it is the Minister who creates EHRs 
for each individual, EHRs which are then contained in an information network designated 
as such by the Minister.  
                                                 
413 Supra note 411. 
414 Supra note 405. 
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What this means for Joe: 
Joe will have quite a clear idea of what comprises his EHR if he travels to New 
Brunswick and a record is made of his personal health information. PHIPAA’s definition 
clearly describes what an EHR constitutes in New Brunswick. However, Joe will not 
have a clear idea in what aspects of health care his EHR is involved and exactly what it 
contains by simply knowing this definition. None of the details contained in the 
government’s comments about what constitutes an EHR as described above are part of 
EHRs statutory definition. Nevertheless, as in British Columbia, which is oddly enough a 
model 1 province, Joe will know that the Minister, in effect, created the EHR as it is 
designated part of an information network. 
ii) Consent to Collection: 
New Brunswick is also unique because it expressly addresses EHRs in PHIPAA’s 
consent provisions by indicating that patients are unable to withdraw consent to 
collection of personal health information into EHRs. Section 22(1) of PHIPAA provides 
that 
[a]n individual may refuse to grant his or her consent or withdraw his or 
her consent to the collection, use or disclosure of the individual’s personal 
health information by a custodian except if…  
(c) the collection, use or disclosure is for the purposes of the creation or 
maintenance of an electronic health record[.] 
Consequently, PHIPAA explicitly indicates consent to collection is not required for 
EHRs. Unlike other model 1 and 2 provinces, which leave the lack of consent required 
for collection implied, New Brunswick explicitly clarifies that consent is not necessary.  
In terms of consent to disclosure, New Brunswick also does not require patient 
consent to disclose personal health information for the following reason: 
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A custodian shall disclose personal health information relating to an 
individual without the consent of the individual…to or via an information 
network designated by the Minister in accordance with the regulations in 
which personal health information is recorded for the purpose of 
facilitating the creation and maintenance of an electronic health record 
established in accordance with the regulations[.]415 
What this means for Joe: 
Thus far in this analysis, it has been shown that other Canadian jurisdictions do 
not require consent to collection of a patient’s personal health information into a patient’s 
EHR. However, no other provinces explicitly states consent is not required for collection. 
Joe will likely not experience a difference between these jurisdictions simply because 
New Brunswick explicitly states consent is not required in respect of collection to EHRs. 
iii) Limited Use: 
PHIPAA’s General Regulation specifically contemplates that particular limits may 
need to be imposed on the use of personal health information contained in EHRs and 
authorizes the Minister to require such limits be placed on use of the information. Section 
14(1)(g) of the General Regulation states that the Minister may  
identify and impose on the custodian limits or conditions on the collection, 
storage, use or disclosure of personal health information contained in or 
disclosed from an information network that are, in the opinion of the 
Minister, required for the privacy and security of the personal health 
information. 
What this means for Joe: 
In New Brunswick, while Joe will not know exactly what limits will be place on 
use of his personal health information contained in his EHR, he will be confident that the 
Minister has prescribed limits that will ensure the privacy and security of his information, 
                                                 
415 PHIPAA, supra note 16, s 37(6)(c)(iii). 
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as it specifically relates to the concerns that arise as a result of using digitized records. 
Consequently, as is true in provinces such as Quebec and British Columbia, Joe will 
perhaps be more confident that specific concerns he has regarding digitized records are 
being addressed by legislation.   
iv) Security Safeguards: 
At a general level, and as is required by many other model 2 provinces, section 
50(1) of PHIPAA requires custodians to  
protect personal health information by adopting information practices that 
include reasonable administrative, technical and physical safeguards that 
ensure the confidentiality, security, accuracy and integrity of the 
information. 
PHIPAA accounts for the specific concerns related to digitized records in section 50(3) in 
requiring custodians to put in place protocols that eliminate the chance that electronic 
personal health information is intercepted through some means by “unauthorized 
persons”. Section 50(4) requires custodians to use “any additional safeguards for the 
security and protection of the information required by the regulations”. Further, section 
46(1) explains that when disclosures are made without consent, custodians must note to 
whom, when and why the information was disclosed and also what information was 
disclosed, except as provided in section 46(2), which directly addresses electronic 
records. According to section 46(2), section 46(1) fails to apply “if the custodian 
discloses personal health information by permitting access to the information stored in 
the information system of the custodian” as long as the system automatically creates an 
“electronic log” of who accessed the information, when the access occurred and what 
information the individual accessed. 
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What this means for Joe: 
Joe’s experience with legislative safeguards for personal health information in his 
EHR in New Brunswick will be similar to the other model 2 and model 1 jurisdictions 
because safeguards are required by the statute but not specified. Moreover, New 
Brunswick keeps audit logs in the same way as is done by other model 2 jurisdictions; so, 
consequently, Joe’s experience will be similar between jurisdictions in this respect as 
well. However, subsection 50(3) does mandate specific protections for EHRs, in a way 
not done by other provinces. Further, section 20(1) of the General Regulation goes into 
even greater detail regarding security requirements for EHRs – requirements that appear 
most like those contained in Quebec’s EHR-specific legislation. In particular, section 20 
requires the following:  
(a) measures to protect the security of personal health information during 
its collection, use, disclosure, storage and destruction; 
(b) measures, for example by the use of passwords and encryption, to 
ensure that removable media used to record, transport or transfer personal 
health information is appropriately protected when in use; 
(c) measures to ensure that removable media used to record personal 
health information is stored securely when not in use; 
(d) measures to ensure that personal health information is maintained in a 
designated area and is subject to appropriate security safeguards; 
(e) measures that limit physical access to designated areas containing 
personal health information to authorized persons; 
(f) procedures that provide for the recording of security breaches; and 
(g) corrective procedures to address security breaches. 
Security mechanisms such as encryption and passwords are safeguards particular to 
digitized records, showing that New Brunswick, more than some other model 2 
provinces, took into consideration what EHRs require in terms of security. Moreover, 
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agreements between custodians and information managers must discuss what information 
managers will do to ensure how safeguards will be put in place to protect personal health 
information.416 It is likely, though, that other provinces have interception prevention in 
place as a result of industry standards, even though it is not required by statute in those 
jurisdictions.  
v) Patient Participation: 
New Brunswick’s general access provisions indicate that patients have a right to 
request in writing a copy of their health record.417 A custodian must respond to the 
request within 30 days. Section 15 has these same requirements for a request to correct 
personal health information in a patient’s health record. As in Manitoba, described below, 
there is no requirement that custodians refuse a correction if the request is made to 
correct opinion-based health information in a patient’s record. 
New Brunswick’s access provision pertaining to electronic records is virtually 
identical to that used in Manitoba. Section 10(5) provides that 
[i]f a request is made for personal health information that a custodian 
maintains in electronic form, the custodian shall produce a record of the 
information for the individual in a form usable by the individual if it can 
be produced using the custodian’s normal computer hardware and 
software and technical expertise. 
What this means for Joe: 
Joe’s experience with New Brunswick health-specific personal data protection 
law will differ very little from that in Manitoba, so the analysis provided for Manitoba 
next also applies here and further comment will not be made in this regard.  
                                                 
416 NB General Regulation, supra note 411, s 21(b). 
417 PHIPAA, supra note 16, s 7(1) & (3). 
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d) Manitoba: 
Like the other model 2 jurisdictions, Manitoba is also in the midst of 
implementing its EHR with the intention of providing “authorized health-care providers 
immediate access to selected patient information”.418 As in Ontario and Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba eHealth has been involved in digitizing health records in particular areas and in 
hospitals since 2007.419 Manitoba contracted with IBM to carry out the 
implementation.420 The areas specifically targeted for EHR creation included diagnostic, 
laboratory and hospital health records. In the spring of 2011, it was announced that 
Manitoba’s EHR system, known as eChart, was launched in the province, allowing health 
care providers across the province access to patient records regardless of a patient’s 
location.421 The system was implemented in 30 hospitals and clinics province-wide. 
Manitoba’s PHIA addresses EHRs within its preamble by stating:  
clear and certain rules for the collection, use and disclosure of personal 
health information are an essential support for electronic health 
information systems that can improve both the quality of patient care and 
the management of health care resources. 
 PHIA’s regulation also discusses additional safeguards for electronic health information 
systems and audit requirements for EHRs. However, only 1 section of the regulations 
addresses EHRs. In PHIA itself, only the preamble addresses EHRs, which is more like 
                                                 
418 Province of Manitoba, “Design, Implementation of Manitoba’s Secure Health Record System Now 
Underway: Oswald” (9 December 2009), online: Province of Manitoba, News Releases 
<http://news.gov.mb.ca/news/index.html?item=7310>. 
419 Ibid. 
420 Ibid. 
 
421 CBC News Manitoba, “Electronic health-record system launched” (9 March 2011), online: CBC News 
Manitoba <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/story/2011/03/09/mb-electronic-health-records-
manitoba.html>. 
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Ontario in the way it accommodates this new technological phenomenon. The way in 
which PHIA addresses each of the four OECD principles examined in this study, as well 
as an EHR definition is discussed next. 
i) EHR Definition: 
EHR is not defined in PHIA. Instead, section 1(1) of PHIA simply states  
"record" or "recorded information" means a record of information in any 
form, and includes information that is written, photographed, recorded or 
stored in any manner, on any storage medium or by any means, including 
by graphic, electronic or mechanical means, but does not include 
electronic software or any mechanism that produces records[.] 
The word “electronic” is used 9 other times in PHIA and 11 in the regulation but neither 
EHR nor an equivalent term are defined in Manitoba’s legislation. 
What this means for Joe: 
Manitoba is truly a hybrid province in terms of the way that it addresses EHRs in 
PHIA. On the one hand, a patient like Joe will find that Manitoba is similar to model 3 
provinces and territories in the sense that it does not define EHR in statute and merely 
indicates a record can be electronic. In other ways, patients like Joe will find that 
Manitoba is much like Quebec in the way that it addresses EHR security in its regulation 
and the act itself. 
ii) Consent to Collection: 
There are no consent provisions that specifically discuss EHRs in Manitoba’s 
PHIA. In fact, PHIA does not usually mandate consent for collection, use and disclosure 
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of personal health information generally for “healthcare and treatment purposes.”422 
Section 15(1) of PHIA allows collection minus consent. In terms of use, section 21 
allows trustees to use personal health information without consent as long as it is used for 
the purpose for which it was collected, a purpose permitted by PHIA. A patient’s consent 
is required if a trustee is going to use the information for any other purpose. The purposes 
for which consent is not required are provided in section 22(2) of PHIA.  
What this Means for Joe: 
Manitoba does not specify which type of consent is required, for example, 
whether the consent must be informed or knowledgeable; other jurisdictions, such as 
Ontario, stipulate the consent type required.423 In the absence of a consent standard, Joe 
may or may not find his experience between Ontario and the other provinces differs. For 
this reason, in Manitoba, the type of consent obtained by trustees during interactions with 
health care providers will likely resemble that in other provinces because it will be 
shaped by ethical standards of professionals, rather than statute. 
iii) Limited Use: 
Section 20(2) of PHIA states that  
[e]very use and disclosure by a trustee of personal health information must 
be limited to the minimum amount of information necessary to accomplish 
the purpose for which it is used or disclosed. 
Consequently, PHIA accords with the OECD’s limited use principle. Section 21 
describes the purposes for which personal health information may be used, if such 
                                                 
422 Information Governance, supra note 178 at 35. 
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purposes were not those originally intended at the time the information was collected. For 
instance, a patient’s personal health information may be used if “the information is 
demographic information about an individual and is used to collect a debt the individual 
owes to the trustee, or to the government if the trustee is a department”424 or “the 
information is demographic information about an individual, or is his or her PHIN, and is 
used to …confirm eligibility for health care or payment for health care”. 425   
At first it appears that EHRs are not expressly mentioned in reference to the 
limited use requirement; however, section 22 seems to address digitized records’ use. 
Section 25(1) explains that trustees are permitted to supply personal health information 
“to an information manager” to process, store or destroy the information or supply the 
trustee “with information management or information technology services.” If trustees 
use an information manager in this capacity that  
information manager may use personal health information provided to 
it…only for the purposes and activities mentioned in subsection [25](1), 
which must be purposes and activities that the trustee itself may 
undertake.426 
What this means for Joe: 
A patient like Joe will find the limited use requirements placed upon health care 
providers in Manitoba are similar to those in the other model 1 and 2 provinces. In each 
of these jurisdictions, personal health information can only be used for the purposes for 
which it was collected, subject to some exceptions outlined in each jurisdiction’s relevant 
act. Manitoba, in some respects, is more like Quebec and British Columbia, in that it 
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explicitly refers to the way in which electronic health information can be used. Either 
way, though, Joe will likely find the limits placed on the general use of his digitized 
information does not differ greatly between model 1 and 2 provinces, even though EHRs 
are not explicitly referenced in the requirements for each of these jurisdictions. 
iv) Security Safeguards: 
Manitoba’s PHIA requires safeguards for both paper and EHRs. Namely, 
safeguards specific to EHRs entail identity verification, mechanisms to prevent 
unauthorized information interception, and logs of EHR use.427 Section 18(2) provides 
for specific safeguards pertaining to EHRs and that  
[w]ithout limiting subsection (1), a trustee shall if the trustee uses 
electronic means to request disclosure of personal health information or to 
respond to requests for disclosure, implement procedures to prevent the 
interception of the information by unauthorized persons[.] 
Section 18(3) addresses “additional safeguards” for EHRs but merely states that “[a] 
trustee who maintains personal health information in electronic form shall implement any 
additional safeguards for such information required by the regulations.” PHIA requires 
nothing further in terms of particular security requirements for EHRs.  
However, section 66(1) of PHIA provides that regulations may be made in respect 
of “security safeguards for personal health information that trustees must establish, 
including requirements for information held in electronic form”. So far, Manitoba’s 
provincial government has included several additional safeguards in PHIA’s one 
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regulation, the Personal Health Information Regulation.428 For example, section 2 of the 
regulation indicates that  
[a] trustee shall establish and comply with a written policy and procedures 
containing…(a) provisions for the security of personal health information 
during its collection, use and disclosure, storage and destruction, including 
measures (ii) to ensure the security of personal health information in 
electronic form when the computer hardware or removable electronic 
storage media on which it has been recorded is being disposed of or used 
for another purpose[.] 
Moreover, section 4 of the regulations mandates that “user activity” is recorded in respect 
of “any electronic information system” and subsection 4(3) stipulates when the user 
activity record is not required. Electronic information system is not defined in PHIA or 
the regulations, though, so it appears to take on a plain meaning. 
What this means for Joe: 
The safeguards to which PHIA refers in section 18(3) differ very little from those 
required by other model 2 provinces, like Ontario and Saskatchewan. In these three 
provinces it is acknowledged that safeguards relating to electronic information change 
depending upon technological advances and industry standards. Effectively this means 
that the safeguards patients like Joe experience in each of these provinces will be quite 
similar if not the same, as has been argued previously.  
That being said, Manitoba’s PHIA goes further than Ontario and Saskatchewan in 
terms of some of the safety requirements prescribed in the regulations, such that 
Manitoba, in some respects resembles Quebec and New Brunswick’s EHR security 
requirements.  
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v) Patient Participation: 
PHIA’s preamble codifies patient access and ability to make corrections as part of 
PHIA’s purpose. PHIA’s preamble states: 
AND WHEREAS [sic] individuals need access to their own health 
information as a matter of fairness, to enable them to make informed 
decisions about health care and to request the correction of inaccurate or 
incomplete information about themselves[.] 
Unlike some of the other model 2 provinces, such as Ontario, PHIA’s statutory 
provisions describing access and corrections expressly reference EHRs. Specifically, 
section 7 describes that patients’ electronic record must be in a form the patient can use 
when received, as long as “can be produced using the trustee's normal computer hardware 
and software and technical expertise”.429   
On face value, the caveat placed upon access to records in electronic form has 
several implications; namely, the section 7(3) caveat could imply trustees should be 
trained to produce electronic records for patient access otherwise few to no patients will 
ever receive a copy of the personal health information contained in their electronic 
record. Section 7(3)’s caveat also implies trustees are not required to go above and 
beyond what they normally can perform with their computer hardware and software and 
technical expertise to assist a patient in accessing their record.  
Section 12 of PHIA provides patients the right to correct their health information. 
PHIA states that “[f]or purposes of accuracy or completeness, an individual may request 
a trustee to correct any personal health information that the individual may examine and 
copy under this Part.” According to subsection 12(2), a patient’s request must be in 
                                                 
429 PHIA, supra note 16, s 7(3). 
  
139 
writing and trustees must respond to patients’ requests within 30 days. There are no 
provisions stating when a trustee is permitted to refuse patient requested corrections, 
although there are provisions that explain what must occur when a refusal is made. 
Section 12 (4) indicates that 
A trustee who refuses to make a correction that is requested under this 
section shall 
(a) permit the individual to file a concise statement of disagreement stating 
the correction requested and the reason for the correction; and 
(b) add the statement of disagreement to the record in such a manner that it 
will be read with and form part of the record or be adequately cross-
referenced to it. 
What this means for Joe: 
Joe, as in other model 2 and 1 provinces, is permitted to access his electronic 
record containing his personal health information if he is located in Manitoba. In 
Manitoba, Joe’s health care provider, or trustee, must provide his record to him in a form 
Joe can use. Joe might expect, though, that access requests he makes in other provinces 
will not result in him receiving a record entirely unusable either. Patients like Joe may 
think that, in some respects, the requirement that the record be usable is redundant and, 
therefore, unnecessary, and also seems to protect trustees from scrutiny if they cannot 
actually produce the record to the patient if it proves to technically difficult to do so. For 
this reason, section 7(3) of PHIA is geared more towards trustees’ interests rather than 
patients’ interests. 
However, while Joe may perceive section 7(3) to protect trustees rather than help 
patients, it is likely the case that patients who make access requests in each of the other 
model 1 and 2 provinces in fact experience this same limitation without it being 
acknowledged in statute. In other words, Joe has the right to request and receive a copy of 
  
140 
his personal health information contained in his EHR in provinces such as Ontario, 
Saskatchewan and Quebec, but he may not receive the record promptly or at all if the 
health care provider in charge of the record cannot provide the record to him in a usable 
form, particularly if the provider does not have the expertise to produce the record to Joe. 
In any case, it is interesting to speculate as to why Manitoba included this caveat, 
whereas other provinces did not include it, even if other aspects of their EHR-related 
statute address specific problems associated with digitized records. Perhaps, Manitoba, 
while codifying patients’ interests in its preamble, is attempting to ensure trustees focus 
on providing efficient, good quality patient care, rather than attempting to solve 
technological issues associated with reproducing information in a digitized patient record. 
Arguably, though, providing patients with access to their health records is part of 
providing good quality care, in that patients can make the most informed decisions about 
treatment if they have access to all the same information to which their health care 
provider has access and also make corrections if an error was made in their record. 
The content of Joe’s right to correct his personal health information in Manitoba 
is virtually identical to that in each of the other model 2 provinces, as well as Quebec; 
namely, the 30-day trustee response requirement and the requirement that the request be 
in writing. However, the lack of reasons for refusal means that PHIA does not directly 
parallel those in the other jurisdictions. In Manitoba, Joe may not know whether trustees 
will refuse to make a correction if the information Joe requests to correct is a health care 
provider’s opinion. Once a refusal is made, Joe is permitted to learn why the refusal was 
made430, but Joe will not know if a request to correct opinion-based information will be 
                                                 
430 As per PHIA, supra note 16, s 12(3)(d). 
  
141 
denied outright. Certainly, PHIA does not give trustees the right to deny correction of this 
type of information; however, this does not mean they will not refuse corrections on this 
basis anyway. 
e) Newfoundland: 
Newfoundland and Labrador, like New Brunswick, more recently enacted its 
health-specific personal data protection legislation, but has been transitioning to EHRs 
for a number of years. Newfoundland and Labrador’s Centre for Health Information is a 
crown agency created in 1996. Its website indicates that it is the “most comprehensive 
health information centre of its kind in Canada”431 and that it “is a model for other 
jurisdictions.”432 The Centre has developed the EHR initiative in Newfoundland and 
Labrador and it “implemented the first provincial client registry specifically for the 
electronic health record.”433 Newfoundland and Labrador are still implementing EHR 
projects throughout the province. The Centre defines the EHR as “a secure and private 
lifetime record of a person’s health and health care history which is available 
electronically to patient-authorized health care providers.”434 
On April 1, 2011, Newfoundland and Labrador’s Personal Health Information 
Act (“PHIA Newfoundland”) came into force and deals with both health-specific personal 
data protection and EHR regulation, including the Newfoundland & Labrador Centre for 
                                                 
431 Newfoundland and Labrador Centre for Health Information, “About the Centre – Newfoundland and 
Labrador Centre for Health Information”, online: Newfoundland and Labrador Centre for Health 
Information <http://www.nlchi.nl.ca/index.php/about-the-centre>. 
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Health Information. Newfoundland and Labrador’s Department of Health and 
Community Services stated that PHIA Newfoundland governs collection, use and 
disclosure of personal health information and also patients right to access their 
information.435 Newfoundland is more like Ontario in its EHR regulation because it deals 
with the Centre for Health Information briefly in its regulations and does not yet have 
specific protections built into the act. EHR-specific regulations are simply contemplated 
at this time. The characteristics of the new act are discussed next. 
i) EHR Definition: 
Even though the Centre defines EHR, PHIA Newfoundland does not. However, 
11 references are made to electronic records. In particular, section 14(4) requires that  
[a] person who provides goods or services for the purpose of enabling a 
custodian to use electronic means to collect, use, modify, disclose, retain 
or dispose of personal health information shall comply with [PHIA 
Newfoundland] and [its] regulations. 
Moreover, section 22(7) specifically authorizes the creation of electronic records 
[a]n information manager may, in accordance with the terms of an 
agreement with a custodian, construct or create an integrated electronic 
record of personal health information comprising individual records, the 
custody or control of each of which may be in one or more custodians. 
EHRs are also not mentioned in either of PHIA Newfoundland’s two regulations, 
although the Pharmacy Network Regulations436 reference the Centre for Health 
Information at sections 2(b) and 3. 
 
                                                 
435 Newfoundland and Labrador Department of Health and Community Services, “The Personal Health 
Information Act” online: Newfoundland and Labrador Department of Health and Community Services < 
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What this means for Joe: 
As is the case with several other model 2 and the model 1 provinces, EHRs are 
specifically contemplated by PHIA Newfoundland, but not actually defined. 
Consequently, a patient like Joe may be at a loss to know exactly what an EHR will 
constitute or look like if he travels to Newfoundland and Labrador. Joe will know that 
protections are afforded to EHR-like documents in statute, but his EHR in Newfoundland 
may not necessarily look entirely like the EHR in Quebec, for instance. Practically 
speaking, though, it is quite unlikely that the two records would differ greatly between 
the jurisdictions. 
ii) Consent to Collection: 
One of the rights PHIA Newfoundland affords patients is to “[r]efuse or give 
consent to the collection, use or disclosure of personal health information, except in 
circumstances specified in PHIA [Newfoundland]”.437 Such a right, on its face, accords 
with the corresponding OECD principle. However, this right is not particular to EHRs 
per se and it contains exceptions. 
Unlike some of the other provinces, though, section 29 of PHIA Newfoundland 
requires consent to collection as follows: 
29. (1) A custodian shall not collect personal health information about an 
individual unless 
(a)  the individual who is the subject of the information has consented to 
its collection and the collection is necessary for a lawful purpose; or 
(b)  the collection is permitted or required by this Act. 
                                                 
437 Newfoundland Labrador Health and Community Services, “The Personal Health Information Act 
Frequently Asked Questions” (February 2011) v 1.1 at 17, online: Newfoundland Labrador Health and 
Community Services < http://www.health.gov.nl.ca/health/PHIA/PHIA_FAQs_Feb_2011.pdf>. 
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Newfoundland and Labrador’s PHIA contains provisions similar to lock box 
provisions used in jurisdictions like Ontario. The Frequently Asked Questions document 
pertaining to the act states that  
When an individual requests a health information custodian not to use or 
disclose his or her personal health information to another custodian, the 
custodian is obliged to inform the recipient custodian that some personal 
health information is inaccessible as a result of it having been “locked” by 
the individual. A custodian must inform the recipient custodian if the 
custodian considers some of the locked information to be reasonably 
necessary for the provision of health care.438 
Section 27 of PHIA Newfoundland gives patients this right to “limited consent”. 
What this means for Joe: 
Joe may experience a disparity between Newfoundland and Labrador and all the 
other Canadian jurisdictions except Ontario because the former generally requires 
consent to collection (like Ontario) and the other jurisdictions generally do not. 
Travelling between provinces and interacting with new health care providers, Joe may 
find his personal health information is dealt with differently between the jurisdictions that 
differ with respect to this requirement. However, it is the case that Alberta previously 
required consent to collection of personal health information into individual’s EHRs439 
but has since repealed the section requiring consent.440 Such a decision may perhaps be 
because it was too cumbersome for health care providers to obtain each patients’ consent 
to collection and that it impacted efficiency of patient care. Newfoundland and Labrador 
may have this experience as well and correspondingly change PHIA Newfoundland’s 
                                                 
438 Ibid at 21. 
439 Bailey, supra note 340 at 40. 
440 HIA, supra note 16, s 59. See also ibid. 
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consent provision. Until that time, however, this is one situation in which Joe will 
experience a difference between his interactions with the two legal regimes, even though 
the provinces that differ belong to the same model. 
Further, while PHIA Newfoundland does expressly pertain to EHRs, it presents a 
similarly flexible scheme to that in Ontario because Joe can place conditions on 
collection, use and disclosure of his personal health information. As PHIA Newfoundland 
is not yet truly specific to EHRs, it does not have EHR-specific options built into the act. 
iii) Limited Use: 
According to section 34 of PHIA Newfoundland, use of patients’ personal health 
information is limited to those purposes expressly permitted by the act. Section 34 does 
not explicitly refer to EHRs, though. Some of the permitted uses include the following: 
(a) …the purpose for which the information was collected or created and 
for all the functions reasonably necessary for carrying out that purpose … 
(c)  for planning or delivering health care programs or services provided or 
funded by the custodian, in whole or in part, allocating resources to those 
programs or services, evaluating or monitoring those programs or services 
or preventing fraud or an unauthorized receipt of services or benefits 
related to those programs or services; 
(d)  for the purpose of risk management or error management or for the 
purpose of activities to improve or maintain the quality of care or to 
improve or maintain the quality of related programs or services of the 
custodian[.] 
The uses prescribed in these sections are quite obviously similar to those described in the 
other jurisdictions examined thus far. Newfoundland and Labrador, therefore, does not 
differ from the other jurisdictions in the extent to which considerably discretion is 
afforded to custodians in terms of determining if a use is permissible, based on the 
wording of the section 34 subsections. 
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What this means for Joe: 
The permissible uses in section 34 demonstrate that Joe’s experience with the way 
in which his personal health information contained in his EHR will be used in 
Newfoundland and Labrador will not differ to any great extent from those provinces 
previously discussed. 
iv) Security Safeguards: 
Section 15 of PHIA Newfoundland addresses security of personal health records. 
This section is not EHR specific and does not mention any safeguards specific to 
electronic records. Section 15 provides that: 
15. (1) A custodian shall take steps that are reasonable in the 
circumstances to ensure that 
(a)  personal health information in its custody or control is protected 
against theft, loss and unauthorized access, use or disclosure; 
(b)  records containing personal health information in its custody or 
control are protected against unauthorized copying or modification; and 
(c)  records containing personal health information in its custody or 
control are retained, transferred and disposed of in a secure manner. 
Such safeguards are not unlike those prescribed in the other model 1 and 2 provinces. 
Even though some of the provinces examined thus far expressly mention EHRs in 
reference to security safeguards, none of the provinces express the specific mechanisms 
through which safeguards are implemented and achieved. So, in effect each province 
states all of its records will be protected without regard to the type of record at hand. 
Perhaps the only exceptions to these assertions include Quebec and New Brunswick, 
which provide some greater specificity pertaining to EHRs. However, it seems most 
provinces followed the decision to not prescribe certain security requirements as this is 
dictated by industry standards and changes as rapidly as the EHR technology itself. 
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As is true of Saskatchewan, a Frequently Asked Questions document relating to 
PHIA Newfoundland describes security safeguards that would pertain to EHRs with great 
specificity. The document indicates that technological safeguards include “passwords, 
firewalls and encryption, where appropriate and applicable.”441 The document further 
states that “[t]he PHIA [Newfoundland] policy development manual contains further 
information about information security under PHIA [Newfoundland].”442 Use of policy 
documents and guides, such as the Frequently Asked Questions document, is analyzed 
and discussed in greater depth below in the Saskatchewan discussion. 
What this means for Joe: 
As was previously discussed for Alberta, most provinces have not specified the 
specific security safeguards required because provinces follow industry standards. 
Newfoundland and Labrador has clearly chosen to follow this route as well, so Joe will 
likely not experience different safeguards pertaining to his EHR in Newfoundland. 
Safeguards, in some respects, are more likely to be dictated by the economic viability of 
each province, rather than legal standards. 
v) Patient Participation: 
Lastly, PHIA Newfoundland expressly provides patients the right to “[r]equest 
corrections…be made to one’s own personal health information”.443 Consequently, the 
                                                 
441 Supra note 437 at 33. 
442 Ibid at 34. 
443 Ibid at 17. 
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OECD individual participation principle is embraced in this newly enacted statute. 
Section 60 of PHIA Newfoundland provides that 
60. (1) Where a custodian has granted an individual access to a record of 
his or her personal health information and the individual believes that the 
record is inaccurate or incomplete, he or she may request that the 
custodian correct the information. 
(2) A request under subsection (1) may be made orally or in writing. 
Section 61 indicates that patients must receive a response to their request to correction 
within 30 days, as is also the case in Quebec, Saskatchewan, Alberta and Ontario, for 
instance. As is also prescribed in these other provinces, a correction will not be made if it 
pertains to professional opinion or an observation made by a custodian.444 
What this means for Joe: 
As in each of the other model 1 and 2 provinces, Joe will have the right to request 
corrections be made in his EHR. Consequently, Joe will not find there is a difference 
between the model 1 and 2 provinces in this respect. The time frame and mode of request 
for and response to correction requests may differ between the provinces, but the analysis 
thus far has shown that, overall, Joe’s experience will be similar between jurisdictions. 
However, at least in respect of Newfoundland and Labrador, Joe would experience this 
similarity regardless of whether he is dealing with his EHR or paper medical records. 
                                                 
444 PHIA Newfoundland, supra note 16, s 62 (1)(b)(ii). A correction may also be refused if it is “originally 
created by the custodian and the custodian does not have sufficient knowledge, expertise and authority to 
correct the record” or if the request was frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith. See sections 62(1)(b)(i) 
& (iii). 
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f) Saskatchewan: 
Saskatchewan is the final province that appropriately fits in model 2. In 
Saskatchewan, the Saskatchewan Health Information Network (SHIN) was introduced in 
the provincial government’s Throne Speech in 1998.445 At the time of its creation, SHIN 
was going to be responsible for Saskatchewan’s EHR. According to a Government of 
Saskatchewan News Release issued August 25, 1997: 
[e]lements of SHIN include[d] the development of individual electronic 
health records, the installation of technology linking health district 
professionals, and the implementation of software systems for ordering, 
recording and tracking health services.446 
Ultimately, the Saskatchewan Ministry of Health took responsibility for the EHR and 
introduced the Health Information Solutions Centre (HISC) to oversee EHR system 
development.447 Most recently, and as in Ontario, eHealth Saskatchewan was created and 
is a crown corporation that has taken on this task. Saskatchewan’s Information and 
Privacy Commissioner recently stated that “[i]t is not clear what the role will be for the 
recently announced eHealth Saskatchewan [and whether it will] be a trustee for purposes 
of HIPA”.448 Even though it may not be clear what will be eHealth Saskatchewan’s role, 
in Saskatchewan, the current EHR system being implemented consists of a “distributed 
network[,] which links information from a number of different domain repositories.”449 
                                                 
445 Dickson, supra note 2 at 4. 
446 Government of Saskatchewan, online: “Saskatchewan Health Information Network to Link Health 
Services”, online: Government of Saskatchewan <http://www.gov.sk.ca/news?newsId=59ca469a-ccd0-
4b7a-8c26-1041422f7784>. 
447 Dickson, supra note 2 at 9-10. 
448 Ibid. 
449 Ibid at 9. 
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In conjunction with SHIN’s introduction in 1998, the Saskatchewan government 
also announced its intention to introduce HIPA. The objective of HIPA is to permit 
personal health information sharing between trustees.450 This new act was and still is 
“focused on certain providers and organizations that are defined as ‘trustees’”451 and 
includes provisions that address patient consent and access. According to Gary Dickson,  
[w]hat is new, due to HIPA, is the privacy piece. This is a set of elements 
that speak to a degree of patient control and go significantly beyond the 
culture of confidentiality. Confidentiality speaks only to keeping the 
information safe once it is in the custody of the trustee.452 
Gary Dickson’s comment on confidentiality applies to each of the other provinces health-
specific personal data protection legislation as well. Personal data protection legislation 
adds another layer of requirements that lie on top of and interact with existing 
confidentiality requirements that must be observed by individuals dealing with patient 
information. Digitized health records have further complicated the layer of personal data 
protection requirements in health-specific personal data protection legislation. As such, 
this section discusses how Saskatchewan laws have dealt with the EHR phenomenon. 
An Overview of the Health Information Protection Act453 (the “HIPA guide”) 
indicates that “[t]he Act prevails over all other Acts and regulations in regard to personal 
health information held by trustees”.454 But, Saskatchewan courts have provided little 
                                                 
450 Ibid at 4. 
451 Ibid. 
452 Ibid at 13-14. 
453 (Regina, Sask: Policy and Planning Branch Saskatchewan Health, 2003) online: Government of 
Saskatchewan Queen’s Printer <http://www.qp.gov.sk.ca/documents/english/Statutes/Statutes/H0-021.pdf> 
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insight into how HIPA should be interpreted.455 One Court of Queen’s Bench decision456 
has dealt with section 4(4) of HIPA and its exclusion provision. According to 
Saskatchewan’s Information and Privacy Commissioner, Gary Dickson, “[t]here have 
been no judicial decisions…dealing with Saskatchewan’s developing EHRi.”457 Perhaps 
the Saskatchewan government intended the HIPA guide to be used as an interpretive tool. 
However, as will be demonstrated in the proceeding discussion, the HIPA guide often 
appears to operate in conjunction with HIPA because of the great degree to which HIPA 
is explained in the HIPA guide.  
It is not entirely clear how the Saskatchewan government intended the HIPA 
guide to operate, and whether it is simply to be used as explanatory notes by patients and 
health care providers, or whether it is meant to be used to guide judges’ and legal 
professionals’ interpretation of HIPA. Guideline use is becoming more prevalent.458 
However, guidelines “akin to dictation can also be a form of law-making, which, absent 
legislative authorization, is invalid or even unconstitutional”.459 The HIPA guide 
emanates from the Policy and Planning Branch of Saskatchewan Health. So, the HIPA 
                                                 
455 Dickson, supra note 2 at 8. 
456 Germain v Automobile Injury Appeal Commission, 2009 SKQB 106 (CanLII) as in Dickson, supra note 
2 at 8. A more recent search of CanLII reveals there are two additional cases decided after Germain that 
cite HIPA including RBG v PMS, 2009 SKQB 298 (CanLII) and R v Finley, 2011 SKPC 16 (CanLII). 
Finley merely references HIPA in one paragraph (71) of the decision, and does not interpret HIPA’s 
provisions. RBG is a family law decision in which the judge also only references HIPA once in the order.  
457 Dickson, supra note 2 at 8. 
458 At least within the administrative law context as is explained by David Stratas, “Agencies 
Administrative Guidelines: Legitimate Regulatory Tool or Threat to the Independence of Tribunal 
Decision-Making?” at 1, online: David Stratas <http://www.davidstratas.com/22.pdf>. While the comments 
from this article were written as applied to administrative law, the analysis is applicable in the personal data 
protection context as well because guides to acts are also known as “soft-law” and, in certain situations, are 
meant to aid decision-making. 
459 Ibid at 2. 
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guide is not created by an agency attempting to revoke “adjudicative independence”460, 
but instead a government office, which appears to be intending to supplement the act. The 
HIPA guide still has interesting legal character, though, because its contents could, 
theoretically, have been made part of HIPA, but were not. Notwithstanding any 
conclusions as to the HIPA guide’s legal character, its contents are analyzed and included 
in the following discussion of the act, as HIPA’s provisions often are not sufficiently 
specific to enable analysis of this study’s five criteria. 
The patient experience with Saskatchewan’s HIPA through the lens of the five 
criteria is discussed next. At first blush, it seems that each of the criteria derived from the 
OECD Guidelines will be addressed within HIPA because the guide to the act461 states 
HIPA is based on principles drawn from the Canadian Standards Association's Model 
Code for the Protection of Personal Information, which as previously discussed, was 
based upon the OECD Guidelines. As this is the final model 2 province, a brief summary 
of each of the provinces will be described following the Saskatchewan analysis. 
i) EHR Definition: 
An interesting feature of HIPA is that not only does it not define EHR, it also 
does not mention the word electronic at all. Instead, Saskatchewan refers to EHRs as 
“comprehensive health records” and explains that comprehensive health records are 
electronic in the HIPA guide.462 Despite that no mention is made of electronic records in 
the text of the act, the guide states HIPA “applies to personal health information in the 
                                                 
460 Ibid. 
461 Overview, supra note 453 at 5. 
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health system in any form, including traditional paper records and emerging electronic 
records such as in the Saskatchewan Health Information Network.”463 HIPA’s application 
to EHRs is, therefore, not evident on the face of the act. In this way, Saskatchewan’s 
HIPA appears similar to, but distinct from, model 3. HIPA is intended to address EHRs, 
but its application to EHRs is not expressly evident in the act. Consequently, on face 
value, Saskatchewan has health-specific personal data protection legislation, which does 
not address EHRs.  
Further reading about the act reveals, though, that the term “comprehensive health 
record” is meant to include EHRs, and could be akin to the “Quebec Health Record” as is 
used in the Quebec Conditions. Therefore, Saskatchewan most appropriately falls within 
model 2 because it addresses EHRs in health-specific personal data protection legislation. 
However, it could be argued that Saskatchewan ideally falls into its own category in 
terms of the way it has addressed EHRs in statute. 
 The HIPA guide states that the “comprehensive health record” definition is “[o]f 
particular importance”.464 In HIPA section 2 (c.1), “comprehensive health record” is 
defined as “a comprehensive health record described in subsection 18.1(2)”, where 
subsection 18.1(2) states that  
(2) A comprehensive health record with respect to an individual: 
(a) consists of records containing the individual’s personal health 
information that are provided by two or more trustees; 
(b) is created for the purposes of: 
(i) compiling a complete health history of the individual; and 
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(ii) providing access to that history to any trustee; and 
(c) is stored and controlled by the Saskatchewan Health Information 
Network or the prescribed person that created it. 
EHRs are not mentioned explicitly in this definition. Subsection 18.1(2)(c) seems to 
imply that some form of electronic document may be used for patient’s personal health 
information because it states that the Saskatchewan Health Information Network stores 
and controls comprehensive health records. Use of the term “network” implies that 
information is digitized but does not expressly indicate this to be true. In fact, the 
definition could also easily apply to paper, as well as electronic, records, as use of term 
Saskatchewan Health Information Network does not expressly exclude paper records. 
The guide to the act indicates that  
[i]t is not the intent that this definition apply to more operational electronic 
health records that are being created, for example, by regional health 
authorities, affiliates, and/or physicians within the regional health 
authority for the purpose of providing services to people seeking services 
with the health region.465 
The statement “more operational electronic health records” implies that comprehensive 
health records includes EHRs. However, for some reason, the Saskatchewan government 
chose to leave the definition open to interpretation, perhaps to accommodate any future 
changes to the technology or the way the technology is managed. Reference to the 
Saskatchewan Health Information Network definition in subsection 2(r) does not provide 
further insight, as it merely states that “‘Saskatchewan Health Information Network’ 
means the Saskatchewan Health Information Network established as a Crown corporation 
pursuant to The Crown Corporations Act, 1993.” This definition does not indicate 
whether this corporation is responsible for paper or electronic records. 
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However, the HIPA guide, rather than HIPA itself, goes on to state that the 
“Saskatchewan Health Information Network (SHIN) is an information management 
service provider.”466 This description again implies that SHIN deals with digitized 
records only and therefore comprehensive health records means EHRs. It is also the guide 
that states that “through the agreements a physician will retain the same degree of control 
over an electronic health record on SHIN as he or she has over paper records in a locked 
file cabinet in the office”.467 This quote again indicates that SHIN, at least primarily, 
deals with EHRs rather than paper records. 
Additional guidance regarding what may constitute an EHR in Saskatchewan can 
be found in other secondary sources. According to Saskatchewan’s Information and 
Privacy Commissioner, “[a]n EHR is an integrated health information system that 
provides authorized users a shared view of health information in a secure 
environment.”468 Dickson describes the EHR environment in Saskatchewan as the 
following: 
Registries or repositories from which information is accessed with an 
EHRi system normally includes provincial pharmacy, laboratory and 
diagnostic imaging clinical repositories, and patient and provider registries 
that contain registration information necessary to properly identify patients 
and providers to the system. Saskatchewan already has in place several 
domain repositories- the Pharmaceutical Information Program (PIP), the 
Diagnostic Imaging and Picture Archiving System (RIS-PAC S), Lab 
Results Repository (SLRR) (so far only in part of the province).469 
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While the secondary sources may be of use, none of the sources are legally binding, and 
instead, merely somewhat instructive. 
What this Means for Joe 
Patients like Joe will perhaps find the comprehensive health record 
definition, coupled with the definition of personal health information in HIPA, 
provide a fairly complete picture of what constitutes Joe’s EHR in Saskatchewan. 
The definition of comprehensive health record not only points to a definition of 
what is contained in the Saskatchewan health record, but also its purpose and the 
entity that manages and is responsible for the record. However, this definition is 
only truly helpful to Joe if it can somehow be determined that it in fact applies to 
EHR. 
Further, on the surface, use of the term “comprehensive health record” 
rather than “electronic health record” could be confusing to Joe, if they do in fact 
mean the same thing in practice. In actual fact, it may be that Saskatchewan’s 
version of the EHR is not any different than that in other provinces, but the 
provincial government made the decision to not call it an EHR in legislation to 
ensure that both paper and electronic records were covered by the act.  
Patients may perceive though that the rules pertaining to EHRs are less 
developed in Saskatchewan because EHRs are not expressly defined. Alternatively, 
it could be argued that the rules relating to EHRs are in fact more developed in 
Saskatchewan legislation because EHRs are more seamlessly integrated into the 
statutory scheme, such that little to no distinction is made between paper and 
electronic records and that the same rules apply to both.  
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Ultimately, though, a lack of specific rules applying to EHRs harkens back 
to the model 3 provinces, which simply address EHRs through existing legislation 
that applies to non-health paper records. 
ii) Consent to Collection: 
Presuming that HIPA does in fact apply to EHRs, even though they are not 
explicitly mentioned in the act as such, then individuals’ informed consent is required in 
order to use and disclose personal health information contained in their EHR, unless 
HIPA indicates that only deemed consent is required.470 Section 5 states: 
Consent required for use or disclosure 
5(1) Subject to subsection (2), an individual has the right to consent to the 
use or disclosure of personal health information about himself or herself. 
(2) A trustee shall use or disclose personal health information about an 
individual only: 
(a) with the consent of the subject individual; or 
(b) in accordance with a provision of this Act that authorizes the use or 
disclosure. 
Indeed, in Saskatchewan consent is deemed amongst those trustees sharing personal 
health information used for treatment and care.471  
In contrast, HIPA does not expressly indicate when consent is required for 
collection of personal health information to the comprehensive health record. Section 6 
provides: 
6(1) Where consent is required by this Act for the collection, use or 
disclosure of personal health information, the consent: 
(a) must relate to the purpose for which the information is required; 
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(b) must be informed; 
(c) must be given voluntarily; and 
(d) must not be obtained through misrepresentation, fraud or coercion. 
(2) A consent to the collection, use or disclosure of personal health 
information is 
informed if the individual who gives the consent is provided with the 
information that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would 
require in order to make 
a decision about the collection, use or disclosure of personal health 
information. 
(3) A consent may be given that is effective for a limited period. 
(4) Consent may be express or implied unless otherwise provided. 
(5) An express consent need not be in writing [emphasis added]. 
Section 6 contemplates that consent to collection may be required in particular 
circumstances, but not all circumstances. Indeed, 
[s]ection 6 of HIPA provides that, where consent is required for collection, 
use or disclosure of personal health information, it must relate to the 
purpose for which it was collected; be informed; be given voluntarily; and 
not be obtained through misrepresentation, fraud or deception.472  
 Further, section 7 of HIPA gives patients the right to revoke their consent to collection, 
which will take effect at any time but will not have retroactive effect. 
Curiously, Gary Dickson, Saskatchewan’s Information and Privacy 
Commissioner, recently stated that Saskatchewan has only recently changed its approach 
to consent as a result of health care provider convenience; in that implied, rather than 
express or deemed, consent is now used “in the initial domain repositories constructed for 
this province’s EHR[.]”473 Gary Dickson’s observation is interesting because it 
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demonstrates that what occurs in practice is not necessarily dictated by the confines of 
statute. In that HIPA still mentions deemed consent but practitioners are moving away 
from that type of consent. For instance section 27 of HIPA states that: 
27(1) A trustee shall not disclose personal health information in the 
custody or control of the trustee except with the consent of the subject 
individual or in accordance with this section, section 28 or section 29. 
(2) A subject individual is deemed to consent to the disclosure of personal 
health information 
However, Gary Dickson suggests that, in most circumstances, implied consent is the 
norm, as is provided in section 6 of HIPA. In either case, a careful reading of the act is 
required to understand which form of consent is legally required in respect of collection, 
use and disclosure. 
Regardless of the types of consent required and the way in which they may vary 
between Saskatchewan and the other provinces, HIPA’s consent provisions do not 
directly address concerns associated with EHRs. That being said, if it is presumed that 
comprehensive health records are the equivalent to EHRs, section 8 of HIPA does 
indicate that “[a]n individual has the right to prevent access to a comprehensive health 
record of that individual’s personal health information.” Further, section 8(2) provides 
that  
[i]n the case of a comprehensive health record created and controlled by 
the Saskatchewan Health Information Network, the subject individual may 
require that the record not be disclosed to trustees by giving a written 
direction, in the prescribed form, to the Saskatchewan Health Information 
Network. 
Arguably, section 8, therefore, does deal specifically with how a patient can control their 
digitized health information, albeit not necessarily specifically through consent to 
collection, but rather through disclosure. However, application of section 8 to EHRs is 
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not immediately evident because no specific mention is made of digitized records in this 
provision, unless it is assumed that comprehensive health record denotes an EHR. 
What this Means for Joe: 
Patients like Joe may experience that Saskatchewan’s “informed consent” differs 
from that used in another model 2 province, namely Ontario, because Ontario uses 
“knowledgeable consent”.474 In Saskatchewan, unlike Ontario, Joe must receive the 
information a reasonable person requires in the same circumstances to decide about 
whether this personal health information should be collected, used or disclosed; such 
information could include “details such as who has access to the information, for what 
purposes, what security measures are in place to protect the information and what the 
risks and benefits are of refusing or consenting to the collection, use or disclosure.”475 
Section 7 of HIPA affords patients rights similar to those in the other model 2 and 
1 provinces, wherein a lock box can be put on their information. In both cases, revoking 
consent to collection and preventing disclosure of information, enable the patient to 
control access to their most personal health details and, therefore, promote the patient’s 
autonomy. However, one could also argue that these two mechanisms are technically 
distinct from one another, and that these provinces have differing privacy requirements in 
standards. Ultimately, though, Joe may not experience a great disparity between these 
provinces in terms of that information which is available to the multitude of health care 
providers with whom he will interact.  
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iii) Limited Use: 
As is the case with the other model 1 and 2 provinces previously discussed, HIPA 
limits use of patients’ personal health information. However, HIPA does not expressly 
reference limits on use of EHRs, and instead appears to use a blanket provision that could 
apply to both paper and digitized records. In this way, HIPA is similar to Ontario and 
Alberta. HIPA’s limited use provisions include sections 23 and 26. Section 23 provides 
that “[a] trustee shall collect, use or disclose only the personal health information that is 
reasonably necessary for the purpose for which it is being collected, used or disclosed.” 
Section 26 also states that 
(1) A trustee shall not use personal health information in the custody or 
control of the trustee except with the consent of the subject individual or 
in accordance with this section. 
(2) A trustee may use personal health information: 
(a) for a purpose for which the information may be disclosed by the trustee 
pursuant to section 27, 28 or 29; 
(b) for the purposes of de-identifying the personal health information; 
(c) for a purpose that will primarily benefit the subject individual; or 
(d) for a prescribed purpose. 
What this Means for Joe: 
HIPA contains sections that require trustees to limit use of EHR personal health 
information. However, sections 23 and 26 provide trustees with a fair amount of 
discretion over the way use is limited. For instance, it may not be clear to a patient like 
Joe who travels to Saskatchewan how trustees determine what is “reasonably necessary”. 
Section 26(c) also affords trustees leeway. What will “primarily benefit” the patient is 
also not certain. Joe will not necessarily have confidence that use of personal health 
information contained in his EHR (or comprehensive health record) will be truly helpful 
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to him. Who decides what is primarily beneficial? How do trustees discern what is 
primarily beneficial and what is somewhat beneficial? What constitutes a benefit? 
That being said, Joe will likely find his experience between the provinces 
examined this far and the way their health care providers limit use does not change 
greatly. Each jurisdiction’s statute contains statutory provisions limiting use but giving 
health care providers discretion as to use. In other words, even though the specific uses 
may differ between provinces, each jurisdiction examined thus far has included statutory 
language that permits trustees or custodians to decide whether use is appropriate in 
particular situations. 
iv) Security Safeguards: 
Section 16 of HIPA imposes a duty upon trustees to create procedures and 
policies that ensure trustees comply with technical, administrative and physical security 
safeguards for personal health information. 476 Indeed, section16 states that 
Subject to the regulations, a trustee that has custody or control of personal 
health information must establish policies and procedures to maintain 
administrative, technical and physical safeguards that will: 
(a) protect the integrity, accuracy and confidentiality of the information; 
(b) protect against any reasonably anticipated; 
(i) threat or hazard to the security or integrity of the information; 
(ii) loss of the information; or 
(iii) unauthorized access to or use, disclosure or modification of the 
information; and 
(c) otherwise ensure compliance with this Act by its employees. 
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HIPA does not provide greater detail about the ways each of these requirements are met. 
However, the HIPA guide describes that there are many ways that trustees will ensure 
personal health information is protected, some of which clearly pertain to digitized 
records.477 However, most of these methods simply include HIPAs statutory 
requirements, such as limited use and consent to disclosure. 
The HIPA guide also explains that HIPA does not include specific security 
requirements because the technology changes so quickly and it is more practical to 
simply require trustees to be “reasonably up-to-date with security provisions for all types 
of information”.478 The HIPA guide does mention that an example of security safeguards 
include trustees ensuring computer systems meet or exceed industry standards for 
security and integrity.479 Further, Saskatchewan’s Information and Privacy Commissioner 
approved guidelines for protecting personal health information “as the standard for 
privacy and security protection by trustees in respect of section 16.73[.]”480 
What this Means for Joe: 
It seems that all of the model 1 and 2 provinces examined thus far require security 
safeguards of some type to protect personal health information contained in EHRs. It 
seems quite evident, though, that the actual means through which security and protection 
of personal health information is obtained is through a set of industry standards that are 
prescribed in legislation. Consequently, patients like Joe are less likely to experience a 
                                                 
477 Overview, supra note 453, at 28. 
478 Ibid at 11. 
479 Ibid. 
480 Information Governance, supra note 178 at 36. 
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significant disparity in the ways that his personal health information is safeguarded across 
Canadian jurisdictions because the actual safeguards used are not jurisdiction specific. 
Technical industry standards are quite likely Canada-wide rather than province-wide. 
v) Patient Participation: 
As has been described by Gary Dickson, “[o]ne of the most important features of 
HIPA is the right of a patient to request in writing access to their own personal health 
information from any particular trustee.”481 Section 13 of HIPA describes patients’ right 
of access and amendment: 
In accordance with Part V, an individual who is given access to a record 
that contains personal health information with respect to himself or herself 
is entitled: 
(a) to request amendment of the personal health information contained in 
the record if the person believes that there is an error or omission in it; or 
(b) if an amendment is requested but not made, to require that a notation to 
that effect be made in the record. 
Patients’ request to access their health record and trustees must respond to patients within 
30 calendar days.482 Trustees are permitted to refuse patient access in six situations,483 
although these situations are quite uncommon.484 Patients’ requests for correction must 
only pertain to factual errors and no amendments can be made to “differences of 
opinion”.485 
 
                                                 
481 Dickson, supra note 2 at 5 
482 HIPA, supra note 16, s 36(2). 
483 Ibid, s. 38(1)(a)-(f). 
484 Dickson, supra note 2 at 5. 
485 Ibid. 
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What this Means for Joe: 
Patients like Joe will not experience a great difference in the way they participate 
with their EHR between model 1 and 2 provinces. In particular, the timelines for response 
to access requests, as well as the types of amendments that can be requested are quite 
similar between jurisdictions. 
Perhaps one of Joe’s only striking experiential changes may be between the way 
British Columbia and Saskatchewan deal with patient participation. British Columbia’s 
E-Health Act does not yet permit patients the right to access and amend their EHR. Yet, 
the E-Health Act was designed specifically to accommodate the specific legal problems 
associated with EHRs. HIPA, though it does not explicitly state that it pertains to EHRs, 
it deals quite comprehensively with patient participation. Ultimately, though, Joe will not 
be precluded from specifically participating with his EHR in either province, unless 
British Columbia fails to adopt the access and amendment provisions the E-Health Act 
currently lacks and relies on FIPPA. 
One clear deficiency in HIPA with respect to access and amendment, which also 
applies to each of the other model 1 and 2 provinces previously examined herein, is that 
there is not a prescribed route to access the complete information contained in a patient’s 
EHR.486 
g) Summary of Patients’ Interactions with Model 2 
Table 2 below summarizes the patient interactions with model 2 provinces. As 
was the case with the model 1 provinces, patients will experience similar trends amongst 
                                                 
486 Ibid at 10. 
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the model 2 provinces. Ontario, Alberta and New Brunswick are the only provinces that 
define EHR in statute. However, secondary documents, such as the HIPA guide used in 
Saskatchewan, as well as the other statutory provisions contained in Newfoundland and 
Labrador and Manitoba’s statutes, will effectively make clear to the same extent what 
constitutes a patient’s health record is the same as in Alberta, Ontario and New 
Brunswick. This is the case because even the provinces in model 2 that actually define 
EHR do not do so with any great specificity, other than perhaps Alberta. Moreover, 
patients’ experiences with limited use, security safeguards and patient participation will 
also not differ to a great extent because (a) health care providers generally have a wide 
discretion for using personal health information despite limited use provisions, (b) 
security safeguards are general and do not directly address the problems associated with 
EHRs and (c) access and correction provisions contain almost identical requirements in 
each jurisdiction in model 2, as a general rule. 
Perhaps the only major difference amongst the model 2 jurisdictions is that 
Newfoundland and Labrador, Saskatchewan and Ontario require consent to collection in 
some situations, but not all, whereas the other jurisdictions do not require consent to 
collection of information for EHRs at all. Such a difference could result in a discrepancy 
in the patient experience between model 2 jurisdictions. 
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TABLE 2: OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE TREATMENT OF PERSONAL 
HEALTH INFORMATION IN EHRS IN MODEL 2 
Study 
Criteria: 
 
Models & 
their 
Jurisdictions: 
 
EHR 
Definition 
Consent to 
Collection487 
Limited Use Security 
Safeguards 
Patient 
Participation 
Model 2:      
ON Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
AB Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
NB Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
MB No No Yes Yes Yes 
NL No No Yes Yes Yes 
SK No No Yes Yes Yes 
 
4) MODEL 3 – NO HEALTH-SPECIFIC PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION OR 
EHR-RELATED LEGISLATION 
a) Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Yukon: 
Model 3 includes territories and provinces that do not have EHR- or health-
specific personal data protection legislation, but instead have general personal data 
protection legislation that applies to EHRs. Model 3 territories and provinces chose to 
enact legislation such as freedom of information and protection of privacy statutes to 
protect health information held by public bodies.488 The Northwest Territories, the 
Yukon, and Nunavut have enacted Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Acts 
                                                 
487 Consent to collection is not required in all situations in any of these provinces. 
488 Information Governance, supra note 178 at 26. 
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(“AIPPAs”).489 Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island have enacted Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Acts (“FIPPAs”).490 These enactments simply 
permit individuals’ to request access to information that is held by a jurisdiction’s public 
entities.  
Unlike the other model 3 jurisdictions, Nova Scotia appears to be in the process of 
enacting health-specific personal data protection legislation that may address EHRs. The 
Department of Health and Wellness is dealing with these issues and has developed the 
Personal Health Information Act491, which received royal assent in December 2010.492 
The act is not yet in force. The Department expects it will be proclaimed in the winter of 
2012-2013.493  
The Department of Health and Wellness explains that an important aspect of the 
new legislation is that it was developed with electronic health information as a primary 
concern and that current laws in Nova Scotia were premised on a paper record health 
system.494 Consequently, once the act is in force, it is arguable that Nova Scotia could fall 
under model 1 because it created legislation specific to EHRs. It could also be argued, 
though, that it simply has health-specific personal data protection legislation, which 
addresses EHRs, like the other model 2 provinces. In some respects, Newfoundland and 
                                                 
489 Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SNWT 1994, c 20 [AIPPA NWT]; Access to 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSY 2002, c 1 [AIPPA YK]; Access to Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act, SNWT (Nu) 1994, c 20 [AIPPA NU]. 
490 Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SNS 1993, c 5 [NS FIPPA]; Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSPEI 1988, c F-15.01 [PEI FIPPA]. 
491 SNS 2010, c 41 [NS PHIA]. 
492 Supra note 79. 
493 Ibid. 
494 Department of Health and Wellness, Personal Health Information Project, “Frequently Asked Questions: 
Personal Health Information Legislation for Nova Scotia” (Halifax: Department of Health and Wellness, 
March 2012) at 2, online: Nova Scotia Canada <http://www.gov.ns.ca/health/phia/PHIA_FAQ.pdf>. 
  
169 
Labrador, which quite recently enacted health-specific personal data protection 
legislation that addresses EHRs (PHIPAA), is similar to Nova Scotia’s PHIA, because 
both are primarily health-specific personal data protection legislation, but the acts both 
contain EHR-specific provisions.  
Apart from Nova Scotia, model 1 and 2 provinces have also enacted similar 
general personal data protection statutes. For instance, Newfoundland and Labrador has 
an Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act495, Saskatchewan, British 
Columbia, Alberta and Ontario have enacted Freedom of Information and Protection of 
Privacy Acts.496 In addition, Quebec enacted An Act Respecting Access to Documents 
Held by Public Bodies and the Protection of Personal Information497 “which applies to 
public bodies and health institutions.”498 So, in addition to the general personal data 
protection statutes, model 1 and 2 provinces have simply chosen to address either health 
information or EHRs specifically in separate pieces of legislation.  In those provinces that 
have acts such as Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Acts that may 
operate in addition to, instead of or be trumped by EHR and health-specific personal data 
protection legislation depending upon the way in which general personal data protection 
statutes are treated in the health or EHR-specific legislation. This study does not examine 
in detail the way that each of the general personal data protection statutes operates in 
provinces that also have EHR- or health-specific personal data protection legislation as 
                                                 
495 SNL 2002, c A-1.1. 
496 Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SS 1990-91, c F-22.01; BC FIPPA, supra note 
23; Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSA 2000, c F-25; Freedom of Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act, RSO 1990, c F.31. 
497 RSQ, c A-2.1. 
498 Information Governance, supra note 178 at 26. 
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well. Instead, the focus in this paper is to determine to what extent each model and the 
jurisdictions in each model addresses EHRs, in particular, to assess how a patient’s 
experience may differ and whether this necessitates immediate or eventual 
harmonization, as has been espoused by scholars to date. 
The following discussion of the model 3 provinces and territories simultaneously 
deals with each of the model 3 jurisdictions when assessing the five criteria used to 
examine the patient experience in this study. In this model, the provinces and territories 
are grouped together under each criterion because the legislative enactments of most of 
the territories and provinces in model 3 are similar, if not identical, and the specificity 
with which the model 3 jurisdictions deal with EHRs is not great enough to warrant a 
separate examination of each jurisdiction. In addition, each of the proposed provisions in 
Nova Scotia’s Personal Health information Act will not be examined in complete detail, 
as this bill is not yet in force, so it does not reflect the current patient experience in Nova 
Scotia. Some reference will be made to the Nova Scotia’s Personal Health Information 
Act for interest’s sake. 
i) EHR Definition: 
None of the model 3 jurisdictions’ statutes define EHR, as none of the statutes in 
these jurisdictions are EHR or even health-specific. Both of Prince Edward Island and 
Nova Scotia’s FIPPAs define personal information in section 1 and the definition 
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explicitly references health information499, but not EHRs. Each of the territories AIPPA’s 
have “personal information” definitions that explicitly reference health information.500  
Of the three territories and Prince Edward Island, the Yukon is perhaps the most 
geared towards the EHR because its AIPPA’s definition of record in section 3 includes 
“electronic”. The Northwest Territories, on the other hand, fails to mention the word 
“electronic” in its AIPPA but “health information” is explicitly mentioned in the 
definition of “personal information”501 and provisions regarding how access to 
information will be provided.502  
The term “electronic health record” is used twice in Nova Scotia’s Bill 89503 but 
there is no definition of EHR in the proposed statute.504 However, no other definitions 
provide any specificity with respect to electronic or health information. 
What this means for Joe: 
Even though EHR is not defined in model 3 jurisdictions’ legislation, Joe’s EHR 
would still be covered by these jurisdictions’ general personal data protection statutes. 
There would still be privacy protections for Joe’s personal health information in these 
jurisdictions but Joe would be unsure as to what is considered an EHR in these 
jurisdictions. As has been previously discussed, though, some of the current EHR 
                                                 
499 For instance, NS FIPPA, supra note 489 states that personal information includes an individual’s health-
care history. See NS FIPPA, supra note 489 s 3(1)(i)(vi) and PEI FIPPA, supra note 489, s 1(i)(vi). 
500 See AIPPA NWT, supra note 488, s 2; AIPPA YK, supra note 488, s 3; AIPPA NU, supra note 488, s 
2. 
501 AIPPA NWT, supra note 488, s 2. 
502 AIPPA NWT, supra note 488, s 10(4). 
503 Bill 89, Personal Health Information Act An Act Respecting the Collection, Use, Disclosure and 
Retention of Personal Health Information, 2nd Sess, 61st Leg, Nova Scotia, 2010. 
504 For example, see NS PHIA, supra note 490, s 31(o). 
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definitions in model 1 and 2 jurisdictions are vague enough that Joe would not know 
what constitutes and is contained in his EHR. Joe may simply be content to know that 
whatever type of record he has, in any form, it is covered by privacy protections.  
Joe may feel that protections afforded his EHR should differ from those afforded 
to other types of records. Consequently, the next sections of this paper examine to what 
extent model 3 jurisdictions deal with the remaining four criteria in general data 
protection statutes to know in what ways non-EHR specific statutes may be deficient in 
protecting personal health information. 
ii) Consent to Collection & Limited Use: 
Prince Edward Island’s and Nova Scotia’s FIPPAs and the Northwest Territories, 
the Yukon and Nunavut’s AIPPAs require consent in the context of use and disclosure of 
personal information, but do not directly address consent in the context of collection, and 
certainly not specifically in respect of EHRs. 
Similar to consent to collection, Prince Edward Island’s and Nova Scotia’s 
FIPPAs and the Northwest Territories, the Yukon and Nunavut’s AIPPAs limit use of 
personal information, but do not directly address limited use in the context of collection, 
and certainly not specifically in respect of EHRs. 
What this means for Joe: 
Like some of the other model 1 and 2 provinces, consent to collection and limited 
use are not addressed directly within model 3 jurisdiction’s legislation. Patients like Joe 
will perhaps experience the greatest difference between model 3 and other models’ 
jurisdictions in respect of consent to collection and limited use because there are no 
provisions in model 3 jurisdictions’ legislation requiring, for example, lock boxes for 
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personal health information contained in EHRs. Consequently, there are certain 
protections built into the model 1 and 2 jurisdictions’ legislation that simply do not exist 
in model 3 jurisdictions that will make patients like Joe feel more confident about the 
way their digitized personal health information is dealt. 
iii) Security Safeguards: 
Each of the model 3 jurisdictions require some type of security safeguard for 
personal information covered by their general personal data protection acts.505 For 
instance, Nova Scotia’s FIPPA states in section 24(3) that “[t]he head of the public body 
shall protect personal information by making reasonable security arrangements against 
such risks as unauthorized access, collection, use, disclosure or disposal.” In almost 
identical language, Prince Edward Island’s FIPPA also requires personal information be 
protected in section 35: “[t]he head of a public body shall protect personal information by 
making reasonable security arrangements against such risks as unauthorized access, 
collection, use, disclosure, disposal or destruction.” 
What this means for Joe: 
Joe can be sure that in each of the model 3 jurisdictions, statutes require that the 
personal health information he provides as part of his EHR will be protected under 
general personal data protection legislation. Patients like Joe may be uncertain as to 
whether adequate protections are being put in place to ensure electronic information is 
properly secured. However, most of the other model 1 and 2 jurisdictions also do not 
specify what is done to protect digitized health information, merely that it is required that 
                                                 
505 See also NWT AIPPA, supra note 488, s 42; NU AIPPA, supra note 488, s 42; YK AIPPA, supra note 
488, s 33. 
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it receive protections. It has previously been discussed that industry standards guide what 
protections are put in place, so legislation stays non-specific. Consequently, patients like 
Joe may rightly feel there may not be a great difference between the protections used in 
each of the models jurisdictions, regardless of what is stated in respect of EHRs in the 
model 1 and 2 jurisdictions. 
iv) Patient Participation: 
Prince Edward Island’s and Nova Scotia’s FIPPAs and the Northwest Territories, 
the Yukon and Nunavut’s AIPPAs each afford individuals the right to correct information 
held by public entities and receive a response to such a request in 30 days.506 One of the 
model 3 jurisdictions, Prince Edward Island, also gives public bodies the right to refuse 
corrections if the information constitutes “a professional or expert opinion”, which is a 
similar requirement to that imposed by some of the model 2 jurisdictions.507 
What this means for Joe: 
At least at face value, the right to request corrections contained in general 
personal data protection differs very little from that same right in health-specific and 
EHR-specific personal data protection legislation. Therefore, patients like Joe will most 
likely have quite similar experiences between each of the Canadian jurisdictions in 
respect of correcting their health information. Perhaps the only difference may be that 
model 3 provinces do not appear to require the request to be in writing, whereas a number 
of the model 2 provinces have such a requirement. 
                                                 
506 Nova Scotia does not have the 30 day response requirement. See NS FIPPA, supra note 489, s 25. 
507 See for example PEI FIPPA, supra note 489, s 34(1.1). 
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b) Summary of Patients’ Interactions with Model 3 
As the discussion of model 3 jurisdictions is considerably shorter than those of the 
model 1 and 2 provinces, it is not necessary to reiterate the general patient experience 
trends amongst the model 3 provinces. Suffice it to say, however, the patient experience 
between each of these jurisdictions will be quite similar as many of the statutory 
provisions are almost virtually identical between jurisdictions. Even though the sections 
do not directly pertain to EHRs a similar patient experience will likely result. 
 
TABLE 3: OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE TREATMENT OF PERSONAL 
HEALTH INFORMATION IN EHRS IN MODEL 3 
Study 
Criteria: 
 
Models & 
their 
Jurisdictions: 
 
EHR 
Definition 
Consent to 
Collection 
Limited Use Security 
Safeguards 
Patient 
Participation 
Model 3:      
NS No No Yes Yes Yes 
PEI No No Yes Yes Yes 
NU No No Yes Yes Yes 
YK No No Yes Yes Yes 
NWT No No Yes Yes Yes 
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CHAPTER 5: WHAT THE PATIENT EXPERIENCE TELLS US ABOUT 
LEGISLATIVE HARMONIZATION & CONCLUSION  
1) THE MODELS, PATIENTS AND HARMONIZATION 
In recent years, scholars have frequently asserted that harmonization of personal 
data protection laws pertaining to EHRs would “facilitate an interoperable EHR”.508 The 
goal of this study was to test scholars’ assertion that harmonization is required against the 
way a patient would currently experience personal data protection in each Canadian 
jurisdiction if required to interact with the health care system and provide information to 
each jurisdictions’ EHR.509 Five criteria were used to assess the patient experience with 
each jurisdiction’s legislation, four of which were based upon the OECD Guidelines. The 
four based on the OECD Guidelines concern 1) consent to collection, 2) use limitation, 3) 
security safeguards and 4) patient participation. The fifth criterion is whether EHR is 
defined in the legislation and, if so, how. 
First and foremost, this study established that the personal data protection 
legislation about EHRs can be categorized into three models. Next, the study established 
into which of the three models each of the provinces and territories falls.510 Two of the 
provinces, British Columbia and Quebec, have enacted separate EHR-specific personal 
data protection legislation and comprise those whose legislation falls within model 1. Six 
provinces, including Ontario, Alberta, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, Newfoundland 
                                                 
508 Information Governance, supra note 178 at 33. 
509 As was previously discussed in Chapter 3, this study drew the assumption that each jurisdiction’s EHR 
system is fully operational and intended to be integrated with other jurisdictions EHRs as is predicted and 
described in the literature. 
510 See Figure 1. 
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and Labrador and Manitoba, amended existing health-specific personal data protection 
statutes to deal with the specific issues associated with EHRs and, therefore, comprise 
those whose legislation falls within model 2. Two provinces, Prince Edward Island and 
Nova Scotia, and each of the territories, the Yukon, the Northwest Territories and 
Nunavut, have not enacted any EHR- or health-specific personal data protection 
legislation, but instead simply have general data protection legislation, and these 
provinces and territories populate model 3.  
However, despite these three different approaches, the important findings from 
this paper show that statutory harmonization may not be as imperative to the delivery of 
health care as originally espoused by academics. As particularly evident in Table 4, 
despite the three distinct legislative approaches to addressing EHRs, when impact on 
patient experience is examined on a number of measures, there are not as many 
differences across models in the care experience. Indeed, what differences exist are not 
aligned with differences between the legislative models but with individual policy 
choices by provincial and territorial governments. 
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TABLE 4: OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE TREATMENT OF PERSONAL 
HEALTH INFORMATION IN EHRS IN EACH JURISDICTION BASED ON 
CRITERIA EVALUATED IN THIS STUDY 
 
Study 
Criteria: 
 
Models & 
their 
Jurisdictions: 
 
EHR 
Definition 
Consent to 
Collection511 
Limited Use512 Security 
Safeguards513 
Patient 
Participation 
Model 1:      
BC No No Yes Yes Yes514 
QC No No Yes Yes Yes 
Model 2:      
ON Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
AB Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
NB Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
MB No No Yes Yes Yes 
NL No No Yes Yes Yes 
SK No No Yes Yes Yes 
Model 3:      
NS No No Yes Yes Yes 
PEI No No Yes Yes Yes 
NU No No Yes Yes Yes 
YK No No Yes Yes Yes 
NWT No No Yes Yes Yes 
 
First, as shown in Table 4, the foregoing analysis shows that a patient’s 
experience with legislative security safeguards in place in each jurisdiction should not 
                                                 
511 Consent to collection in all situations is not required in any of these jurisdictions. 
512 Only Model 1 provinces, British Columbia and Quebec, address limited use directly in the EHR context.  
Each of the other Canadian jurisdictions addresses limited use of either personal health information (in 
Model 2 provinces) or personal information (in Model 3 provinces). 
513 Only general security safeguards are described in British Columbia’s FIPPA, as is the case with each of 
the other Model 2 and Model 3 jurisdictions. There are no security safeguards described in the E-Health 
Act. Quebec’s Conditions describe security safeguards specifically related to EHRs. 
514 Patient participation is addressed in British Columbia’s FIPPA rather than in the E-Health Act (at least 
until s. 17 of the E-Health Act is declared in force, which was not yet true at the time of writing). 
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differ to any great extent across Canada. Even provinces that contain EHR-specific 
provisions or have EHR-specific statutes do not specifically address those technical 
safety concerns raised by EHRs. The Saskatchewan government explained this was the 
case because technology industry standards, rather than statutory provisions, must dictate 
what protections are put in place. In either case, it seems harmonization of these 
provisions is not truly necessary.515 
Second, Table 4 reveals that every Canadian jurisdiction contained a statutory 
provision that limited the use by health care providers of personal health information, 
even if the provision was not EHR-specific. However, further harmonization of these 
provisions does not appear to be imperative because the statutes afforded health care 
providers a wide purview of discretion over when the use limitation is not applicable to 
their needs. Indeed, when the provisions were specific to personal health information, a 
choice to provide health care providers with discretion respecting limiting use shows that 
provincial and territorial governments do not wish to impede system-wide health care 
delivery, but rather enhance its efficiency and comprehensive nature, thus, limiting 
individual ability to create inefficiencies by withholding personal health information. 
Last, it is evident in Table 4 that each of Canada’s jurisdictions permits patients to 
access their records and request corrections be made to their personal health information, 
whether or not it is contained in an EHR. In fact, some of the time limits and other 
statutory requirements appeared already harmonized across Canada because they were 
identical in most jurisdictions and across the models as well. One of the only differences 
within a model is that only two of the model 2 provinces, New Brunswick and Manitoba, 
                                                 
515 Overview, supra note 452 at 11. 
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indicate in their health-specific personal data protection legislation that patients can 
request corrections be made to their personal health information contained in their EHR 
and appear to permit corrections to be made to opinion-based comments in patients’ 
medical records. Ontario, Alberta, Newfoundland and Labrador and Saskatchewan, on 
the other hand, do not allow patients to request corrections to be made to opinion-based 
comments. One of the model 3 jurisdictions, namely Prince Edward Island, also does not 
allow opinion-based corrections. With respect to the model 1 provinces, Quebec’s 
Conditions and British Columbia’s E-Health Act and FIPPA are silent on whether 
opinion-based corrections are or are not permitted.  
Despite the fact that there are differences between models over whether 
corrections can be made to opinion-based comments, all Canadian jurisdictions that have 
a time limit pertaining to response to corrections indicate that patients must receive a 
response in 30 days. Nonetheless, despite these minor differences between individual 
provinces even within models, analytically, one can conclude that each of the models and 
jurisdictions is consistent with the others because at least one statute in each jurisdiction 
permits access as well as a right to request corrections.  
In summary, on the whole, patients like Joe, who travel between several Canadian 
jurisdictions and receive care in those different jurisdictions, will experience some 
differences between certain specific jurisdictions, but no notable differences between the 
models themselves. With respect to security safeguards, use limitations and patients’ 
ability to request corrections, practically speaking, it appears from this study that patients 
will experience a uniformity across Canada, because each Canadian jurisdiction requires 
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security safeguards, limits use and allows patients to access their records and request 
corrections be made to the personal health information contained in their EHRs. 
This study examined each Canadian jurisdictions’ legislation to determine what 
the patient experience would be. Let us recap the fictional patient scenario and Joe’s 
travels to discuss Joe’s expected experience as he travels across Canada. Applying the 
jurisdictional analysis to Joe’s travels further emphasizes the finding in this study that 
harmonization is not as important as it is currently discussed to be in the literature. To 
prevent redundancy, since Joe’s experiences have been discussed in detail earlier in this 
paper, the following section will review his experiences generally and comment upon 
trends. 
Joe516 lives in a small town located on the provincial border between Alberta and 
Saskatchewan. So, he frequently receives health care in both provinces, as urban centres 
containing health care providers are located approximately equal distances from his 
home. Each time he visits a healthcare professional in each of these provinces, that 
professional accesses and updates Joe’s EHR. Joe developed a rare form of cancer 
requiring treatment before it progresses further.  Joe chooses to pursue the treatment that 
is only available in British Columbia. Joe’s British Columbia physician updates Joe’s 
EHR so healthcare professionals who care for Joe in Alberta and Saskatchewan can 
access his most up to date cancer treatment information. Joe also attends his daughter’s 
wedding in Prince Edward Island. While there, Joe trips and attends at an emergency 
room to be sure he did not break bones during his fall. His emergency room physician 
pulls up Joe’s EHR to ensure that he has a full medical history and medication list to 
properly treat Joe.  
 
While at home, no matter whether Joe is in Alberta or Saskatchewan, Joe will 
have a similar sense of what constitutes his EHR because although only Alberta directly 
defines it, Saskatchewan makes clear what comprises an EHR through a combination of 
the statutory definition of comprehensive health record and the HIPA guide. In most 
cases in Alberta, consent to collection is not the way that Joe will control his personal 
                                                 
516 Again, Joe is a fictional individual. 
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health information, as collection can occur without patient consent. Similarly, in 
Saskatchewan, consent to collection appears to be required in certain but not all 
situations. Further, use by health care providers of this personal health information is 
limited in some ways in both Alberta and Saskatchewan, although some prescribed uses 
are permitted. So, in both provinces, use will often come down to individual discretion of 
health care providers in some cases. Both these model 2 provinces also discuss security 
safeguards for records containing personal health information, although Alberta’s 
provision addresses EHRs directly, and both provinces permit Joe to request corrections 
be made to his EHR. 
Upon travelling to British Columbia, Joe may be unclear about whether his EHR 
is governed by the E-Health Act, as it must be contained within an HIB for that to be the 
case. So, interestingly, Joe will be less clear about what constitutes an EHR in British 
Columbia, which is an EHR-specific model 1 jurisdiction, than he is at home travelling 
between model 2 jurisdictions that simply amended their legislation to address EHRs. 
However, consent to collection under British Columbia’s E-Health Act appears similar to 
the cases in Alberta and Saskatchewan, because consent to collection is not expressly 
mentioned in respect of EHRs. The use limitation on health care providers regarding 
personal health information contained in HIBs in British Columbia is similar to those in 
Alberta and Saskatchewan because the British Columbia E-Health Act requires that use is 
limited subject to certain purposes, which again affords health care providers discretion. 
Security safeguards are not prescribed in the British Columbia E-Health Act, so Joe may 
not be as confident about the safety of his personal health information contained in his 
EHR when he is receiving care in British Columbia. However, British Columbia’s FIPPA 
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has been said to apply where there is silence in the E-Health Act, and FIPPA does offer 
security protections, although not those which are EHR-specific. In terms of patient 
participation, the British Columbia E-Health Act does not yet afford Joe the right to 
request corrections or access his record, but does offer disclosure directives, as discussed 
earlier in this paper. Comparing British Columbia with Alberta and Saskatchewan, Joe 
will actually find the British Columbia E-Health Act less in line with the five criteria 
examined in this study than the legislation in his home jurisdictions, Alberta and 
Saskatchewan, even though British Columbia is the jurisdiction, of the three, that has 
enacted EHR-specific legislation. Ultimately, though, the continued operation of British 
Columbia’s FIPPA may mean that Joe’s experience in British Columbia does not differ 
as much from his experiences in the other provinces as one would have expected from 
examining British Columbia’s E-Health Act. 
Because British Columbia’s FIPPA applies to protection of personal health 
information contained in EHRs when the E-Health Act does not, Joe’s experience in 
British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan will not differ greatly from his experience 
in Prince Edward Island. As a model 3 jurisdiction, without specific legislation dealing 
with health, let alone EHRs, the concept of an EHR is not defined in PEI. As in the other 
provinces Joe to which travelled, consent to collection is not directly addressed, use by 
health care providers is limited but only to a certain extent, safeguards are required but 
they are not technology specific and access by Joe to his records is permitted and requests 
by Joe to make corrections to his record are permitted.  
Ultimately, it seems Joe will really not be drastically disadvantaged in any of the 
provinces to which he travels, under any one of the three models, although he will 
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encounter some idiosyncrasies in the legislation of given jurisdictions, particularly in 
British Columbia. Perhaps the main difference Joe will experience between any one 
jurisdiction and the others, which is also the most unique requirement pertaining to 
EHRs, is Joe’s right to disclosure directives contained in British Columbia’s E-Health 
Act. Such directives appear to afford patients a certain level of autonomy by promoting 
decision-making and enhanced participation in health care. However, even disclosure 
directives can be overruled by health care providers, in favour of promoting efficiency or 
in the event of emergency, and so the patient experience, without an effective directive 
will not differ between British Columbia and the other jurisdictions. 
Nevertheless, it is certainly the case that the legislation currently in place in most 
of the jurisdictions is quite general and does not address specific EHR-related concerns. 
This is the case even in jurisdictions where an act has been created or amended as a result 
of EHRs’ arrival.517 Nonetheless, the gaps and generalities do not appear to have the 
result that any jurisdiction is entirely deficient in offering Joe an experience consistent 
with experiences in other jurisdictions, if Joe is forced to travel between jurisdictions. So, 
while harmonization may be a laudable goal that would necessarily promote consistency 
across Canada, Joe’s experience with each of the jurisdictions examined demonstrates 
that harmonization is not nearly as important as currently espoused by its proponents 
because there is already a great deal of consistency in terms of the patient experience 
between jurisdictions. True harmonization of the legislation is not required. 
                                                 
517 For example, British Columbia’s E-Health Act does not specifically address security safeguards and 
patient participation. Ontario’s PHIPA contains some EHR-related provisions but those provisions directly 
pertaining to limited use and patient participation for example are general and not particular to EHRs, even 
though provisions in the regulation were amended to address EHRs in other respects. 
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2) CONTRIBUTION 
This study contributes to current literature on EHRs in Canada because it is 
current, patient-centred and truly national in scope. 
The research presented in this thesis is unique because it is pan-Canadian. One 
author, Gordon, previously categorized relevant legislation but, due to the scope of her 
research, did not mention all of the provinces and territories. Gordon grouped provincial 
approaches to legislating on EHRs in her discussion about reform of Ontario’s EHR-
related laws. Gordon’s thesis did not delve into territorial or Quebec laws. Further, 
Gordon’s categorization of EHR regulation arises out of an entirely different 
phenomenon (Ontario legislative reform) than is dealt with in this thesis (harmonization). 
Consequently, Gordon’s thesis did not present a national survey of Canadian legislation. 
Moreover, the PIPEDA Report, which did canvas all Canadian jurisdictions, including 
Quebec and the territories, is not up-to-date. Therefore, this study fills this gap in the 
current literature. 
This study is also unique because it is patient-centred, though not empirical in that 
sense. Only a few authors have addressed the patient experience to any degree. Most 
authors generally and simply state that digitization threatens protection of personal health 
information contained within medical records. For instance, Gordon’s analysis does not 
cover how the patient experience will differ across Canada as a result of trans-
jurisdictional flows of personal health information in EHRs. Scott also describes the 
effect of the E-Health Act on the patient in addition to discussing its effect on 
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institutions.518 However, only British Columbia is the focus of Scott’s article, and she 
does not present a national perspective of the patient experience. 
One issue this study did not explore was the university research context in which 
EHRs will be present. This study was premised upon the fictional patient receiving active 
treatment and not receiving care or treatment as part of a research study or any other 
study. However, the patient experience with health care in Canada cannot be fully 
explored if the research context is ignored. Personal health information contained in 
EHRs may also be implicated in the research context as it is often the case that patients 
interacting with EHRs may also be undergoing experimental treatment as part of a 
university research study. It would be useful to compare the way in which jurisdictions 
deal with personal data protection related to EHRs as identified in this study and in 
contexts where the treatment is part of a research context. A future study could build on 
and update both this study and the work performed by Perry and Wilkinson.519 
3) CONCLUSION 
The issues discussed in this thesis are important because maintaining the public’s 
trust is a “critical” goal “in the health sector.”520 This trust is critical because of the value 
placed upon personal health information by many members of society. Again, using Joe 
as an example, Joe probably values the personal health information he provides to his 
                                                 
518 Scott, supra note 26 at 75. 
519 Mark Perry & Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “The Creation of University Intellectual Property: Confidential 
Information, Data Protection, and Research Ethics” (2010) 26 CIPR 93. Perry and Wilkinson conducted a 
study wherein it was determined whether and how provincial personal data protection legislation regulated 
personal information collected during the course of university research, in the medical context and 
otherwise. They did not focus on the EHR context. 
520 Pan-Canadian Framework, supra note 131 at 1.  
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health care providers and which is contained in his521 EHR because it is about him and 
comprises the most intimate details about his life. Joe’s health care providers value the 
information contained within Joe’s EHR because it comprises Joe’s comprehensive 
medical history of which they can avail themselves to ensure they have the most 
complete knowledge about Joe’s health. Such enhanced knowledge is valuable to health 
workers because it means they are able to provide the most appropriate health 
information to Joe and treat him properly. This allows Joe’s health care providers to 
maintain their reputations as health care providers, to avoid harming Joe, and to avoid 
liability. 
The differing value placed upon personal health information by different 
stakeholders requires legislators and policy makers to resolve issues that threaten to erode 
trust. In addition to good legislation, “[n]o matter how much care and attention is devoted 
to the technology behind the EHR…it will never be enough if the policies, procedures, 
practices, and training needed for its proper and secure operation are neglected”.522 
Scholars have previously asserted that current laws and policies relating to EHRs are 
deficient, and have been neglected, because, in their views, Canadian patients are not 
well-served by the current “piecemeal” legislative scheme pertaining to EHRs. Indeed, a 
“piecemeal” approach to personal health information protection, it is asserted, could 
diminish patients’ trust in the health care system if protections are not adequate and are 
inconsistent. In the absence of harmonization, it has been suggested that “perhaps, 
                                                 
521 By stating it is his EHR, I am not implying that Joe has ownership over his EHR. Ownership over EHRs 
is a subject of debate in most provinces and territories, other than Quebec. I am simply indicating that the 
EHR contains Joe’s personal health information. 
522 Privacy Security Requirements, supra note 116 at 11. 
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healthcare organizations involved in data transfers may wish to consider adopting the 
highest standard in place in order to facilitate such transfers and ensure compliance in all 
jurisdictions.”523 Indeed, this approach has been used already within the European Union, 
which stipulates the conditions under which data transfers could take place between EU 
and non-EU states.524 
With all of this in mind, this study has shown that it is important to critically 
assess what is currently in place in Canadian jurisdictions to ensure we are not 
overstating problems associated with the protection of personal health information 
contained in EHRs. This study has established that Canadian jurisdictions use one of 
three separate modes of incorporating EHR-specific rules into legislation; however, the 
outcome of this variation in approach is not entirely disparate, in terms of (a) the way that 
EHRs are defined, and (b) the ways in which (i) consent to collection, (ii) limited use, 
(iii) security safeguards and (iv) patient participation are addressed. Patients like Joe can 
be assured they will not experience widely differing legal environments that regulate the 
ways in which the personal health information in their EHR is governed as they move 
throughout Canada. 
This study is not intended to diminish the importance of examining data 
protection issues and problems arising as a result of EHR use. Certainly, privacy breaches 
are a real and significant phenomenon, and can seriously affect all of those involved. 
However, the aim of this study was to perform an up-to-date, high-level comparison of 
Canadian jurisdictions’ EHR related statutes to tackle fears that legislation in the different 
                                                 
523 Information Governance, supra note 178 at 33. 
524 Ibid. 
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jurisdictions that make up the Canadian federation is leading unsuspecting patients down 
widely differing personal data protection-paths. The results of this study should assuage 
those fears. 
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